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This thesis contributes to two research streams of the literature regarding marketing
cooperatives, namely, social capital and product diversification. First, the thesis examines
the nature of a marketing cooperative by considering both its economic and social attribu -
tes. Several formal models are formulated to address the interaction between cooperative
governance structure and the different dimensions of cooperative social capital. The coope -
ra tive’s social and economic attributes are viewed as the equilibrium outcome of this
interaction, while the social context of the cooperative community affects the equilibrium
that the cooperative will choose. Second, the governance structure of cooperatives has an
impact on the product diversification. An agent-based simulation shows that the single
origin constraint of a cooperative creates a centralization effect in its product portfolio
evolution, resulting in a lower diversification level and a larger output of the cooperative.
Empirical evidence from the Netherlands shows that cooperatives are less diversified than
publicly listed firms in 2001. However, the diversification level of cooperatives is compar -
able to that of publicly listed firms in 2012. It is concluded that, by making a change in the
governance model in response to changes in the competitive environment, cooperatives
may actually behave not differently from other types of enterprises in terms of product
diversification.
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1. Introduction
Cooperatives play an important role in the world economy. According to the 
International Co-operative Alliance website (ICA, 2014), ‘the United Nations 
estimated in 1994 that the livelihood of nearly 3 billion people, or half of the world’s
population, was made secure by cooperative enterprises’. Nowadays, cooperative
enterprises worldwide provide 250 million jobs and the largest 300 cooperatives 
generate a turnover of more than 2.2 trillion USD in 2014 (ICA, 2014). Cooperatives 
are also an important governance structure in the agricultural sector. For instance, as 
of 2007, cooperatives occupy 95% of the dairy market in New Zealand (ICA, 2014).
‘The average market share of all agricultural marketing cooperatives in the EU is 40%’
(Bijman et al., 2012:29). In Japan, 91% of farmers are registered as cooperative 
members in 2007 (ICA, 2014), and in China, more than 25% of agricultural
households have joined cooperatives by the end of 2013 (MoA, 2014). Cooperatives 
will continue to contribute in the economic and social development of many countries.
The research in this dissertation focuses on marketing cooperatives. 1 According to 
Feng and Hendrikse (2012:242), ‘a cooperative is an enterprise collectively owned by 
many independent farmers as input suppliers in a production chain’. The main 
activities of marketing cooperatives include ‘bargain for better prices, handle, process 
or manufacture, and sell farm products’ (Ortmann and King, 2007:43). Marketing 
cooperatives advance the interests of members by bringing the following benefits: 
economies of size, elimination of double marginalisation, profits from processing, 
assurance of product outlet, gains from vertical and horizontal coordination, risk 
reduction, countervailing power, competitive yardstick effect and auxiliary services
for members, etc. (e.g. Cotterill, 1987; Shaffer, 1987; Cook, 1995; van Dijk, 1997). 
Agricultural marketing cooperatives are thus important for farmer members as well as
for the socio-economic development of the agricultural sector.
In the past two decades, agribusiness underwent significant changes. On the one hand, 
the great concentration of the agrifood distribution sector, rise of demand on processed 
products, increasing concern for product quality, and changing consumer preferences 
for products, etc. all placed new market opportunities and challenges on cooperatives
(e.g. Bijman, 2010; Hendrikse, 2011; Liang, 2013). On the other hand, the 
advancement in information technology, financial instruments, and biological science
largely changed the agricultural production practices on the farm. Members nowadays
1 It should be noted that the development of cooperative forms of business ‘varies between 
countries and between sectors of the economy’ (Karantininis, 2007:19). The focus of this 
dissertation is the development of cooperatives in developed countries.
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become more heterogeneous and have different interests than before (e.g. Hakelius, 
1999; Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Hendrikse, 2011). Confronted with these changes 
in the external and internal environment, cooperatives have no choice but to ‘balance 
the interests of producer-members with their ability to compete in a dynamic market’ 
(USDA, 2002:21). Since the efficient governance structure has to match the situation 
facing the enterprise (Feng, 2011), how cooperatives can adapt to the changing 
situations and maintain as efficient governance structure is the core question of the 
current research.
The governance structure of traditional cooperatives is usually highly collective. The 
ownership rights are allocated to all farmer members, who have two roles: as patrons 
of the cooperative by providing input and as collective claimants of the residual rights 
over the cooperative (Feng, 2011). In recent decades, people observe that many 
marketing cooperatives shift to more individualistic governance structures by adopting 
non-traditional allocations of decision and income rights (Nilsson, 1998; Hendrikse 
and Veerman, 2001a and 2001b; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Hendrikse, 2011; Bijman, 
Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). To answer the question of whether cooperatives can 
still be efficient, cooperative scholars examine the cooperative governance structure 
and its adaptation to new situations across a large number of research themes 
(Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:503). Among these themes, two of them have not been 
extensively addressed in the previous research, namely, social capital and product 
diversification of cooperatives. This dissertation is devoted to these two themes.
The first research theme, social capital of cooperatives, is related to cooperatives’ 
intrinsic characteristics. Cooperatives have a ‘double nature’ (Draheim, 1955; in 
Valentinov, 2004:5). Every cooperative represents simultaneously a social group, and 
a joint enterprise owned and operated by the same group of members (Valentinov, 
2004). Much of the previous research attention regarding the efficiency of 
cooperatives has been given to the formal institutions of cooperative governance 
structure, while the social attributes of cooperatives and their value are largely ignored. 
The theoretical analysis of social capital of cooperatives lags behind empirical 
approaches. Furthermore, there has been no attempt to investigate the interaction 
between social capital and governance structure of cooperatives. Thus, the research 
regarding cooperative social capital in this dissertation aims to provide a theoretical 
analysis of social capital in cooperatives. We seek to understand better how social 
capital exists within cooperative organisations and how it affects the cooperative 
business. After examining the content and value of social capital in cooperatives, we 
formally analyse the interaction between social capital and governance structure and 
highlight the importance of the balance between the social and economic attributes of 
cooperatives. 
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There are several ways to position this dissertation in the literature of social capital. 
First, despite growing research interest in social capital of cooperatives, previous 
research usually focuses on specific facets or components of social capital and uses 
various constructs to measure it. This dissertation is among the first to provide an 
integrated analysis of social capital in cooperatives by covering all its dimensions. 
Second, since a cooperative is simultaneously a firm and a community, one cannot 
study it meaningfully as one or the other in isolation. Nonetheless, to our knowledge,
theoretical modelling of social capital in cooperatives is still missing in the literature. 
In addition, while social capital has been proven to be important for cooperatives, the 
way it generates value for cooperatives and the factors that determine its level are not
well understood. In this dissertation, we develop several formal models to address the 
different dimensions of social capital and their interaction with governance structure. 
The results provide novel insights into the complex characteristics of cooperatives and 
have implications for the organisational design of agricultural marketing cooperatives.
The second research theme of this dissertation is product diversification of 
cooperatives. Although the research interest of product diversification can be traced 
back to more than half a century ago (Penrose, 1959), the studies about product 
diversification strategies of cooperatives are still sparsely covered by literature (van 
Oijen and Hendrikse, 2002). Given the differences in governance structure,
cooperatives may behave differently than IOFs do in product diversification. 2 In 
addition, as product diversification is one of the potential strategies of cooperatives to 
respond to changing market situations, there is a need to forward our understanding of 
this topic. In this dissertation, we mainly investigate the relationship between 
governance structure and product diversification strategies. Several characteristics of 
cooperative governance structure, such as the single origin constraint, double
screening in decision making, vertical integration, etc., may influence cooperatives’ 
product diversification. We attempt to capture the consequences of these features by 
using agent-based simulations. In addition, as empirical evidence shows that many 
cooperatives have adopted innovative governance structure models in the past decades 
(e.g. Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013), it is worth 
2 When cooperatives are compared with investor owned firms (IOFs), the topology we use 
to define different institution forms is based on their ownership structures: cooperatives are 
owned by suppliers of input while IOFs are owned by investors of capital (Hansmann, 
1996). The analysis will be focused on the consequences of the principal differences 
between these two ownership structures, such as the different allocations of control and 
decision rights. Although there are various types of IOFs such as publicly listed firms and
private IOFs, the differences between them are not the focus of the analysis in this 
dissertation.
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investigating empirically whether these governance structure changes of cooperatives 
have led to a change in their diversification behaviours.
The research on diversification of cooperatives in this dissertation contributes to the 
scientific knowledge in various ways. First, agent-based simulations are used to
compare cooperatives with IOFs regarding their product portfolio evolution and 
composition. The single origin constraint of cooperatives can be captured in an agent-
based model by assigning an infinite lifetime to the first product of a cooperative while 
assigning a limited lifetime to the first product of an IOF. In addition, various other 
aspects of governance structure and the competition between the cooperative and IOF 
can be explicitly analysed in the agent-based model. Through simulations, we are able 
to observe how organisational decisions are made in different governance structures 
and analyse the outcomes that emerge at the aggregated level. From the 
methodological perspective, the current study introduces a novel approach in the 
research of cooperative governance structure. Second, we test the proposition that 
there is a relationship between firms’ governance structure and diversification 
strategies by using a dataset of Dutch cooperatives and publicly listed firms.
Specifically, we aim at explaining the impacts of the unique characteristics of 
cooperative governance structure on cooperatives’ choices regarding product portfolio 
composition. We also investigate the restructuring of cooperative governance structure 
and discuss how the innovative cooperative models can influence cooperatives’ 
diversification strategies. Finally, the results of the research will provide information 
about the trend in diversification strategies based on firms’ governance structures. 
Importantly, this study helps cooperative practitioners understand the impacts of 
various cooperative organisational characteristics on the choices of potential product 
diversification strategies.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured into two parts, each covering one 
research theme outlined above. Part A of the dissertation is devoted to the research on 
social capital of cooperatives. It consists of five articles (Chapters 2 – 6) and one 
conclusion chapter (Chapter 7). We begin with a literature review of cooperative 
social capital in Chapter 2. In this review, we analyse the structural, cognitive, and 
relational dimension of social capital in the organisational context of cooperatives. 
From the perspective of the enterprise as a system of attributes, these social capital 
dimensions are viewed as the social attributes of cooperatives, which must be aligned 
with cooperatives’ economic attributes. In addition, we integrate diverse ideas and 
empirical facts that pertain to cooperative social capital with the cooperative lifecycle 
theory. 
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Chapter 3 addresses the relationship between income rights structures and product 
quality of cooperatives in a standard economic model. It serves as a benchmark for the 
analysis in Chapter 4, in which relational social capital is formally modelled in the 
provision of product quality. Chapters 4 – 6 model the relational, structural, and 
cognitive dimension of cooperative social capital, respectively. Specifically, Chapter 4 
focuses on the influence of relational social capital on the income rights structure. It 
shows that it is efficient for the cooperative to adopt a collective income rights 
structure when its social capital level is high. However, when the social capital level 
decreases, the cooperative should implement more individualistic income rights 
structures with strong economic incentives in order to maintain efficient. Chapter 5 
investigates the influence of the income rights structure on structural social capital. 
We model members’ social interactions and the dynamics of members’ social ties 
under different pooling policies. The results show that the collective income rights 
structure featured by complete pooling is beneficial for cooperative social capital
because it creates a large externality in members’ production activities. However, 
when the social context of the cooperative is no longer conducive to social interactions, 
the complete pooling policy will become inefficient. The cooperative should adopt the 
no-pooling policy. Chapter 6 explores the potential efficient combinations of cognitive 
social capital and decision rights structure in different market settings. We show that 
the common vision of the CEO and Board of Directors (BoD) and the double
screening process in project decisions make the cooperative attractive when upstream 
projects are dominant. However, in environments with a relatively high percentage of 
downstream projects, the cooperative should hire a professional CEO who holds a 
vision different from the BoD. In Chapter 7, we conclude and discuss the results of 
Part A. We pose that the combination of high social capital levels and collective 
governance structure represents one coherent attribute system that has been adopted by 
many traditional cooperatives. Alternatively, low social capital levels and 
individualistic governance structure form another coherent system, which is 
commonly found in IOFs. These systems of attributes with different attribute values 
are interpreted as alternative equilibrium outcomes of the interaction between social 
capital and governance structure. The social context of the cooperative community 
determines to a large extent the equilibrium that the cooperative will choose. Chapter 7 
also outlines avenues for future research on cooperative social capital.
Part B of the dissertation investigates product diversification of cooperatives. It 
consists of two articles (Chapters 8 and 9) and one conclusion chapter (Chapter 10). In
Chapter 8, we develop an agent-based model to compare the product diversification of 
cooperatives and IOFs. The simulation results show that the single origin constraint of 
a cooperative is responsible for pulling all its products together in one cluster centred 
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on the original product, resulting in the lower diversification level and larger output of 
the cooperative. In addition, we capture the competition between a cooperative and an 
IOF in the simulation of a mixed duopoly market. We show that although the 
cooperative and IOF have very different product portfolio composition, the total 
surplus of the cooperative is close to the total profit of the IOF. Chapter 9 empirically 
tests the influence of governance structure on product diversification behaviour by 
comparing the product diversification levels of Dutch cooperatives and publicly listed 
companies in 2001 and 2012.3 The results show that cooperatives are less diversified 
than publicly listed companies in 2001, whereas in 2012, the product diversification 
levels of these two types of companies are statistically comparable. We conclude that, 
with flexibility in governance structure, cooperatives and other types of enterprises
may actually behave indifferently in terms of product diversification. Chapter 10
summarises the findings in Part B and outlines future research possibilities.4
3 Because of the lack of agricultural marketing cooperatives in the database, this empirical 
study includes cooperatives from other industrial sectors.
4 The comments and suggestions by Jos Bijman and Jerker Nilsson on Chapter 2, and the 
comments and suggestions by Aswin van Oijen on Chapter 9 are greatly appreciated. Any 
remaining errors are the author’s.
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Part A:
Social Capital of Cooperatives
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2. Cooperative Social Capital ̢ Towards a Lifecycle 
Perspective5
Abstract
This chapter provides an integrated analysis of the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimension of internal social capital in cooperatives. We integrate the social capital 
concept with cooperative lifecycle theory and describe the change of cooperative 
social capital along the lifecycle. We propose that cooperatives in different stages of 
the lifecycle are featured with different levels of social capital. Cooperatives are 
supposed to enjoy a high level of social capital in the early stages of the lifecycle. 
However, the level of social capital in cooperatives exhibits a trend of declining along 
the development of the organisation. The decrease of social capital will lead to an 
imbalance of the social and economic attributes of cooperatives. The cooperative’s 
governance structure must change accordingly. We argue that it is important for 
cooperatives to maintain and develop the social capital strategically over time. 
Otherwise, the comparative advantage of the cooperative business form may disappear.
Keywords: Social Capital, Cooperatives, Lifecycle
2.1 Introduction
Cooperative researchers have investigated how cooperatives are distinct from other 
organisational forms in a broad range of themes (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). To 
address these topics, various theoretical perspectives are applied, including agency 
theory (Cook, 1995; Hueth and Marcoul, 2009), transaction costs theory (Bonus, 1986; 
Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a), property rights theory (Fulton, 1995; Hendrikse and 
Veerman, 2001b), team theory (Hendrikse, 1998), and bounded cognition theory (Feng, 
2011), etc. One common shortcoming of these theoretical approaches is that they 
largely ignore the embeddedness of the cooperative’s and members’ economic 
activities in the social context of cooperative community. The explanatory relevance
of the social relationships among cooperative members is not taken into consideration.
It is commonly argued that social capital is a valuable asset based on inter-personal 
social relationships (e.g. Coleman, 1990; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Cooperatives are 
5 A version of this chapter was published in the proceeding of the EAAE (European 
Association of Agricultural Economists) 2014 Congress, Ljubljana, Slovenia
(http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/182922).  
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regarded as ‘social capital-based organizations’ (Valentinov, 2004:15) or as ‘dual 
organizations’ (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011:339). Therefore, social capital is 
potentially important in addressing the difference between cooperatives and investor 
owned firms (IOFs) because ‘the existence of this social foundation of cooperation, 
giving rise to its expressly democratic and people-oriented character, was the basis for 
differentiating between the cooperative and “capitalistic” organization’ (Valentinov, 
2004:5). In addition, social capital has been recognised as a main comparative 
advantage of the cooperative form (Røkholt, 1999; Spear, 2000).
Social capital at the organisational level can be categorised as internal and external 
social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Leana and Pil, 2006).6 Internal social capital 
describes the aggregate form and value of social relationships among organisational
members (e.g. Coleman 1990; Putnam, 1993), whereas external social capital 
describes the social linkages between the organisation and other external actors (e.g. 
Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). In this dissertation, we focus on the internal social capital of 
cooperatives. In other words, we treat a cooperative as a community and look at the 
structure and content of relationships among its members, which facilitate the pursuit 
of collective goals of the cooperative (Adler and Kwon, 2002). For the sake of 
simplicity, the term ‘social capital’ hereafter refers to the internal social capital and 
our discussion is geared to marketing cooperatives.
In the cooperative literature, many issues related to the notion of social capital, 
including ideology, culture, value, trust, identity, norms, loyalty and commitment, 
have been studied by scholars (e.g. Fulton and Adamowicz, 1993; Hansen, Morrow 
and Batista, 2002; Valentinov, 2004; James and Sykuta, 2006; Bhuyan, 2007; Nilsson, 
Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). In examining these studies, it seems to us that an
integrated analysis of social capital of cooperatives is missing. Therefore, the primary 
motivation for this chapter is to conduct a literature review and develop a theoretical 
connection between social capital and cooperative organisations. 
Accordingly, we strive to achieve three objectives in this chapter. The first objective is 
to identify the content of social capital of cooperatives and the benefits resulting from 
it. To achieve this objective, we adopt Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) three 
dimensions of social capital: structural, cognitive, and relational. From the perspective 
of a system of attributes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), these social capital dimensions 
6 Social scientists have categorised the forms of social capital in other ways, such as 
bonding and bridging (e.g. Adler and Kwon, 2002; Carolis and Saparito, 2006), or intra-
and inter-organisational (e.g. Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, and Very, 2007). These 
characterisations of social capital are similar to the internal and external view adopted in 
the current study. See Payne et al. (2011) for a typology of social capital.
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constitute the social attributes of the cooperative, which must be aligned with the 
cooperative’s economic attributes. We delineate each social capital dimension and 
discuss how they may generate comparative advantages for cooperatives. Second, this 
chapter integrates diverse ideas and empirical facts that pertain to cooperative social 
capital with cooperative lifecycle theory. Although social capital is an asset of 
traditional cooperatives, the level of social capital in a cooperative is by no means 
static. The development and expansion of the cooperative will change the environment 
where social capital develops and sustains. Some researchers attribute the failure of 
some large cooperatives to the decline of social capital in the organisation (Nilsson, 
Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). Based on Cook’s (1995) cooperative lifecycle model, 
we describe the change of social capital along the cooperative lifecycle and its 
potential impacts on cooperatives’ business performance. Our fundamental argument 
is that the social capital level in a cooperative may decrease along the cooperative 
lifecycle. The decrease of social capital level leads to an imbalance of the social and 
economic attributes of the cooperative. When this happens, the cooperative’s 
governance structure may become inefficient and need to be changed. Third and 
finally, we argue that it is important that cooperative leaders strategically maintain and 
develop social capital over time. Otherwise, the comparative advantage of 
cooperatives over IOFs may disappear. We discuss the implications for the 
management practice in cooperatives. Specifically, we offer some suggestions to
sustain and recreate social capital in large and modern cooperatives.  
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop an integrated analysis 
of cooperative social capital. Section 2.3 contours the evolution of cooperative social 
capital along the lifecycle with illustrative empirical evidence. In Section 2.4, we 
discuss the practical implications of social capital for the management of cooperatives. 
The last section encompasses conclusions and presents some implications for future 
research on cooperative social capital.
2.2 Social Capital and Cooperatives
There is a growing interest and research regarding social capital of cooperatives. Many 
cooperative scholars have emphasised the importance of social capital and tried to link 
it with the development and performance of cooperatives. However, owing to the 
multi-dimensionality of the social capital concept, the previous research usually 
focuses on specific facets or components of social capital and uses various constructs 
to measure it. Therefore, it is important and necessary to clarify the dimensions of 
social capital in cooperatives and identify the benefits resulting from each dimension.
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According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital is composed of three distinct 
dimensions: structural, cognitive and relational. The measurement of social capital can 
be operationalised according to these dimensions (e.g. Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Leana 
and Pil, 2006; Wu, 2008). In the following subsections, each dimension will be 
examined in the organisational setting of cooperatives. In addition, we characterise a
cooperative by its social and economic attributes.7 These social capital dimensions are 
conceptualised as the social attributes, whereas the governance structure of the 
cooperative represents its economic attributes. The social and economic attributes 
must be aligned in order to obtain organisational coherence. Our analysis aims at 
laying the ground of explaining how social capital will change along the lifecycle and 
why cooperative decision makers should try to maintain it during the development of 
cooperatives.
Structural Dimension
The structural dimension of social capital reflects the overall pattern of social 
connections between the members of an organisation, and the most important facets in 
this dimension include the network ties, network configuration and appropriability 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Network ties describe the social connections between people in an organisation. They 
are regarded as a fundamental aspect of social capital because ‘an actor’s network of 
social ties creates opportunities for social capital transactions’ (Adler and Kwon, 
2002:24; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005:152). A cooperative is by design an organisation
with plenty of social ties among its members. It is formed by a group of farmers
voluntarily to achieve their collective goals and interests. The members of a 
cooperative are not anonymous financiers but real persons who run their own 
agricultural enterprises (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The collective
ownership of the member group towards the downstream processor and the local 
nature of the cooperative entail that the members are likely to know each other and 
have social relationships (Cropp and Ingalsbe, 1989; Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 
2012). Therefore, there exists a social network among the members of a cooperative.
The configuration of a social network determines the pattern of linkages among 
network members, such as the network hierarchy and relationships density, etc.
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The social network in a cooperative is a combination of 
horizontal and vertical social ties. The horizontal ties represent the social relationships 
and interactions between members in the cooperative society. The vertical ties are the 
7 Cooperatives have been analysed in other attribute systems; see Hendrikse and Veerman 
(1997), Bijman (2002), and Feng (2011).
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social connections between the members and the cooperative processor and 
management. In cooperatives, the Board of Directors is elected from the membership, 
and historically, the CEO of a traditional cooperative is also a member.8 There is thus 
personal acquaintance between the members and cooperative leaders. Furthermore, as 
the members transact frequently with the cooperative processor (Hendrikse and Feng,
2013), they meet with management in a personal way regularly. Close social
relationships between them are expected to develop.
According to Bolino et al. (2002:510), ‘network appropriability relates to the ease with 
which different types of relationships can be transferred within a network’. It measures 
the extent to which a relationship developed in one context can be (re)used in other
contexts (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Pearson, Carr and Shaw, 2008). Every 
cooperative represents simultaneously a social group and a joint enterprise (Valentinov, 
2004). As the joint enterprise is owned and operated by the same group of members,
the pre-existing social relationships established between members in the community
are thus transferred into the joint enterprise and its business. The members’ economic
activities in the cooperative are highly embedded in their social network.
In short, a cooperative is not only a business firm but also a society with a dense inter-
personal social network. The structural social capital of a cooperative can be measured 
by the strength of social ties, by the density of social network, and by the frequency of 
social interactions among the members. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000:184) summarise 
the previous research on social networks and conclude that ‘networks can help actors 
to coordinate critical task interdependencies and to overcome the dilemmas of 
cooperation and collective action’. Therefore, because a social network creates a
platform for information sharing and exchange (Gulati, 1995; Walker et al., 1997; 
Sparrowe et al., 2001), a high level of structural social capital is advantageous for both 
members and cooperatives. For individual members, strong ties with similar producers
may lead to spill-over effects that result in an increase in efficiency and productivity 
(Levin and Reiss, 1998). For the cooperative firm, the close social connections 
between members and managers may create a superior vertical information flow that 
significantly supports the collective activities (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013).
Cognitive Dimension
The cognitive dimension is the ‘shared representations, interpretations and systems of 
meaning among parties, which reflects the members’ collective understanding of the 
8 Nowadays, many cooperatives, especially in China, still use one of the members as a 
CEO, rather than hire an outsider. Conversely, in Western countries, especially in the US,
most cooperatives employ outside CEOs. In Spain and Brazil, the situation is more mixed
(Liang and Hendrikse, 2013).
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organisation’s culture, shared vision and purpose, common language and codes, etc.’
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998:244).
The cooperative culture, vision, and purpose are largely carried by the ideology and 
values of traditional cooperatives, which provide a good starting point for the members 
to develop mutual understanding. When farmers take collective actions to found a 
cooperative, they are supposed to agree on what their cooperative should do, and how 
to do it. They also acknowledge the proper way of acting in such a community. The 
cooperative principles such as the Rochdale principles contain a clearly discernible 
element of ideology describing these issues (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). 
In general, the cognitive foundation of cooperative values, norms and beliefs in 
traditional cooperatives is to emphasise service to members over profit, to subordinate 
individual goals to the good of the whole, and to value equality, etc. (Hogeland, 2004). 
For example, in Sweden, the old farmers ‘view the cooperative memberships as a way 
of showing solidarity with peers, economic aspects being of secondary importance’
(Hakelius, 1999:31). 
A cooperative will also develop a set of common language or codes among the 
members. The geographical and production proximity entails that the members will 
have similar production and marketing problems and thus less disagreement
(Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). In addition, the frequent social interactions within the 
membership network and the repeated transactions between the members and the 
processor will also support the development of the system of shared meanings in the 
cooperative (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Wu, 2008). 
The cognitive social capital of a cooperative can be measured by the extent to which 
the members share congruent vision and goals. A high level of cognitive social capital 
benefits cooperatives in several ways. First, it supports the collective actions of 
members. People with shared vision are more willing to enter into cooperation (Tsai 
and Ghoshal, 1998). In addition, Leana and Pil (2006) argue that the shared goals in a 
community can mitigate the free-riding problems and reduce the use of formal control 
mechanisms. Second, the cognitive social capital promotes successful coordination by 
facilitating effective communication and common perceptions among members. 
Inkpen and Tsang (2005:157) claim that, ‘when a shared vision is present in the 
network, members have similar perceptions as to how they should interact with one 
another’. A shared vision provides members with the ability to communicate more 
effectively and avoid possible misunderstanding in communications (Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998). In cooperatives, better communication increases the level of mutual 
understanding among members and helps them anticipate the actions of other members
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(Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). This will lead to the cooperative’s successful 
coordination of business activities and adaptation to changing situations.
Relational Dimension
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:244), the relational dimension of social 
capital is composed of ‘trust, shared norms, perceived obligations, and a sense of
mutual identification’.
Trust is the key facet of the relational dimension of social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Bolino et al., (2002: 511) summarise the prior research (e.g. Putnam,
1993; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and conclude that ‘trust facilitates social and resource 
exchange, increases communication, and enhances cooperation between individuals’.
When individuals trust each other, they are more likely to cooperate and participate in 
the collective actions (Gulati, 1995). The value of trust has been widely studied in the 
cooperative literature. Researchers claim that cooperatives have greater organisational
trust than IOFs do, which exist both among the members and between the members 
and processor (Shaffer, 1987; Balbach, 1998; Shapira, 1999; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; 
James and Sykuta, 2005, 2006). The trust in the cooperative makes the members 
willingly identify themselves to the cooperative (Borgen, 2001), be loyal to the
cooperative (James and Sykuta, 2006), and actively participate in the cooperative 
governance (James and Sykuta, 2005; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; Barraud-Didier et 
al., 2012). The members’ trust towards their cooperative also makes them willing to 
accept the control of the cooperative (Søgaard, 1994) and leads to more efficient 
contracts between the members and processor (Balbach, 1998). Ollila, Nilsson and von 
Brömssen (2011:1) claim that ‘mutual trust between the membership and their 
cooperative has through history enabled both members and cooperatives to survive 
financially difficult times’.
A norm represents ‘a degree of consensus in the social system’ about the proper way 
to behave (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998:255). According to Coleman (1990:243), a 
norm exists ‘when the socially defined right to control an action is held not by the 
actor but by others’. As a society with a dense social network and common ideology, a 
cooperative is supposed to develop social norms emphasising cooperation, reciprocity, 
and loyalty. In cooperatives, members are willing to accept a high degree of social 
control via these norms (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). Social control can
curb free-riding problems by making opportunistic behaviours more costly due to the 
threat of social sanctions and reputational effects (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati et al., 
2000). Therefore, the need for formal control can be reduced (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:255), ‘obligations represent a commitment 
or duty to undertake some activity in the future’. Members’ obligations towards the 
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collective actions are crucial for cooperatives because their survival and success rely
on the patronage and member commitment (Fulton and Adamowicz, 1993). When 
members have a strong sense of obligation towards one another and towards their 
cooperative, they will commit themselves by actively patronising the cooperative 
processor, providing risk capital, and participating in cooperative governance
(Österberg and Nilsson, 2009).
Finally, identification is defined as ‘the process whereby individuals see themselves as 
one with another person or a group of people’ (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998:256). It is 
members’ sense of belonging to the cooperative. Group identity is beneficial for
information exchange and cooperation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). It can also 
become a social motivation (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). In cooperatives, members’ 
sense of identity can be induced by their common goals and a long history of social 
interactions. Gray and Kraenzle (1998) underline the strong identification of members 
with their cooperative. Members’ identification with the cooperative is also a 
significant trust-making mechanism (Borgen, 2001) and a source of members’
commitment (Jussila et al., 2012).
The relational social capital can be measured by the amount of trust members place on 
each other and on management, by the strength of social norms in the community, and 
by the level of loyalty of members towards their cooperative. In general, the relational 
social capital serves as the key resource for creating cooperatives’ comparative 
advantage over IOFs. Successful cooperatives are characterised by possessing a large 
stock of these relational social capital components, which facilitate the collaborative 
behaviours and collective actions of members. On the other hand, there is rich 
evidence showing that the future for cooperative business barely exists if there is no 
sufficient relational social capital, such as trust, commitment and loyalty, to support 
collective actions of farmers (e.g. Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011).
Relation between Different Dimensions
As Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) point out, although we can discuss the dimensions of 
cooperative social capital separately for analytical reasons, they are closely 
interrelated. We suggest that the three dimensions are complementary in nature, with 
each dimension reinforcing the creation of the other dimensions.
First, the structural dimension serves as an important resource for the creation of the 
other two dimensions (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Previous studies have suggested that 
social ties and interactions promote trust between individuals (Gulati, 1995; 
Granovetter, 1985; Arregle et al., 2007). Norms are more firmly held and easier to 
enforce in a denser social network (Granovetter, 2005). In addition, the organisation 
members’ social ties and interactions support the formation of shared vision (Tsai and 
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Ghoshal, 1998) and altruisms (Dur and Sol, 2010). It is easy for members to share 
common values and understanding of roles if they closely connected (Podolny and 
Baron, 1997). The closure of a social network also facilitates the development of high 
levels of relational and cognitive social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Second, Tsai and Ghoshal (1998:466) propose that ‘the common values and a shared 
vision, the major manifestations of the cognitive dimension of social capital, 
encourage the development of trusting relationships’. Pearson, Carr and Shaw (2008) 
also argue that the cognitive dimension serves as an antecedent to the relational 
dimension. They suggest that ‘a shared vision will lead to collective trust and norms 
for fulfilment of the common purpose’ (p.958). In addition, the cognitive social capital 
also supports the development of structural dimension because people who share the 
same mental model, language and value are more likely to interact with one another 
and exchange information regularly (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001; Leana and Pil, 
2006).
Third, the relational dimension of social capital reinforces the creation of the other 
dimensions. As Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:251) argue, ‘trust creates anticipation of 
value through social interactions with others and thus motivates actors to deepen 
relations and pursue interactions’. In addition, ‘trusting relations allow for the 
transmission of more information as well as richer and potentially more valuable 
information’ (Leana and Pil, 2006:354).
Cooperative as a Coherent System
Due to the ‘double nature’ of cooperatives (Draheim, 1955; in Valentinov, 2004:5), we 
can perceive a cooperative as a system composing both social and economic attributes. 
The structural, cognitive, and relational social capital constitute the social attributes 
while the economic attributes are represented by the governance structure
characterised by the income and decision rights allocation (Hansmann, 1996). Income 
rights specify ‘the rights to receive the benefits and the obligations to pay the costs 
associated with the use of an asset, thereby creating the incentive system faced by the 
decision makers’, and decision rights concern all rights and rules regarding ‘the 
deployment and use of assets’, and specify who directs the enterprise’s activities
(Hendrikse, 2011:1693). To reach organisational efficiency, the values of a company’s 
social and economic attributes must be coherent (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical comparison of a traditional cooperative and an IOF 
with respect to the values of their social and economic attributes. The social attributes 
consist of the structural, cognitive, and relational social capital. The economic 
attributes are the governance structure. There are two possible values for each attribute,
i.e. strong – weak, common – diverse, high – low, and collective – individualistic. 
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Figure 2.1: Attributes of a cooperative and an IOF
We argue that the cooperative and the IOF are both efficient because their social and 
economic attributes are coherent. The cooperative (represented by the solid 
rectangular) is characterised by a high level of social capital featured by the strong
social ties, common vision, and high trust within the membership. Although depicted
as separate attributes, they are mutually-reinforcing and complementary to each other. 
The governance structure of the cooperative is featured by the collective income and 
decision rights allocation. A unique feature of cooperatives’ income rights structure is 
that members hold the residual claims collectively and receive benefits proportional to 
their patronage (Dunn, 1988). Pooling is a prominent element in the income rights 
structure of traditional cooperatives. It entails that ‘revenues and costs are to a certain 
extent allocated independent of quantity and/or quality’ (Hendrikse and Feng, 
2013:509). The members thus receive collective instead of individualistic incentives
for their patronage. Regarding decision rights, members usually have equal voting 
power and make decisions collectively based on the one-member-one-vote principle
(Hansmann, 1996). With the collective governance structure, traditional cooperatives 
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are supposed to face with organisational inefficiency due to the opportunistic
behaviours and high collective decision-making costs. However, the presence of a
high level of social capital complements the collective governance structure by 
controlling and coordinating the members’ activities via social mechanisms.
The IOF (represented by the dashed rectangular) has a different set of social and 
economic attribute values featured by a low social capital level in combination with an 
individualistic governance structure. An IOF is owned by investors and the primary
goal of the IOF is to give its investors the highest investment return. The farmers are 
only the suppliers of the IOF and the relationship between the farmers and the IOF is 
seen as solely seller-buyer. The farmers, as individual suppliers, are not supposed to 
socialise with each other so frequently as how the cooperative members will do.
Therefore, there is a low social capital level among the farmers, and between the 
farmers and the IOF. However, when the farmers deliver their produce to the IOF, 
they receive an individual instead of pooled price. The economic incentives are 
individualised. The investors of the IOF are the holders of decision rights, although 
these rights are usually delegated to the CEO, who ‘often has substantial control over 
setting, ratifying and implementing company policy’ (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:507).
In the IOF, economic incentives instead of social mechanisms play the dominant role 
of controlling and coordinating economic activities. Individualistic governance
structure is thus coherent with the low social capital level.
The analysis of system of attributes provides insights into organisational dynamics.
Changing the value of a particular attribute in the system without changing the values 
of other attributes may lead to a serious loss in the organisational efficiency (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990). For the cooperative, if one or some values of its social attributes
change, the cooperative may become inefficient if the collective income or decision 
rights allocation in the governance structure remain the same. To avoid organisational
inefficiency and failure, a new combination of attribute values must be forged. These
dynamics will be discussed in the next section from the perspective of the cooperative
lifecycle.
2.3 Social Capital along the Lifecycle of Cooperatives
Social capital is closely bound with the development and strategy of the organisation 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). In this section, the evolution of social capital in a 
cooperative is contoured along the cooperative lifecycle.9 We aim to highlight the 
9 The discussion in this section is mainly based on the development history of cooperatives 
in Western Europe and North America. The development of cooperatives in Central and 
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dynamics of social capital in cooperatives. Moreover, we explain the formation, 
growth, decline, and change of cooperative organisations from the lens of social 
capital and the coherence between social capital and governance structure.
Cook (1995:1155) suggests a five-stage lifecycle model for cooperatives: ‘(1) 
economic justification and establishment, (2) survival of infant stage, (3) growth and 
consolidation, whereby problems of so-called vaguely defined property rights appear, 
(4) struggle against the vaguely defined property rights problems, (5) exiting, 
restructuring (including choosing a hybrid model and involving outside co-owners), or 
shifting (choosing an individualised cooperative model, including tradable delivery 
rights)’. We propose that cooperatives in different stages of the lifecycle are featured 
with different levels of social capital. Cooperatives are supposed to possess a large 
stock of social capital in the early stages of the lifecycle, which forms a coherent 
system with the traditional cooperative governance structure. However, the level of 
social capital in cooperatives exhibits a declining trend along the development of the 
organisation (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The values of the three social 
attributes indicated in Figure 2.1 gradually change from dense to loose, from common 
to diverse, and from high to low as the cooperative develops. We examine the ways in 
which certain organisational changes in cooperatives affect each social capital 
dimension. In the last stages of the lifecycle, a low social capital level in the 
cooperative is no longer aligned with the economic attributes featured by the collective 
governance structure. The imbalance of social capital and governance structure
explains the cooperative’s common property problems and loss of competiveness. We 
present some cases showing how cooperatives respond to the imbalance of social and 
economic attributes.
Economic Justification and Establishment
While economic justifications, such as correction of market failures (Cook, 1995), 
competitive yardstick effect (Cotterill, 1987), economies of scale (LeVay, 1983), etc., 
provide farmers various motives to form a cooperative, a high level of social capital 
among the potential members initialises their collective actions. Regarding the 
structural dimension, because most cooperatives start on a small scale, members are 
usually well acquainted with each other and there are strong social ties among them 
(Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The pre-existing social ties provide
information on potential members’ trustworthiness and reliability. Meanwhile, in a 
relatively small and close social network, the presence of frequent interactions, 
common interests, and similar backgrounds promotes the development of a shared 
Eastern Europe and developing countries may follow a different trajectory (Chloupkova, 
2002; Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011; Liang, 2013).
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vision in the community. Communication is effective in the social network and clear
objectives of the cooperative can be developed. The social ties and common vision
thus provide a condition for developing an initial coalition of potential members and 
the formation of a stable membership. The cooperative’s formation also needs a high 
level of relational social capital. When the members pool their resources to form their
cooperative, they create mutual dependence on each other. They must be confident
that no one will shirk their commitments as business partners. Therefore, trust among 
the farmers is crucial before they decide to invest time and money in the cooperative.
Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012:190) view social capital as ‘the point of 
departure’ in the governance of cooperatives. Feng, Nilsson, Ollila and Karantininis 
(2011:1) also claim that member loyalty and commitment are sine qua non for the 
success and adaptation of cooperative enterprises. To the contrary, if there is not 
sufficient social capital in the community, especially the mutual trust between 
individual farmers, cooperatives will not be founded because no collective actions can 
be initiated and sustained. The empirical study of cooperative membership in 
Macedonia demonstrates that a low level of trust between the farmers prevents them 
from taking any initiative in cooperative formation, although they have a need for 
cooperatives to correct market failures (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011). In Eastern 
Europe, farmers have been reluctant to join cooperatives due to their distrust of 
collective arrangements stemming from their experiences under communist regimes 
(Chloupkova, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003). In fact, even after cooperatives, like 
those in Russia, have been established in a top-down way by governmental 
administration, these cooperatives have meagre survival chances if there is only an 
extremely low level of trust within the membership (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011). 
Therefore, a high level of social capital can be regarded as the necessary condition for 
the formation of cooperatives. During the establishment stage, the level of social 
capital in a cooperative is very high and it exists as a result of interpersonal 
relationships developed from the informal social interactions among farmers. The trust 
among members and between members and management is high. Members are very 
loyal to their cooperatives and maintain a high level of commitment. 
Survival of Infant Stage
In the second stage of the lifecycle, the economic survival and growth of cooperatives
as business firms rely on cooperative social capital. In general, social capital supports 
the cooperative business through promoting cooperation, reducing opportunisms, 
mitigating free-riding and agency problems, and improving coordination and operating 
efficiency, etc. (e.g. James and Sykuta, 2006; Bhuyan, 2007; Nilsson, Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2012).
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The structural dimension of social capital is manifested as the social ties and 
interactions in the cooperative community. Horizontally, it supports the dispersion of 
production technology and knowledge among the members (Peterson and Anderson, 
1996). Vertically, when the cooperative processor needs information on members’ 
products and production methods in order to schedule its processing and marketing 
activities, the structural social capital generates superior information exchange and 
coordination between the members and processor (Hueth and Marcoul, 2009; 
Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). 
By facilitating common language and meanings, the cognitive social capital supports 
the collective actions of the members by improving communication efficiency. In 
addition, when there are mutual understanding and common goals among the members, 
a consensus in decision-making is easy to achieve. The costs associated with collective 
decision-making in the cooperative are thus low.
Relational social capital strongly benefits cooperatives by serving as social 
mechanisms supporting both coordination and control. According to Borgen (2001), 
coordination and control in cooperatives cannot be fully accomplished by means of 
prices or authority. Successful cooperatives are characterised by their capacity to 
overcome this gap with the strength of relational social capital, featured by a high 
level of trust and strong social norms. As the trust between members makes them 
believe that nobody will shirk their duties, the cooperative is able to reduce the time 
and costs spent on expensive controlling measures such as formal contracts, 
information gathering, monitoring, and surveillance. In addition, the trust of members 
in their cooperative is a determining factor of members’ commitment to the
cooperative (James and Sykuta, 2006). According to Fulton (1999: 423), members’
commitment is ‘the preference of cooperative members to patronize a cooperative 
even when the cooperative’s price or service is not as good as that provided by an 
IOF’. Committed members are willing to invest in the cooperative and participate in 
cooperative governance (Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Furthermore, they are more 
supportive to the organisational changes of their cooperative (Trechter et al., 2002).
Social norms in the cooperative mitigate the opportunistic behaviours and generate 
certain routines in transactions and collective actions. The costs of formal control and 
coordination are further saved. As such, the informal mechanisms steered by the 
relational social capital play a crucial role in cooperative governance by reducing 
transaction costs (Chloupkova, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003; Volentinov, 2004).
Chloupkova, Svendsen and Svendsen’s (2003:243-244) case study of the Danish 
cooperative dairy movement highlights the value of a high social capital level. From 
1882, an increasing number of Danish peasants committed themselves to deliver all 
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their milk to their own cooperatives. The cooperatives were formed by circles of 
energetic entrepreneurs in the local rural communities and ‘valuable social capital was 
created bottom-up’ (p.243). The cooperative dairies became very successful and the 
quality of the butter was increased. It became possible to standardise output and thus 
demand higher prices. The social control mechanism guaranteed that none of the 
members would cheat and the milk was delivered in good condition. In general, as a 
high level of social capital reduces the tendencies to free ride and default for 
individual advantage (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000), it guaranteed the milk quality 
under complete pooling while no strict formal control was provided at such an early 
stage of the Danish dairy cooperatives. Recent evidence from Kenya also shows that 
the observed differences in the performance of producer cooperatives can be explained 
by the differences in the organisations’ social capital levels (Wambugu, Okello and 
Nyikal, 2009).
Growth and Consolidation
In stage three of the lifecycle, successful cooperatives become large and complex by 
expanding horizontally and vertically. Cooperatives tend to adopt market-oriented 
strategies in order to respond to the increasing competition and changing market 
situations (Bijman, 2010). While facilitating the growth and competitiveness of 
cooperatives, the social capital level in cooperatives may decline gradually and 
become quite low in large and complex cooperatives (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 
2012). The comparison between small and large grain marketing cooperatives in 
Sweden shows that the larger the cooperative, the lower the social capital level, which 
is expressed in members’ involvement, trust, satisfaction, and loyalty (Feng and 
Nilsson, 2012). Nilsson, Kihlén, and Norell (2009) also conclude that the reason for
poor member satisfaction, involvement, and trust is that the cooperative in question is
very large and complex. Therefore, cooperatives’ growth may lay the seeds of their 
failure because all social capital dimensions are affected by cooperatives’ expansion. 
First, the structural social capital decreases. The expansion of the cooperative will
create a large and heterogeneous membership (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012).
It becomes infeasible for members to maintain social connections with most people in 
a large society. As a consequence, the social ties between members become weaker,
the cohesiveness of member community disappears, the distance between members 
and management increases, and communication problems emerge (Nilsson, Kihlén 
and Norell, 2009; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). The technological developments such 
as electronic transactions, which have increasingly replaced face-to-face transactions,
may also hamper the development and maintenance of intimate connections between 
members and the cooperative (Byrne and McCarthy, 2005). When the cooperative 
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becomes large, it needs to hire professional executives, who are not from the 
membership (Feng, 2011). Information asymmetry between the members and the 
professional management may increase (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011). In addition, as 
the cooperative develops, members have decreasing involvement the cooperatives’ 
decision making and management becomes increasingly autonomous (Bager, 1996;
Hart, 1997; Bhuyan, 2007; Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). The social ties 
between the members and cooperative leaders also disappear in large cooperatives.
Second, the large and heterogeneous membership has detrimental effects on the 
cognitive social capital. According to Hogeland (2006), the culture of traditionally 
organised cooperatives vanishes gradually as the cooperative expands. The social 
interactions in cooperatives, which serve as the mechanism to develop and maintain 
shared beliefs and values, become less frequent when the cooperative membership is 
large. The pronounced heterogeneity in membership, such as size, geographical 
location, knowledge, interests, even nationality, makes it difficult for members to 
develop common values and organisational language. Moreover, cooperative ideology 
plays a less prominent role in cooperatives nowadays. According to Fulton (1995), 
changes in society’s values are likely to make cooperation more difficult. Profitability
becomes the priority of the members. Farmers today, especially the young generation 
of farmers, are more pragmatic about their cooperatives and members’ decisions are 
based mainly on economic terms (Hakelius, 1999; Karantininis and Zago, 2001).
Finally, following the decline of the structural and cognitive social capital, the 
relational social capital decreases. Horizontally, with less interaction in the 
membership, the traditional conditions for personal trust building are no longer in 
place (Granovetter, 1985). At the same time, ‘the larger the group, the lower is its 
ability to crystallize and enforce norms, including those against free-riding behaviours’
(Granovetter, 2005:34). Bijman and Verhees (2011) also find that members’
commitment decreases in the geographical size of cooperatives. Vertically, the stricter 
hierarchical control mechanisms demanded by the vertical coordination may lead to a 
negative attitude and commitment of the members towards their cooperatives 
(Hogeland, 2006). The lack of communication between the members and cooperative
leaders will lead to low trust of members in management. The shrinking members’
control in large cooperatives makes the members care less about the governance of 
their cooperative and increase the agency costs. As the cooperative becomes large, it
acts more like IOFs, and becomes more corporate-oriented (Hind, 1997, 1999; Nilsson 
and Ollila, 2009). The identification of members with the cooperative weakens 
(Borgen, 2001). ‘Members consider their relationship with the cooperative purely in 
business terms’ (Ollila, Nilsson and Hess, 2013:4), and the behavioural constraints that 
social mechanisms can place on members are much weaker.
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The decrease of social capital in a cooperative in its expansion stage can be attributed 
to the change in factors that shape the evolution of social capital, namely, time, 
interaction, interdependence and closure (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). In general, the 
expansion of a cooperative over time may change all or most of these factors by 
modifying the social structure of cooperative community, decreasing the possibility of 
interactions among members, lowering the interdependency between members, and 
weakening the identity of membership. Consequently, the trust, common vision,
loyalty and other elements of social capital disappear in the minds of the members.
Struggle Against the Vaguely Defined Property Rights Problems
In stage four of the lifecycle, cooperatives are confronted by the ‘conflicts over 
residual claims and decision control’, represented by the vaguely defined property 
rights problems such as free rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence problem
(Cook, 1995:1156). The common property rights in cooperatives are based on a high 
degree of collectivism. When there is insufficient social capital to support the 
collectivism in the governance structure, the common property rights structure is no 
longer appropriate. The vaguely defined property rights problems surface and become 
acute (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). Essentially, these problems are rooted 
in the imbalance of the social and economic attributes of cooperatives. In other words, 
the governance structure featured by collective income and decision rights allocation 
is no longer coherent with the decreasing social capital level.
Therefore, the vaguely defined property rights problems are typically interrelated with 
the low level of social capital in cooperatives. Borgen (2004) states that the adversarial 
consequences of the common property rights are expected to appear in the form of
weak membership commitment. The combination of traditional equitable policies and 
a low level of social capital may cause free-riding problems and the adverse selection 
of efficient members (Hendrikse, 2011; Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013). In addition, 
the decrease of social capital level forms a vicious cycle with the vaguely defined 
property rights problems. For example, if members don’t have trust in their 
cooperative’s long-run perspective, they will have a strong desire for low retained 
earnings and a short redemption period, reflected as the horizon problem. On the other 
hand, the members who become dissatisfied with the common property rights will 
continuously lose their loyalty towards their cooperative. As such, a low level of social 
capital aggravates the vaguely defined property rights problems, and in turn, these 
problems further erode cooperative social capital.
Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012:187) posit that ‘the drain of social capital in 
cooperatives is reflected in a lessening of members’ involvement for mutual benefits, 
less collaboration, and decrease in trust in their cooperatives’ leaders, as well as in 
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each other’. With a low level of social capital, members forgo cooperative values and 
care mainly about individual economic benefits. Furthermore, members lose their 
loyalty to their cooperative; they are unwilling to sacrifice any short-term loss for a
long-term gain; they tend to be free riders and are unwilling to provide equity; they do
not trust management anymore and provide adequate commitment to control 
management; and the collaboration in cooperatives becomes cumbersome and 
efficiency is lost, to name a few. As the low social capital level jeopardises the 
foundation of cooperative governance structure, the cooperative loses its 
competiveness gradually and faces the risk of being abandoned by its members. At the 
end of stage four, some cooperatives recognise the imbalance of the social and 
economic attributes of cooperatives and consider options for change, which leads to 
stage five of the lifecycle. 
Exit, Restructuring, or Shifting
In attempting to solve the vaguely defined property rights problems, cooperatives 
seem to choose among three different strategies (Cook, 1995). Some choose the exit 
strategies of liquidation or conversion to an IOF structure. Others stay with the 
cooperative form but decide to restructure or shift the governance structure. 
One governance structure restructuring strategy cooperatives can adopt is to change
their collective income rights structure into more individualistic forms, e.g. replacing 
complete pooling with partial or no pooling, introducing individualised and tradable 
ownership, differentiated member treatment, etc. (Chaddad and Cook, 2004;
Hendrikse, 2011). These solutions can be seen as a strategic move of cooperatives to 
align their economic attributes with the new status of the social attributes. The 
Greenery is an example of cooperative development and restructuring during stage 
three to stage five of the cooperative lifecycle. Specifically, The Greenery chose to 
convert its income rights structure from a collective to an individualistic form
(Hendrikse, 2011). 
The Greenery is a leading fruit and vegetable company in Europe. As the outcome of a 
merger of nine Dutch regional fruit and vegetable auction cooperatives, the new 
cooperative has been struggling in implementing its new strategy and in finding the 
most appropriate organisation (Bijman, 2002; Hendrikse, 2011). Besides the large size, 
The Greenery’s membership heterogeneity increased due to the fact that ‘consumers’ 
demand on more variety and higher quality has induced some growers to innovate’
(Hendrikse, 2011:1699). In the first few years after the merger, some large growers 
left the cooperative because of ‘cross-subsidization of small growers’ (Bijman and 
Hendrikse, 2003:102). Meanwhile, some innovative producers also left because the 
equality principle of pooling limits the payoff they could receive for their innovation
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efforts (Hendrikse, 2011). Explained from the social capital perspective, The Greenery,
as a large and complex cooperative, has difficulty in maintaining social capital in the 
organisation. As Bijman (2002:105) points out, the organisational changes after the 
merger resulted in dissatisfaction among growers and part of the dissatisfaction was 
caused by ‘a lack of communication between The Greenery and members’. Members’ 
loyalty and commitment is no longer in place to serve as their social motivation to stay 
with and deliver to the cooperative. Driven mainly by economic benefits, the members 
who are not compensated for their higher product quality or larger volume would
simply leave the cooperative to trade with IOFs or form a new cooperative. This 
process was finally countered by the introduction of member benefit programmes in 
The Greenery, which ‘increased the number and extent of quality attributes covered by 
specific clauses in the incentive contracts’ (Hendrikse, 2011:1699). It entails that 
members realise the payoff for higher product quality by receiving a quality-specific 
price. With the member benefit programmes, the cooperatives adopted strong and 
individualistic quality incentives. The Greenery case illustrates the necessity of 
adjusting the income rights structure according to the cooperative’s social attributes. In
a large and complex cooperative with heterogeneous membership, when social capital 
seems to have played a limited role in members’ decision making, adopting
individualistic income rights allocation is necessary.
Instead of changing the income rights structure, cooperatives can also choose to 
maintain or recover social capital during the development of the organisation. 
Although it may become increasingly difficult as the membership base expands and 
becomes more heterogeneous (Valentinov, 2004), it can still be very successful. 
However, as social capital takes a long time to build, it thus requires management’s 
continuous efforts and great endeavour (Putnam, 1993).
Uzea and Fulton (2009) provide empirical evidence of the Co-operative Retailing 
System (CRS) in Canada, where the identity management has successfully been used, 
together with economic mechanisms, to manage opportunisms in a large cooperative, 
such as shirking on quality maintenance of the cooperative brand name, patronising 
outside and overexpansion. CRS is a network of about 264 retail co-operatives and 
their wholesaler, Federated Co-operatives Limited (FCL). The strategy of FCL to 
maintain social capital mainly consists of ‘identity management’ (p.12), which 
includes establishing CRS identity, fostering retails’ identification with the system and 
establishing succession planning. Empirical study has shown that the strong 
identification is a significant trust-making mechanism in cooperative organisations
(Borgen, 2001). CRS successfully removed individualistic norms, created cooperative
norms, enhanced common and mutual understanding, shared knowledge and promoted
loyalty. By inducing the members to identify with the network, members have the 
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desire to ‘act in compliance with one’s own identity’ (p.5). With all these measures to 
maintain the cognitive and relational social capital, the robust cooperation among 
members is promoted. In combination with identity management, the economic 
mechanisms of CRS such as the patronage refund system and the marketing 
programme are also introduced to deter opportunisms by the retails. For example, the 
patronage refund system, which distributes part of the net savings to members in 
proportion to their patronage, ‘provides retails strong incentive to operate in the 
system’ (p.22). The well-designed social and economic mechanisms brought great 
success to CRS. It is worth noticing that the social capital in CRS, represented by
retails’ identification with the system, is reinforced by the success of the CRS. The 
success of CRS demonstrates that it is possible to achieve cooperative success by 
strategically building cooperative social capital in combination with economic 
mechanisms. The CRS case shows that both recovering the social capital level and 
introducing individualistic incentive structures will help support cooperative 
performance. Importantly, individualistic incentives complement the maintenance of 
social capital. Therefore, it entails that a high social capital level and an individualistic
governance structure can form a coherent system of attributes.
2.4 Management Implications 
In this section, we focus on the implications of the study of social capital for the 
management practice in cooperatives and discuss how cooperatives can maintain and 
create social capital. 
Agricultural cooperatives have been faced with the challenges of new market 
conditions. To respond to the intensified competition and differentiated demands of 
the market, many cooperatives choose to expand horizontally or/and vertically (van 
der Krogt, et al., 2007). As a consequence, cooperatives become large in size and
complex in organisational structure. Meanwhile, cooperatives start to adopt the 
competitive strategies and control mechanisms similar to those used usually by the 
IOFs (Bijman and Wollni, 2008). Cooperatives nowadays are becoming more and 
more akin to IOFs, and gradually, ‘members consider their relationship with the 
cooperative purely in business terms’ (Ollila, Nilsson and Hess, 2013:4). However, all 
these strategies of a cooperative aiming for economic success are at the cost of its 
social capital, which happens to be the cooperative’s comparative advantage over IOFs.
According to Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012:194):
‘If a cooperative is not aware of its comparative advantage in terms of social 
capital, and therefore does not protect it, it risks losing this form of capital in 
the process of developing into a large-scale enterprise. Consequently, profits 
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from economies of scale and scope may be outweighed by loss of social 
capital mirrored in less trust among members and between members and 
leaders, alienation and passivity among members, low involvement, weak 
democratic governance, private good provision rather than collective good 
provision, widespread free riding, low satisfaction, and loss of solidarity.’
Cooperatives largely rely on members’ collective actions. Our discussion of 
cooperative social capital along the lifecycle suggests that social capital can be 
regarded as a key success factor of cooperatives. Therefore, when cooperatives 
respond to changing market conditions and modify their structures from the traditional 
to innovative forms, they must develop means to maintain or even increase social 
capital (Ollila, Nilsson and Hess, 2013). The primary mechanisms by which social 
capital can be maintained and increased reside in each social capital dimension. First, 
as the structural dimension serves as the basic resource for the creation of social 
capital, the most obvious way for a cooperative to build social capital is to foster the 
social relationships among its members (Leana and van Buren, 1999). Cooperatives 
should invest in maintaining the membership network by promoting social interactions 
between members. This can be done by creating social events and gatherings of 
members, developing an appropriate communication policy, organising workshops and 
training seminars, and so on. In addition, cooperatives should put efforts into keeping 
the membership stable. According to Inkpen and Tsang (2005), ‘a highly unstable 
network may limit the opportunities for the creation of social capital, because when an 
actor leaves the network, ties disappear’.
Second, the cognitive dimension can be developed through the effective 
communication of cooperatives’ shared goals and values. Cooperatives should provide
education about the nature and benefits of cooperation to members to reinforce the 
cooperative ideology (Byrne and McCarthy, 2005). Cooperatives can also establish 
shared vision by selecting and rewarding members who value working collectively 
(Leana and van Buren, 1999). As frequent interactions evoke the development of 
shared language and understanding among group members, the suggested investment 
in the structural dimension will also benefit the growth of cognitive social capital. 
Finally, drawing on the discussion in Section 2.2, the relational dimension is highly 
dependent on the development of the first two dimensions. Consistent with this idea, 
the cooperative’s investment in the structural and cognitive dimension will ultimately 
lead to the development of its relational social capital. For example, frequent 
communication between the members and management will enhance the trust and 
loyalty of members towards the cooperative (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). Trechter et
al., (2002) also show that cooperative communication strategies have the potential to
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increase members’ commitment. In addition, cooperatives should develop measures to 
encourage members to participate in cooperative governance. Previous study suggests 
that members’ access to information and their feeling of control over the cooperative
strengthen their trust and commitment (e.g. Fulton, 1999; Birchall and Simmons, 2004;
Byrne and McCarthy, 2005; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Finally, the case of CRS 
described in the previous section provides an illustrative example of recovery of social 
capital through strengthening cooperative identity. 
Furthermore, cooperatives should pay attention to the complex relationship between 
social capital and governance structure. In the last stages of the lifecycle, many 
cooperatives confront the vaguely defined property rights problems by introducing 
individualistic income rights structure and transferable and appreciable equity shares. 
This change of cooperative governance structure provides members with more 
economic motivation for patronage commitment and equity contribution. However, 
the consequence of this motivation on cooperative social capital is still unclear. One 
possibility is that the new governance structure with strong and individualistic
economic incentives will lead to economic success of the cooperative and social 
capital is in turn reinforced by the economic success. This phenomenon can be found 
in the CRS case described above. Cechin et al. (2013a) also find that stricter
hierarchical control mechanisms actually have a positive effect on members’
commitment. In this situation, the individualistic governance structure and a high 
social capital level form a new coherent system of attributes. Another possibility is
that strong and individualistic economic incentives in combination with formal control
mechanisms will crowd out the intrinsic motivation of members and suppress trust 
(Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). It decreases the 
cooperative’s social capital level. Ultimately, the cooperative is featured by an
individualistic governance structure and a low social capital level in the system of 
attributes, which is similar to IOFs. Therefore, a better understanding of both 
possibilities is crucial for cooperative leaders when they consider the change in
governance structure.
2.5 Conclusion and Further Research
In this chapter, we seek to understand how social capital exists within cooperatives 
and how social capital affects the cooperative business. We adopt Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal’s (1998) conceptualisation of social capital, and provide an integrated 
analysis of the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of social capital in 
cooperatives. Specifically, we complement the previous research on cooperative social 
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capital by delineating the links between the three dimensions of social capital and the 
governance structure of cooperatives.
The second focus of this chapter is to study the social capital in cooperatives from the 
perspective of the cooperative lifecycle (Cook, 1995). During the early stages of the 
lifecycle, the social capital level in cooperatives is high. It serves as the basis for the 
formation, survival, and success of cooperatives. The high level of social capital in 
cooperatives deters free-riding behaviour and promotes stable cooperation among 
members. However, social capital in cooperatives will decline as the cooperatives 
become large in size and complex in structure. Cooperatives’ market-oriented 
strategies and approaches of horizontal and vertical expansion may bring economic 
success, but in the meantime, the loss of social capital may outweigh the economic 
gain. When the low level of social capital upsets the balance between social and 
economic attributes, the cooperative may lose its efficiency. Cooperatives in this stage 
of the lifecycle shall adopt strategies that can rebalance the social and economic 
attributes, either by restoring cooperative social capital or by changing income rights 
structure.
In order to sustain organisational social capital, Leana and van Buren (1999) argue that 
it is important for the organisation and its members to understand the benefits and 
value of social capital. Therefore, cooperative leaders shall be aware of the differences 
between cooperatives and IOFs and pay special attention to the social attributes of 
their organisations. Moreover, management shall elicit efforts of members in
maintaining social capital in their cooperatives. We offer some suggestions on the 
sustaining and recreation of social capital in large and modern cooperatives. These 
measures cover the different dimensions of social capital. In addition, as the 
relationship between social capital and governance structure is still equivocal, 
cooperatives should take the potential costs of social capital into consideration when 
any decision of cooperative restructuring is made.
Given the significant importance of cooperative social capital, further research on this
topic is warranted. We would like to suggest some avenues for further theoretical and 
empirical work. Researchers can further explore the dimensions of social capital to 
identify the means by which these dimensions affect each other and affect other 
important organisational outcomes. Furthermore, each social capital dimension 
consists of several facets. The nature of how each facet relates to the other facets of 
the same dimension and the facets of other dimensions is not precisely formalised. It 
requires further investigation. The outcome of this type of research will provide 
practical implications for cooperative decision makers who want to maintain and 
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recreate cooperative social capital effectively and, in turn, sustain cooperatives’ 
comparative advantage.
Second, we analyse the internal social capital of cooperatives on the organisational
level in this chapter, however, the external/bridging social capital held by specific 
individuals may affect the behaviour of the individuals and the performance of 
organisations as well (Burt, 1992). External social capital is often operationalised in 
research as the social connections held by top managers (Leana and Pil, 2006). The 
research on Chinese cooperatives shows that, the CEO and core members play an 
important role in their cooperative due to their rich external contacts and social 
resources (Liang, 2013). This type of social capital is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter and deserves more investigation. 
Finally, we focus only on the positive side of social capital so far. However, social 
capital may also have a ‘dark side’ (Nooteboom, 2007:35). The cohesiveness of 
cooperative society may be harmful for the cooperative development in some respects. 
For example, Leana and van Buren (1999) point out the maintenance costs associated 
with social capital. In addition, excessive social capital may also result in an overly 
closed network, limiting access to external resources, and impeding actors’ ability to 
adapt to changing task environments (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999). The 
trade-off between the positive and negative impacts of the social capital needs to be 
further evaluated.
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3. Uncertainties and Governance Structure in 
Incentives Provision for Product Quality10
Abstract
This chapter compares product quality provisions of cooperatives and investor owned 
firms (IOFs) by highlighting the impacts of two types of uncertainty on agricultural 
production and marketing, and farmers’ risk aversion. In a principal-agent model, we 
show that the linear contract can shift the risk of market uncertainty from farmers to 
processors, and pooling can share the risk of production uncertainty among 
cooperative members. Complete pooling makes the cooperative in a disadvantageous 
position in the competition with the IOF in a quality-differentiated market due to the 
loss of free-riding dominating the gain of risk sharing. Product quality of cooperatives 
decreases when the membership size increases. Cooperatives can overcome this 
disadvantage by partial pooling. Product quality of cooperatives will be equivalent to 
that of IOFs when an optimal income rights structure with partial pooling is adopted.
Keywords: Quality, Cooperative, Investor Owned Firm, Pooling
3.1 Introduction
In the organisational economics literature, cooperatives are commonly considered less 
efficient in terms of delivering high-quality products to market. Saitone and Sexton
(2009:1224) list a number of disadvantages of cooperatives in the provision of product 
quality, including: ‘(i) revenue pooling, which in quality-differentiated markets is 
generally regarded as disadvantageous due to the potential for adverse selection; (ii) 
patronage-based financing, which leads to the horizon problem and underinvestment 
in long-term strategies that can enhance objective or perceived product quality; (iii) 
providing a “home” for member production, which is problematic both with respect to 
product quality and the potential to glut niche markets; (iv) difficulties in terminating 
“marginal” members; and (v) limitations on procuring product from nonmember 
sources.’ These considerations have led to the pessimistic prospect of cooperatives’ 
future regarding their ability to compete and survive in the modern agricultural 
markets (Fulton, 1995; Cook, 1995). 
10 A version of this chapter was published as Deng, W. & Hendrikse, G.W.J. (2013). Uncertainties 
and Governance Structure in Incentives Provision for Product Quality. In T. Ehrmann, J. 
Windsperger, G. Cliquet & G.W.J. Hendrikse (Eds.), Network Governance: Alliances, Cooperatives, 
and Franchise Chains (pp. 179-203). Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
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However, nowadays there are many large cooperatives active in the market, competing 
with investor owned firms (IOFs) for market share by delivering products with 
superior quality. For example, in the Brazilian broiler industry, Cechin et al. (2013b)
find that suppliers delivering to a cooperative are performing better in terms of quality 
than suppliers delivering to an IOF are. Another empirical observation raising doubts 
about the prospects for cooperatives is that in many sectors, they coexist with IOFs. 
Mérel et al. (2009) posit that several particular characteristics of cooperatives, such as 
the preference of consumers for cooperative products, better communication, 
insurance function of pooling, etc., have the potential to counterbalance the 
disadvantages of cooperatives in the provision of product quality. Other cooperative 
researchers consider the components of social capital in cooperatives, such as 
identification and trust, as cooperatives’ comparative advantage in the competition 
with IOFs (Uzea and Fulton, 2009; Feng et al., 2011; Nilsson et al., 2012).
This chapter formulates a principal-agent model regarding the provision of product 
quality by different governance structures, including self-processing, cooperative and 
IOF. The impacts on product quality of three aspects are highlighted: farmers’ risk-
aversion, uncertainties, and (partial) pooling. First, although farmers are usually 
regarded as risk-averse (Staatz, 1987), this characteristic is not explicitly captured in 
most of the conceptual models analysing the decision-making of cooperative members.
Second, agricultural production and marketing are subject to different types of risk,
including biological, price, and institutional (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). We 
highlight two types of risk in agribusiness: the risk of market uncertainty and 
production uncertainty (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). Third, a pooling policy is often 
adopted by cooperatives (Hendrikse, 2011). We show that a cooperative with a 
complete pooling policy will have lower product quality than an IOF. The growth of 
the cooperative membership will hamper the cooperative’s provision of product 
quality. Cooperative researchers have pointed out that large cooperatives have to adopt 
a strong incentive structure by paying a quality-specific price to the members with 
high product quality (Hendrikse, 2011). We investigate how a large cooperative can 
maintain an high product quality level by designing an optimal income rights structure 
with partial pooling, which is effective because it provides on the one hand insurance 
to risk-averse farmers and on the other hand incentives for high-quality products. In 
this chapter, because we address the relationship between income rights structures and 
product quality in a standard economic model, the impact of social capital on the 
provision of product quality is not included. Chapter 4 extends the current model and 
formally analyses the relational dimension of cooperative social capital. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we formulate the 
model. Section 3.3 compares the quality provision of different governance structures. 
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In Section 3.4, we investigate the design of a cooperative’s income rights structure, 
and determine the optimal income right structure for large cooperatives. Section 3.5
discusses the findings and the last section concludes. 
3.2 Model
This section develops a non-cooperative game with a group of upstream farmers and a 
downstream processor. Assume that there are ܰ identical farmers in a region 
producing a certain raw commodity that needs to be processed before reaching the 
final market. The farmers each produce only one unit of the raw produce and 
individually make decisions regarding the quality of their produce. The cost related to 
the product quality provision of farmer ݅, where ݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ, is ܥ(ݍ௜) =
ଵ
ଶ
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
The quality provision cost coefficient ܿ is identical for all farmers and is treated as a 
constant. Without loss of generality, the production costs of the raw produce, and the 
processing costs and valued-added of the final product are sunk and will not enter into 
the analysis (Mérel et al., 2009). We also assume that one unit of the raw produce will 
be processed into one unit of the final product. We refer to the difference in the quality 
as in the realm of vertical product differentiation (Mérel et al., 2009). The quality of 
the raw produce determines the quality of the final product, and the processing itself 
cannot change the product quality.
The farmers are risk-averse, their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an 
uncertain economic payoff ߨ௜  (݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ) is ௜ܷ = െ exp(െݎߨ௜). Parameter  ݎ ,
which is assumed identical for all farmers, is the farmers’ coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, i.e. the higher ݎ is, the more risk averse the farmers are. 
We highlight two types of risk in our model. The first type of risk is from the market 
uncertainty. Because we want to investigate the provision of product quality, in the 
current model we only try to capture the uncertainty in the market’s preference of 
product quality. Assuming that the market is competitive and quality-differentiated, 
the final product’s unit price in the market increases linearly with the product quality, 
nevertheless, with a certain level of uncertainty:
௠ܲ = ( ଴ܲ + ߳ଵ)ݍ.
ݍ (> 0) denotes the quality of the final product sold, which is determined by the 
quality of the raw produce, and the coefficient ଴ܲ(> 0) denotes the marginal market 
price with respect to the product quality. ଴ܲ can also be understood as the market’s 
aggregate ‘taste parameter’ in the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978:301). The utility 
that the market derives from consuming one unit of the product with the quality of ݍ is 
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଴ܲݍ, and it pays the equivalent price ଴ܲݍ to the product seller. The market prefers 
higher ranked quality by paying a higher price as ଴ܲ > 0. However, the preference or 
taste of the market is uncertain. Therefore, there is a normally distributed random 
noise term ߳ଵ in the marginal market price, with mean zero and variance ߩଵଶ.
The second type of risk is from the uncertainty in agricultural production per se. 
Assuming that farmer ݅ ’s planned quality for his production is ݍ௜ . However, his
realised product quality after harvest is ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ௜, where ߳ଶ௜ is a normally distributed 
random noise term, with mean zero and variance ߩଶ௜ଶ , representing the uncertainty in 
his production. We assume that production uncertainty is common for all farmers, i.e. 
߳ଶ௜ = ߳ଶ, ߩଶ௜ଶ = ߩଶଶ. The variances ߩଵଶ and ߩଶଶ represent the objective risk of the market 
and production, respectively.
Three governance structures regarding the processing of a farmer’s produce will be 
considered: self-processing, cooperative and IOF. In the following, we will analyse
how the risk of market and production uncertainty affects the farmers’ utility when 
they trade with different processors, and the consequence on the provision of product 
quality.
Self-processing 
Consider the situation where a farmer processes the raw produce into the final product 
by himself, and then sells the final product in the market directly. In self-processing, a 
farmer, also as the processor, sells the product in the market and will receive price ௠ܲ
from the market according to his product quality  ݍ௜ . There is indeed no contract 
between the farmer and processor. Farmer ݅’s economic payoff is
ߨ௜ = ( ଴ܲ + ߳ଵ)(ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
The farmer’s utility function is
௜ܷ = െ exp ൜െݎ ൤( ଴ܲ + ߳ଵ)(ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ൨ൠ.
The farmer’s certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜ = ଴ܲݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ଵݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ଶ ଴ܲଶ + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ),
where ݇ଵ = ݎߩଵଶ,݇ଶ = ݎߩଶଶ denote the farmer’s subjective risk towards the market and 
production uncertainty, respectively. Each term of subjective risk is the corresponding 
objective risk scaled by the farmer’s degree of aversion (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 
2005, Chapter 4). The term 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ଵݍ௜ଶ and 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ଶ ଴ܲଶ are risk premiums, which are the 
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disutility of risk. ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ) is the risk premium of the joint contribution of the market 
and production uncertainty. It is negative and decreases when the market and 
production uncertainty increases. 
The farmers can also sell the raw produce to an enterprise processor. The enterprise 
processor has one of the two governance structures: an open-membership cooperative 
or an IOF. We model the transactions between the enterprise processor and the farmers 
in a principal-agent framework (Holmström, 1979). The processor acts as a principal, 
and the farmers are agents who are rewarded by the outcome of their efforts invested 
in the product quality. The efforts per se are not observable, but the quality ݍ of the
delivered raw produce from the farmers to the processor is contractible. The processor 
offers the farmers a linear contract stating the payment formula as
ܲ = ߙ + ߚݍ. 
ܲ is the unit price of the raw produce that the processor will pay for. ߙ (൒ 0) is the
base (guarantee) price and ߚ (൒ 0) is the incentive regarding the product quality or the 
quality premium. An important function of the linear contract between the principal 
and agent is to ‘balance the costs of risk bearing against the incentive gains’ (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992:207). This form of contract is commonly used in agribusiness, 
whether the processor is an IOF or a cooperative (Gow et al., 2000; Cechin et al.,
2013b). 
Cooperative
Confronted with the market and production uncertainty, the individual farmers, who 
used to process individually and trade directly in the market, may have incentive to 
form a marketing cooperative with an open-membership policy. The members of the 
cooperative jointly own the processor, but the farmers remain independent regarding 
their quality decisions. We assume that the cooperative adopts the traditional principle 
of complete pooling policy. This assumption will be relaxed later. The marketing 
contract between the cooperative and the members has the payment formula as follows:
௖ܲ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖ܳ௖
ܳ௖ =
1
݊
෍(ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ ߳ଶ௜).
The price consists of a fixed base price ߙ௖ and a quality-incentive ߚ௖ . In complete 
pooling, the cooperative enacts a single pool for all products with various qualities, 
and the members share equitably on a per-unit basis in the revenue stream that has 
been created (Saitone and Sexton, 2009). This equality principle distributes the net 
revenue to members based on the delivered volume, regardless the quality of the 
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product. Therefore, in the payment formula of the marketing contract, the quality 
incentive is related to the pooled or aggregate quality ܳ௖ instead of the individual 
product quality ݍ௜, since the cooperative will also receive revenues from the market 
based on  ܳ௖. A member ݅’s economic payoff is
ߨ௜ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖ܳ௖ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
And the member’s utility function is
௜ܷ = െexp {െݎ[ߙ௖ +
ߚ௖
݊
෍(ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ ߳ଶ௜)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ]}.
Different from the utility function of the self-processing farmers who trade directly in 
the market, the subjective risk towards market uncertainty ݇ଵ is not in the member’s 
utility function. This is because the members are not selling their products to the final 
market directly. Instead, they sell to the market via the cooperative they own and they 
are insulated from the market uncertainty ߳ଵ and risk ߪଵଶ. Their projected income is 
then decided by the payment formula ௖ܲ. A member’s certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜ = ߙ௖ +
ߚ௖(ݍ௜ + ܳି௜)
݊
െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ଶ
ߚ௖ଶ
݊
.
Notice that ܳି௜ is the sum of the quality decisions of the other members besides 
member ݅ and σ ߳ଶ௜௡௜ has a normal distribution with variance ݊ߪଶଶ. We can see that 
complete pooling reduces the member’s risk premium term 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ଶ
ఉ೎మ
௡
related to the 
production uncertainty by a factor of  
ଵ
௡
. It captures the risk sharing function of pooling. 
IOF
An IOF procures the raw produce of the farmers and sells the processed products in 
the same final market. The contract the IOF offers to the farmers is
௙ܲ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜ .
Similarly, the price consists of a fixed base price ߙ௙ and an individualised quality-
incentive  ߚ௙ , and with this contract, the farmers are not faced with the market 
uncertainty ߳ଵ and risk ߪଵଶ directly. Differently, the quality incentive is now based on 
the individual instead of pooled product quality. The economic payoff of a farmer ݅,
who trades with the IOF, is
ߨ௜ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
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His utility function is
௜ܷ = െ exp ൜െݎ ൤ߙ௙ + ߚ௙(ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ௜)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ ൨ൠ.
And, his certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ଶߚ௙ଶ.
Different from the certainty equivalent payoff of the cooperative members, in 
farmer ݅’s certainty equivalent payoff, both the quality incentive and risk premium of 
the production uncertainty are individualised. Table 3.1 lists the players’ decisions in 
three different governance structures.
Table 3.1: Decisions of the farmers and the processor
Self-processing IOF Cooperative
Processor - ߙ௙,ߚ௙ ߙ௖,ߚ௖
Farmer ࢏
(࢏ = ૚,૛, … ,ࡺ) ݍ௜ ݍ௜ ݍ௜
Assume that the farmers’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion, quality provision cost 
coefficient, production uncertainty, and the market’s preference and uncertainty are 
common knowledge. The product quality is perfectly measurable. The timing of the 
two-stage game is as follows: (i) the principal (processor) chooses the ߙ and ߚ of the 
payment formula; (ii) the agents (farmers) choose the product quality to maximise
their certainty equivalent payoff. This game will be solved by backward induction.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the equilibrium product quality in different governance 
structures and compare the farmers’ certainty equivalent payoff.
Self-processing
The self-processing farmer’s decision regarding product quality is obtained by the 
FOC (first-order condition) of his certainty equivalent payoff:
߲ܥܧ௜
߲ݍ௜
= ଴ܲ െ ݇ଵݍ௜ െ ܿݍ௜ = 0
ݍ௜כ =
଴ܲ
ܿ + ݇ଵ
.
The result entails that if the farmer trades directly in the market, the quality of the 
product is determined by his subjective risk towards the market uncertainty ݇ଵ. The 
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product quality will be reduced if the farmer’s subjective risk towards the market 
uncertainty is high. The production uncertainty doesn’t play a role in the quality 
decision because it is intrinsic and the farmer cannot change the disutility from the 
production uncertainty by choosing his product quality. However, it determines 
whether the farmer will participate in the market. The farmer’s certainty equivalent 
payoff is
ܥܧ௜כ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2
(
1
ܿ + ݇ଵ
െ ݇ଶ) + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ).
Assuming that the farmer’s reservation certainty equivalent payoff is zero, when ݇ଵ
and ݇ଶ is so large that ܥܧ௜כ < 0, the farmer is not willing to participate in the market. 
Cooperative
The cooperative members make their decisions individually. Member ݅’s decision on 
his product quality is obtained by the FOC of his certainty equivalent payoff:
߲ܥܧ௜
߲ݍ௜
=
ߚ௖
݊
െ ܿݍ௜ = 0
ݍ௜כ =
ߚ௖
݊ܿ
.
While the subjective risk towards market uncertainty ݇ଵ doesn’t play a role in 
members’ decisions now, the cooperative’s membership size ݊ and quality incentive 
ߚ௖ jointly determine the member’s decision regarding product quality. As the 
cooperative becomes large in terms of  ݊ , while the policy of complete pooling 
attenuates the production risk of individual members by risk sharing, it also causes an 
offsetting impact – the members will free ride on other members’ efforts in product 
quality improvement. The members have little incentive to supply high-quality 
product, since each member’s share is relatively insensitive to his effort level in a 
large organisation. When any individual effort will not be directly rewarded, it gives
rise to free riding. Because all members are identical, the cooperative’s aggregate 
product quality is
ܳ௖כ =
ߚ௖
݊ܿ
+
1
݊
෍߳ଶ௜
௡
௜
.
For the members, the risk of market uncertainty is now placed on the cooperative 
processor. In fact, this risk cannot be completely shifted from the members to the 
processor because the members are also the decision makers and residual claimants of 
the processor. They are actually the same people. Therefore, farmer cooperatives are 
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usually regarded as risk averse in decision-making (Vitaliano, 1983; Staatz, 1987). 
However, the risk sharing is still possible between the members and processor because 
‘the equity in the cooperative can be used as a buffer to absorb temporary fluctuations 
in profits’ (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004:193). In the current model, we assume that the 
cooperative can execute this buffering function and treat the cooperative processor as 
risk-neutral regarding the decision of the payment formula. Assuming that the 
processing costs and valued-added of the cooperative processor is sunk, the processor 
retains no earnings and its objective is to maximise the joint certainty equivalent 
payoff of the processor and members, which is
ߨ௖ = ܧ ቈ݊ ଴ܲܳ௖כ െ
݊
2
ܿݍ௜כଶ െ
݊
2
݇ଶ
ߚ௖ଶ
݊
቉ = ݊ ቆ ଴ܲ
ߚ௖
ܿ݊
െ
1
2
ߚ௖ଶ
ܿ݊ଶ
െ
1
2
݇ଶ
ߚ௖ଶ
݊
ቇ.
Following the FOC regarding ߚ௖  (0 ൑ ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ):
߲ߨ௖
߲ߚ௖
=
଴ܲ
ܿ݊
െ
ߚ௖
ܿ݊ଶ
െ
݇ଶߚ௖
݊
= 0
ߚ௖כ =
଴ܲ
1
݊ + ܿ݇ଶ
.
It entails that the cooperative’s quality incentive payment ߚ௖כ should increase with 
membership size but decrease with the members’ subjective risk towards production 
uncertainty. The cooperative’s expected aggregate product quality is
ܳ௖ = ܧ ൥
ߚ௖כ
݊ܿ
+
1
݊
෍߳ଶ௜
௡
௜
൩ = ଴ܲ
ܿ(݇ଶ݊ܿ + 1)
.
The member’s certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜כ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(݇ଶ݊ܿ + 1)
.
The result shows that, in comparison with self-processing farmers, the members of the 
cooperative with a complete pooling policy can always obtain a positive certainty 
equivalent payoff because the cooperative processor bears the risk of market 
uncertainty for its members. However, due to the increasing free-riding problem, the 
cooperative’s aggregate product quality and members’ certainty equivalent payoff 
decreases when its membership size increases.
IOF
The farmer trading with the IOF makes the decision of product quality based on the 
FOC of his certainty equivalent payoff:
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߲ܥܧ௜
߲ݍ௜
= ߚ௙ െ ܿݍ௜ = 0
ݍ௜כ =
ߚ௙
ܿ
.
Owned by investors who can hold diversified portfolios, the IOF is modelled as risk-
neutral. Assuming that the processing costs and valued-added of the IOF processor is 
sunk, it will maximise its total economic payoff subject to the farmers’ participation 
constraint. The farmer’s reservation certainty equivalent payoff  ܴ is assumed equal to 
the certainty equivalent payoff of the cooperative members:
ܴ = ଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(݇ଶ݊ܿ + 1)
.
The participation constraint of the farmers to deliver his raw produce to the IOF is
ܥܧ௜כ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜כ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜כଶ െ
1
2
݇ଶߚ௙ଶ ൒ ܴ.
The IOF will simply pay the lowest possible fixed payment so that the farmers are 
willing to deliver:
ߙ௙כ = ܴ െ
ߚ௙ଶ
2ܿ
+
1
2
݇ଶߚ௙ଶ.
The total expected payoff of the IOF is
ߨ௙ = ܧൣ݊ ଴ܲݍ௜כ െ ݊൫ߙ௙כ + ߚ௙ݍ௜൯൧ = ݊ ቆ
଴ܲߚ௙
ܿ
െ
1
2
݇ଶߚ௙ଶ െ
ߚ௙ଶ
2ܿ
െ ܴቇ.
The IOF maximises its payoff by choosing ߚ௙  (0 ൑ ߚ௙ ൑ ଴ܲ):
߲ߨ௙
߲ߚ௙
= ݊ ቆ ଴ܲ
ܿ
െ ݇ଶߚ௙ െ
ߚ௙
ܿ
ቇ = 0
ߚ௙כ =
଴ܲ
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
.
Given the contract offered by the IOF, the farmer’s decision on the product quality can 
be obtained. As all farmers are identical, and assuming that there are ݉ farmers 
supplying the IOF, the expected aggregate product quality of the IOF is
ܳ௙ = ܧ ൥
ߚ௙כ
ܿ
+
1
݉
෍߳ଶ௜
௠
௜
൩ = ଴ܲ
ܿ(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
.
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From the equation above, we see that the farmers’ subjective risk towards production 
uncertainty ݇ଶ determines the IOF’s product quality. The farmers’ certainty equivalent 
payoff is equal to his reservation certainty equivalent payoff and the IOF keeps the 
remaining part of the payoff of each unit of the product. The IOF exists because by 
offering the contracts to the non-member farmers, it also insures them from the market 
uncertainty and elicits supplies.
Comparison
Table 3.2 presents the comparison of the product quality, farmers’ certainty equivalent 
(CE) payoff and the processor’s payoff per unit of product in different governance 
structures.
Table 3.2: Product quality and CE payoff in the three governance structures
Self-processing IOF Cooperative
Product 
Quality
଴ܲ
ܿ + ݇ଵ
଴ܲ
ܿ(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
଴ܲ
ܿ(1 + ݊ܿ݇ଶ)
Farmers’ 
CE Payoff
଴ܲ
ଶ
2
(
1
ܿ + ݇ଵ
െ ݇ଶ) + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ)
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(1 + ݊ܿ݇ଶ)
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(1 + ݊ܿ݇ଶ)
Processor’s 
Payoff
n.a.
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
െ ଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(1 + ݊ܿ݇ଶ)
0
When the farmers process individually and trade directly in the market, the product 
quality is merely decided by their subjective risk towards the market uncertainty. 
However, when the farmers’ subjective risk towards the market and production 
uncertainty is too large to produce a non-negative certainty equivalent payoff, they 
will not participate in the market. By contrast, when the farmers trade with a 
(enterprise) processor, the risk of market uncertainty is shifted from the farmers to the 
processor through the contract. This result is supported by empirical findings (Knoeber 
and Thurman, 1995; Franken, Pennings and Garcia, 2009), and it may justify the trend 
that, fewer and fewer products are traded on open markets and production contracts 
are becoming more common (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). However, the farmers still 
face the risk of production uncertainty. The product quality will thus be determined by 
the contract offered by the processor, which balances the production risk bearing and 
incentive provision. 
The cooperative has an advantage over self-processing, since the risk-averse farmers 
can always earn a positive certainty equivalent payoff as members of the cooperative 
in an uncertain market. This provides a justification for the formation of agricultural 
cooperatives. However, the complete pooling policy is problematic. Although the 
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complete pooling policy can bring the benefits of risk sharing that supports the quality 
provision of the cooperative, it goes at the detriment of its members’ incentive in 
quality improvement. With the complete pooling policy, when a new member joins the 
cooperative, the loss from the free-riding dominates the benefit of risk sharing. In 
addition, the cooperative is not able to provide sufficient incentives for the provision 
of product quality. As a consequence, the cooperative’s product quality will 
continuously decrease as its membership size increases. 
Instead of using the quality incentive based on pooled quality, the IOF processor offers 
the farmers quality incentive based on individual product quality. Without pooling, the 
individualised incentive will expose the farmers to more production uncertainty.
However, the IOF processor can design an optimal contract which reaches a trade-off 
between providing incentives and minimising the cost of risk. Therefore, the IOF 
processor is able to elicit farmers to deliver products with higher quality. We can 
formulate the first proposition as follows: 
Proposition 1: The product quality of the cooperative with a complete pooling policy 
is always lower than that of the IOF.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical illustration that compares the product quality of the 
IOF and the cooperative.  
Figure 3.1: Product quality
How will the farmers choose the processor? As discussed previously, if self-
processing and trading directly in the market brings no positive certainty equivalent 
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payoff to the farmers due to the large uncertainties, i.e. 
௉బమ
ଶ
ቀ ଵ
௖ା௞భ
െ ݇ଶቁ+ ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ) ൑
0, no farmers will participate in the market alone. They either form a cooperative or 
trade with the IOF. Assuming that both a cooperative and an IOF exist, they attract the 
supplies from the farmers in the same region. Figure 3.2 illustrates the competition 
between the cooperative and the IOF over raw produce supplies.
Figure 3.2: Certainty equivalent payoff
When the cooperative’s membership size is ܯ, each member’s certainty equivalent 
payoff is equal to 1. The IOF processor designs the contract subject to the farmers’ 
participation constraint, which will be equal to 1. The cooperative’s membership size 
will no longer grow because each member’s certainty equivalent payoff will be less 
than 1 if more farmers join the cooperative, and as a consequence, some members will 
leave and turn to the IOF. However, if the IOF processor wants to attract more 
suppliers, it can simply modify the contract it offers to the suppliers by increasing the 
base payment ߙ௙. As such, the certainty equivalent payoff of the farmers who supply 
the IOF will be higher than the cooperative members’ certainty equivalent payoff. For 
example, if the certainty equivalent payoff of the farmers who supply the IOF is 
increased from 1 to 1.5, some cooperative members will then leave the cooperative 
and trade with the IOF. The cooperative membership size will decrease. With fewer 
members, the cooperative’s product quality and members’ certainty equivalent payoff 
will increase because the free-riding problem is relatively eased. When the 
membership size decreases to ܯԢ, cooperative members’ certainty equivalent payoff is 
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again equal to the certainty equivalent payoff received by the farmers trading with the 
IOF, and the members will stay in the cooperative. The membership size of the 
cooperative is determined by the certainty equivalent payoff that the IOF offers to its 
suppliers. Generally, the cooperative with a complete pooling policy is in a 
disadvantageous position in the competition with the IOF. The IOF can not only elicit 
supply with better quality, but also attract supplies from the cooperative’s members by 
increasing payment. The total certainty equivalent payoff (sum of farmer and 
processor) of each unit of product generated by the IOF is larger than that by the 
cooperative, i.e. 
୔బమ
ଶୡ(ଵାୡ୩మ)
>
୔బమ
ଶୡ(ଵା୬ୡ୩మ)
. The IOF is thus more efficient than the 
cooperative.
Another situation we have to consider is when self-processing and trading directly in 
the market can bring a positive certainty equivalent payoff to the farmers, i.e. 
௉బమ
ଶ
ቀ ଵ
௖ା௞భ
െ ݇ଶቁ+ ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ) > 0. The curve in Figure 3.3 approximates the situations 
where the certainty equivalent payoff of self-processing is equal to zero. The area 
below the curve thus represents the range of ݇ଵ and  ݇ଶ , within which the self-
processing farmers can obtain a certain level of positive certainty equivalent payoff. 
This positive certainty equivalent payoff also serves as the reservation payoff of all 
farmers. According to Figure 3.2, the certainty equivalent payoff of the cooperative 
members will continuously decrease when the membership size increases. When the 
certainty equivalent payoff of the cooperative members is equivalent to the certainty 
equivalent payoff of the self-processing farmers, the farmers are indifferent between 
self-processing and becoming members of the cooperative. The cooperative’s 
membership size will thus no longer grow. The membership size of the cooperative is 
determined by the certainty equivalent payoff of the self-processing. When ݇ଵ and ݇ଶ
increase, the certainty equivalent payoff of the self-processing will decrease, so will 
reservation payoff of all farmers. The membership size of the cooperative will also 
increase. If there exists also an IOF in the region, the IOF will design the contract 
subject to the reservation payoff as well and take it as the farmers’ participation 
constraint. As such, the farmers will be indifferent in self-processing or supplying to 
the cooperative or the IOF. Given that ݇ଵ > 0,݇ଶ > 0 and  ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ) < 0 , through 
simple derivation we can obtain the result that the total certainty equivalent payoff of 
each unit of product generated by the IOF is larger than that by self-processing, i.e. 
௉బమ
ଶ௖(ଵା௖௞మ)
>
௉బమ
ଶ
(
ଵ
௖ା௞భ
െ ݇ଶ) + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ) . The IOF is also more efficient than self-
processing.
We can compare the product quality of different processors according to the value of 
݇ଵ and ݇ଶ. According to the values of ݇ଵ and ݇ଶ, the rank of product quality of three 
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different governance structures is illustrated Figure 3.3. First, the IOF’s product 
quality is always higher than that of the cooperative (Proposition 1). Second, when the 
certainty equivalent payoff of self-processing is positive and  ݇ଶ <
௞భ
௖మ
, the IOF’s 
product quality is higher than that of the self-processing products, i.e.
௉బ
௖(ଵା௖௞మ)
>
௉బ
௖ା௞భ
.
Third, when the certainty equivalent payoff of self-processing is positive and ݇ଶ <
௞భ
௡௖మ
,
the cooperative’s product quality is higher than that of the self-processing product, i.e.
௉బ
௖(ଵା௡௖௞మ)
>
௉బ
௖ା௞భ
. Finally, when self-processing and trading directly in the market 
brings no positive certainty equivalent payoff to the farmers (݇ଵ and ݇ଶ are in the area 
above the curve), there will be no self-processing. Denote the product quality of self-
processing, cooperative and IOF as ܳ௠, ܳ௖ and ܳ௙, respectively. 
Figure 3.3: Uncertainties, governance structures and product quality
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3.4 Partial Pooling
In this section, we investigate how a cooperative can design an optimal income rights 
structure by adjusting its pooling policy, in order to achieve high product quality when 
the membership size is large. We extend the model of the cooperative processor in
Section 3.2 by adding the decision regarding a pooling ratio  ߪ (0 ൑ ߪ ൑ 1) , in 
addition to the decisions of the fixed payment ߙ௖(൒ 0) and quality incentive ߚ௖  (0 ൑
ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ). The payment that a member will receive is modified to
௜ܲ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖ߪܳ௖ + ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)ݍ௜ .
The pooling ratio ߪ measures to what extent the quality incentive will be paid 
according to the pooled quality ܳ௖, whereas 1െ ߪ denotes the portion of a member’s 
production that receives a quality-specific price (Saitone and Sexton, 2009).  
Member ݅’s economic payoff is
ߨ௜ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖ߪܳ௖ + ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)ݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
The member’ utility function is
௜ܷ = െ exp ൝െݎ ൥ߙ௖ +
ߚ௖ߪ
݊
෍(ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ௜)
௡
௜
+ ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)(ݍ௜ + ߳ଶ௜)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ൩ൡ.
The member’ certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜ = ߙ௖ +
ߚ௖ߪ
݊
෍ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)ݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ଶߚ௖ଶ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1െ ߪ)ଶ቉.
The member’s decision on quality is obtained by:
߲ܥܧ௜
߲ݍ௜
=
ߚ௖ߪ
݊
+ ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)െ ܿݍ௜ = 0
ݍ௜כ =
ߚ௖ߪ
݊ܿ
+
ߚ௖(1െ ߪ)
ܿ
=
ߚ௖
ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ
The cooperative’s aggregate quality is then
ܳ௖כ =
ߚ௖
ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ+
1
݊
෍߳ଶ௜
௡
௜
.
Similarly, the cooperative processor retains no earnings and maximises the joint 
certainty equivalent payoff of the processor and members, which is:
63_Erim Deng BW stand.job
49
ߨ௖ = ܧ ቊ݊ܲ0ܳ௖כ െ
݊
2
ܿݍ௜כଶ െ
݊
2
݇ଶߚ௖ଶ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1 െ ߪ)ଶ቉ቋ
= ݊ ቊ
ܲ0ߚ௖
ܿ
(
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪ)െ
ߚ௖ଶ
2ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ
ଶ
െ
1
2
݇ଶߚ௖ଶ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1 െ ߪ)ଶ቉ቋ.
The cooperative maximises ߨ௖ by choosing ߚ௖  (0 ൑ ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ) and ߪ (0 ൑ ߪ ൑ 1):
߲ߨ௖
߲ߪ
= ݊ ൤ ଴ܲ
ߚ௖
ܿ
(
1
݊
െ 1)൨ െ
݊ߚ௖ଶ
ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ ൬
1
݊
െ 1൰ െ ݊݇ଶߚ௖ଶ ቂ
ߪ
݊
െ (1െ ߪ)ቃ = 0
ߪכ =
൬ ଴ܲܿ െ
ߚ௖
ܿ ൰ ቀ
1
݊ െ 1ቁ+ ݇ଶߚ௖
ߚ௖
ܿ ቀ
1
݊ െ 1ቁ
ଶ
+ ݇ଶߚ௖ ቀ
1
݊ + 1ቁ
.
When  ݊ is large, ଵ
௡
ൎ 0:
ߪכ ൎ
ܿ݇ଶߚ௖ + ߚ௖ െ ଴ܲ
ܿ݇ଶߚ௖ + ߚ௖
= 1െ
1
(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
ߚ௖
଴ܲ
.
Because 0 ൑ ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ, the pooling ratio the cooperative can choose is
0 ൑ ߪכ ൑
ܿ݇ଶ
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
And:
߲ߨ௖
߲ߚ௖
=
݊ ଴ܲ
ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ െ
݊ߚ௖
ܿ
ቀ
ߪ
݊
+ 1െ ߪቁ
ଶ
െ ݊݇ଶߚ௖ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1െ ߪ)ଶ቉ = 0
ߚ௖כ =
଴ܲ
ܿ (
ߪ
݊ + 1െ ߪ)
1
ܿ ቀ
ߪ
݊ + 1െ ߪቁ
ଶ
+ ݇ଶ ൤
ߪଶ
݊ + (1െ ߪ)
ଶ൨
ൎ ଴ܲ
(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)(1െ ߪ)
ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
=
1
(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)(1െ ߪ)
.
Because 0 ൑ ߪכ ൑ ௖௞మ
ଵା௖௞మ
:
1
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
൑
ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
൑ 1
In sum, we obtain the optimal decision of the cooperative:
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ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
(1െ ߪכ) =
1
(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
.
Denote  ߛכ = ఉ೎
כ
௉బ
, (0 ൑ ߛ ൑ 1) , as the ratio between the quality incentive of the 
cooperative and the marginal market price with respect to the product quality in the 
market. It measures the relative strength of the cooperative’s quality incentive. In sum, 
the optimal income rights structure ܵכ of the cooperative can be written as
ܵכ = ߛכ(1െ ߪכ) =
1
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
,
1
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
൑ ߛכ ൑ 1 ܽ݊݀ 0 ൑ ߪכ ൑
ܿ݇ଶ
1 + ܿ݇ଶ
.
With the optimal income rights structure, the expected aggregate quality of the 
cooperative is
ܳ௖ = ܧ ൥
ߚ௖כߪכ
݊ܿ
+
ߚ௖כ(1െ ߪכ)
ܿ
+
1
݊
෍߳ଶ௜
௡
௜
൩ ൎ ଴ܲ
ܿ(1 + ܿ݇ଶ)
.
Because the cooperative operates with a zero-profit constraint, the base price can be 
obtained by:
଴ܲܳ௖כ െ [ߙ + ߚ௖כߪכܳ௖כ + ߚ௖כ(1െ ߪכ)ݍ௜כ] = 0.
ߙ௖כ = ݍ௜כ( ଴ܲ െ ߚ௖כ).
Figure 3.4 illustrates the optimal income rights structure the cooperative can choose. 
Given a certain level of members’ subjective risk towards the production 
uncertainty ݇ଶ and quality provision cost coefficient  ܿ , the solid part of the curve 
represents the efficient frontier of the optimal income rights structure. 
Several important implications regarding the optimal income rights structure can be 
drawn. First, a high pooling ratio is associated with high relative quality incentive 
strength ߛ. While the high pooling ratio reduces the disutility of the risk premium term 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ଶߚ௖ଶ ቂ
ఙమ
௡
+ (1െ ߪ)ଶቃ in the members’ certainty equivalent payoff, it also reduces the 
members’ incentive to improve product quality and boosts free-riding. Hence, a high 
quality incentive is needed to maintain the product quality provisions from the 
members when the pooling ratio is high. On the other hand, when the pooling ratio is 
low, the relative quality incentive strength ߛ must decrease as well. When the pooling 
ratio is low, its risk-sharing function will decrease whereas the quality incentive will 
become effective due to less free-riding. The low pooling ratio individualises not only 
the risk of production uncertainty but also the rewards of product quality. Therefore, 
with a low pooling ratio, the cooperative only needs relative low incentive strength to 
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support the product quality but a high base price to decrease the members’ disutility 
from the risk of production uncertainty. 
Figure 3.4: The optimal income rights structure of cooperatives
Second, the complete pooling policy, i.e. ߪ = 1, should by no means be adopted by 
the cooperative. Instead, the highest pooling ratio that the cooperative can enact is 
ߪ௠௔௫ =
௖௞మ
ଵା௖௞మ
. When the cooperative chooses ߪ௠௔௫, the base price ߙ௖ will be zero and 
the quality incentive ߚ௖ will be ܾ in the corresponding optimal payment formula. It 
entails that the members will receive no base price and the cooperative’s quality 
incentive will be equal to the quality marginal price of the market. The relative quality 
incentive strength ߛ is then equal to 1. In other words, with pooling ratio ߪ௠௔௫, the 
cooperative does not need to pay a base payment to members to bear their risk of 
production uncertainty. The pooling arrangement itself has already minimised the cost 
of risk by risk-sharing. If the cooperative’s pooling ratio is set higher than ߪ௠௔௫, the 
cooperative has to use a relative quality incentive strength  ߛ > 1, i.e. ߚ௖ > ଴ܲ , to 
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maintain the  product quality level. The reason is that a pooling ratio higher than  ߪ௠௔௫
further reduces the members’ incentive in quality improvement. To sustain the product 
quality, a more powerful incentive must be provided. However, as the cooperative 
operates on a zero-profit condition, choosing ߚ௖ > ଴ܲ entails that  ߙ௖ < 0 , i.e. the 
cooperative charges the members a base fee for each unit of produce they deliver. This 
is impractical and it also proves that the traditional principle of complete pooling, 
which we have modelled in Section 3.2, is inefficient. Therefore, there is an upper 
bound on the pooling ratio that the cooperative can adopt. Beyond that, the 
cooperative will be not able to maintain its product quality with the increase of 
membership size. The dashed part of the curve in Figure 3.3 represents the 
inapplicable income rights structure. Another implication of the upper bound on the 
pooling ratio is that ߪ௠௔௫ will decrease when the farmers’ subjective risk towards
production uncertainty ݇ଶ and quality provision cost coefficient ܿ decrease. It entails 
that, while agricultural modernisation nowadays attenuates the production uncertainty 
and quality provision cost, the upper bound on the pooling ratio is continuously 
lowered. 
Third, the cooperative can adopt the no-pooling policy i.e. ߪ = 0, which means that 
the quality incentive will be fully individualised. This is the same arrangement as in 
the contract of the IOF. Under this circumstance, a lowest quality incentive ߚ௖ =
௉బ
ଵା௖௞మ
 must be chosen; otherwise, the members will encounter a large disutility brought 
by the risk premium 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ଶߚ௖ଶ, which is also fully individualised under the no-pooling 
policy. As the low quality incentive ߚ௖ is accompanied with a high base payment ߙ௖,
when there is no pooling to share the members’ risk of production uncertainty, the 
highest base payment is provided to the members for bearing the risk. 
In sum, the optimal income rights structure ܵכ, which consists of the decisions of the 
pooling ratio and relative quality incentive strength, provides the cooperative with 
optimal alignments between pooling, incentive and risk bearing, thereby supporting 
the quality provision of the cooperative. The cooperative’s decision regarding the 
pooling ratio is flexible as it can choose from a range of pooling ratios. However, the 
cooperative may prefer a specific pooling ratio, which is able to bring the organisation 
additional benefits. We leave this topic for further research. 
The second proposition is formulated as follows:
Proposition 2: The range of the efficient equilibrium pooling ratio of the 
cooperative is ቂ૙, ࢉ࢑૛
૚ାࢉ࢑૛
ቃ.
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Table 3.3 compares the product quality, farmers’ certainty equivalent payoff and the 
processor’s payoff per unit of product in different governance structures when the 
cooperative adopts the optimal income rights structure with partial pooling.
Table 3.3: Product quality and CE payoff under the optimal income rights structure
Self-processing IOF Cooperative
Product 
Quality
଴ܲ
ܿ + ݇ଵ
଴ܲ
ܿ(ܿ݇ଶ + 1)
଴ܲ
ܿ(ܿ݇ଶ + 1)
Farmers’ 
CE Payoff
଴ܲ
ଶ
2
(
1
ܿ + ݇ଵ
െ ݇ଶ) + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ)
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(ܿ݇ଶ + 1)
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ(ܿ݇ଶ + 1)
Processor’s 
Payoff
n.a. 0 0
With the optimal income rights structure, the cooperative’s product quality can reach 
the same level as that of the IOF. Importantly, as the certainty equivalent payoff the 
members receive increases, so does the farmers’ reservation payoff. As the IOF 
processor is competing with the cooperative for the supplies of raw produce from the 
farmers in the same region, it has to increase the certainty equivalent payoff of its 
suppliers to the level as high as the farmers’ reservation payoff. Therefore, the 
competition pushes the IOF processor’s profit to zero and makes the farmers 
indifferent to supplying the cooperative and the IOF. Because 
௉బమ
ଶ௖(ଵା௖௞మ)
>
௉బమ
ଶ
(
ଵ
௖ା௞భ
െ
݇ଶ) + ܥܧ(߳ଵ߳ଶ), i.e. the certainty equivalent payoff of the farmers trading with an 
enterprise processor is strictly larger than that of self-processing farmers, no farmer 
will choose self-processing. The governance structure of the cooperative and the IOF 
are both efficient, while self-processing is inefficient. Our third proposition can be 
formulated as follows:
Proposition 3: The product quality of the cooperative with an optimal income rights 
structure will be equivalent to that of the IOF. 
3.5 Discussion
We have highlighted two different types of risks in our model and investigated their 
impacts on the quality decisions of risk-averse farmers. Specifically, our results imply 
that the market uncertainty and production uncertainty both will deter the provision of 
product quality. If the payoff regarding the product quality is uncertain, the risk-averse 
farmers will be reluctant to invest efforts in quality improvement. We show that an 
important attribute of the production or marketing contract is to shift the risk of market 
uncertainty from the farmers to the processor. Via the contract, the farmers’ 
participation can be secured. Since the farmers still face the risk of production 
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uncertainty, another function of the contract is to balance the production risk bearing 
and incentive, in order to elicit optimal product quality from the farmers. The 
processor thus optimises the contract according to its objective by choosing the 
payment formula. It is proved that the cooperative processor with a complete pooling 
policy is disadvantageous in the competition with the IOF processor. The latter can 
elicit the optimal quality provisions from the farmers by offering an efficient contract 
with individualised quality incentives. By contrast, the product quality of the 
cooperative with the complete pooling policy will be lower than that of the IOF, and 
will decrease when the cooperative becomes large in terms of membership size. 
Therefore, the cooperative must change its income rights structure and adopt a partial 
pooling policy. 
When investigating the optimal income rights structure of the cooperative, we relax its 
traditional principle of complete pooling and the cooperative can choose a pooling 
ratio. This adds an additional dimension in the cooperative’s approach of aligning risk-
sharing and incentives of the members. One important benefit of pooling is to share 
the risk of production uncertainty among members. When the risk is shared by more 
members, the disutility of risk is smaller for each member and the members are more 
willing to invest efforts in quality improvement. However, the pooling also has a 
negative impact on the quality provision because it will reduce the member’s incentive 
and cause free-riding when the members make quality decisions. Under the 
circumstance of pooling, the more members the cooperative has, the weaker the 
incentive. Therefore, the cooperative must find the applicable pooling ratio, with 
which the pros and cons of the pooling policy can be balanced by the linear 
contract ܲ = ߙ + ߚݍ. Based on this rationale, we derive the optimal income rights 
structure for the cooperative, under which the cooperative can maintain a high product 
quality even when the membership size is growing and large. The configuration of the 
optimal income rights structure is flexible. In order to reach the optimal product 
quality, the cooperative need not necessarily imitate the IOF by abandoning pooling 
and adopting a fully individualised quality incentive. Instead, the cooperative can 
choose from a range of pooling ratios. When a high pooling ratio is chosen, the risk of 
production uncertainty is well shared, and the cooperative can choose a contract with a 
stronger quality incentive. When the a low pooling ratio is chosen, the incentive as 
well as the risk is more individualised, the cooperative thus must choose a contract 
with a large base payment and a weak quality incentive, which better bears the 
members’ production risk. As such, the cooperative has more flexibility in its payment 
arrangements. Importantly, we emphasize that when the members have subjective risk 
towards production uncertainty, the pooling ratio must be lower than an upper bound. 
With a pooling ratio higher than this upper bound, the pros and cons of pooling can no 
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longer be balanced by a contract, and the cooperative’s product quality will therefore 
decrease as the cooperative grows. 
Table 3.4 summarises the effects of the institutional arrangements of different 
governance structures on the provision of product quality.
Table 3.4: Effects on quality provisions in the three governance structures
Self-
processing IOF
Cooperative
Complete 
Pooling
Optimal 
Structure
Shifting Market Risk No Yes Yes Yes
Pooling of Production Risk No No Yes Yes
Free-riding No No Yes Yes
Bearing Production Risk 
by ࢻ No Yes Yes Yes
Providing Sufficient 
Quality Incentive by ࢼ No Yes No Yes
Our model also provides an explanation for the coexistence of IOFs and cooperatives 
in agricultural markets. We argue that by abandoning the complete pooling policy and 
adopting an optimal income rights structure, cooperatives can overcome their 
disadvantageous position in the competition with IOFs.  Theoretically, the product 
quality of the IOF and the cooperative with an optimal income rights structure can 
both reach the same optimal level. However, in reality, the competition between the 
IOF and cooperative is much more dynamic. First, they may have different and non-
precise judgements on the farmers’ absolute risk aversion, quality provision cost 
coefficient, and the level of production uncertainty, which can lead to their different 
decisions regarding the payment formula. Second, the quality incentive of the 
cooperative is normally projected by the members as a certain promise, because the 
members own and control the processor, they can decide and enforce the incentive 
collectively. By contrast, when trading with the IOF, the farmers may have additional 
subjective risk towards the IOF’s quality measurement and payment (Balbach, 1998; 
Gow et al., 2000). This may distort the farmers’ decisions in product quality. Third, 
the cooperative processor may be, to some extent, risk averse instead of risk neutral. 
They may thus adopt a more conservative policy regarding the quality provision. All 
these factors may play a role in the quality competition between cooperatives and 
IOFs. In addition, different processors are also competing in the quality dimension by 
other means. For example, they may provide the farmers with farming supplies and 
technical support in order to decrease the farmers’ subjective risk towards production 
uncertainty ݇ଶ, or help the farmers to decrease the quality provision cost coefficient ܿ.
With such measures, they are able to increase product quality further.
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3.6 Conclusion and Further Research
For a risk-averse decision maker, an uncertain payoff is considered less valuable than 
a certain payoff with the same expected value (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).
Confronted with the risk of market and product uncertainty, the risk-averse farmers’ 
efforts of product quality provisions will be deterred, especially, when they trade 
directly in the market individually. By forming a cooperative, the risk-averse farmers 
can obtain benefits because the cooperative processor insures them from the risk of 
market uncertainty. Pooling also reduces the risk of product uncertainty. However, 
with a complete pooling policy, the members are rewarded for their product quality 
according to the pooled quality of the cooperative. The farmers can also trade with the 
IOF, which rewards the farmers’ product quality on an individualised basis. In a 
principal-agent framework with the processor as risk-neutral principal and the farmers 
as risk-averse agents, we compare the quality provision of a cooperative and an IOF. It 
is shown that the traditional principle of complete pooling policy makes the 
cooperative in a disadvantageous position in the competition with the IOF in a quality-
differentiated market. The reason is that, with the complete pooling policy, when a 
new member joins the cooperative, the loss from the free-riding dominates the benefit 
of risk sharing. As a consequence, the cooperative’s product quality will continuously 
decrease as its membership size increases. By contrast, the IOF processor can design 
an optimal contract that reaches a trade-off between providing incentives and 
minimising the cost of risk. Therefore, the IOF processor elicits higher quality from 
the farmers.
However, the cooperative can overcome this disadvantage by relaxing the traditional 
principle of complete pooling to partial pooling. We find that given the members’ 
subjective risk towards product uncertainty ݇ଶ, the complete pooling policy should be 
by no means adopted by the cooperative. Instead, there is an upper bound on the 
pooling ratio that the cooperative can adopt. We prove that by designing an optimal 
income rights structure for the organisation, the cooperative can maintain an optimal 
product quality level, which is equivalent to the product quality level of the IOF. The 
configuration of the optimal income rights structure is flexible. The cooperative can 
choose from a range of pooling ratios, from no pooling to the upper bound pooling 
ratio. When a high pooling ratio is chosen, the risk of production is well shared, and 
the cooperative can choose a contract with a stronger quality incentive ߚ. When a low 
pooling ratio is chosen, the incentive as well as the risk is more individualised, the 
cooperative thus must choose a contract with a large base payment ߙ, which bears the 
members’ production risk, and a weak quality incentive ߚ. As such, the cooperative 
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also has more feasibility in payment arrangements. However, why the cooperative
may choose a specific pooling ratio within the range needs to be further investigated. 
In general, our model contributes to comparing the product quality provisions of 
cooperatives and IOFs by capturing the uncertainties in agribusiness and the farmers’ 
characteristics of risk aversion. We argue that cooperatives are able to compete with 
IOFs in a quality-differentiated market if an optimal income rights structure is adopted. 
This may provide an explanation for the coexistence of cooperatives and IOFs in many 
agricultural sectors. 
There are various possibilities for further research by relaxing some assumptions of 
our model. One assumption is that the farmers are identical, with respect to both the 
absolute risk aversion level and quality provision efficiency. Hence, the adverse 
selection effect of heterogeneous farmers is not addressed in our model. Second, we 
don’t distinguish between the common and idiosyncratic production uncertainty, and 
simply model the contract based on the absolute quality evaluation. However, the 
contract rewarding farmers based on the relative product quality is also commonly 
used in agricultural production, which shifts the common part of the production 
uncertainty to the processor. Third, as mentioned in Section 3.3, the cooperative 
processor may be risk-averse as well. However, the level of absolute risk aversion of 
the cooperative as a whole may be less than that of each individual member. In 
addition, the IOF may behave opportunistically ex-post regarding quality measurement 
and payment. This entails an additional risk for the farmers who trade with the IOF. 
Finally, the final product market is assumed to be perfectly competitive in our model. 
However, in many agricultural sectors, the markets are oligopolistic. Different market 
settings may change the behaviours of the processors regarding contract optimisation. 
In sum, we argue that there are several additional factors that may potentially 
influence the quality provision of cooperatives and their competition with IOFs.
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4. Social Capital and Incentives in the Provision of 
Product Quality by Cooperatives11
Abstract
This chapter highlights the interaction between social capital, pooling and quality 
premiums and their influence on cooperative members’ decisions regarding product 
quality. A necessary condition for adopting the cooperative equitable principle of 
complete pooling is that there exists a high level of social capital in the cooperative. 
When the level of social capital is high, the social motivation in the cooperative can 
guarantee high product quality while economic incentives are weak. When the level of 
social capital declines, an income rights structure with stronger quality incentives must 
be adopted by the cooperative to maintain product quality. The cooperative is uniquely 
efficient when the farmers are very risk averse and product quality is highly uncertain. 
When the level of social capital in cooperatives is higher than a threshold, which is 
decreasing in members’ subjective risk towards production uncertainty, cooperatives 
are able to achieve higher product quality than IOFs.
Keywords: Quality, Social Capital, Cooperatives, Income Rights Structure
‘Cooperation is jointly determined by social factors and incentive 
alignment.’
(Williamson, 1985:6)
4.1 Introduction
Cooperatives are often associated with low-quality products. The decentralised
decision-making mechanism (Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013) and various traditional 
11 A version of this chapter was published in the proceedings of the following conferences:
the Economics and Management of Networks Conference (EMNet), 2013, Agadir, 
Morocco (https://emnet.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Deng_Hendrikse_2_.pdf); the 140th 
EAAE (European Association of Agricultural Economists) Seminar, Perugia, 2014, Italy; 
the EAAE 2014 Congress, Ljubljana, Slovenia (https://www.conftool.pro/eaae2014/); and 
the Workshop on Producers’ Organizations in Agricultural Markets, 2014, Toulouse, 
France. This chapter has been accepted for presentation at the Conference of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), 2015, Harvard University,
Massachusetts, US.
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cooperative business practices seem not to be conducive to meeting consumers’ need 
for quality (e.g. Saitone and Sexton 2009; Merél, Saitone and Sexton, 2009; Fulton 
and Sanderson, 2002). Specifically, ‘the practice of pooling in cooperatives is 
commonly believed to place cooperatives at a competitive disadvantage in quality-
differentiated markets’ (Liang, 2013:66).
In a pooling arrangement, ‘revenues and costs are to a certain extent allocated 
independent of quantity and/or quality’ (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:509). Under the 
assumption of self-interest or opportunism, due to the free-riding behaviours of 
individual members, collectively optimal quality outcomes will not arise under 
pooling. Low product quality of cooperatives is thus essentially a problem of 
collective motivation. To solve this problem, cooperatives need to adopt an income 
rights structure with a well-designed pooling policy and quality premiums to promote 
the quality provisions of members (Deng and Hendrikse, 2013), and keep high-quality 
farmers (Hendrikse, 2011). There is evidence showing that the cooperatives delivering 
high quality products are characterised by paying quality premiums to members. For 
example, Balbach (1998) reports that after the extractable sugar contracts were 
introduced by cooperative processors to provide additional incentives to reduce 
impurities, the average sugar losses to molasses fell by 36%, while actual sugar 
production per ton of beets rose by 12%, representing significant increases in quality 
and value.   
However, there is also considerable evidence showing that the informal aspects of 
cooperative organisations such as social norms and reputation effects among members 
are no less important than the formal institutional settings of cooperatives (e.g. Nilsson 
and Hendrikse, 2011). Actually, social capital can enable cooperatives to produce 
high-quality products even with the practice of complete pooling. Chloupkova, 
Svendsen and Svendsen’s (2003:243-244) case study of the Danish dairy cooperative 
movement records that, starting from 1882, an increasing number of Danish farmers
started to deliver all their milk to their own cooperatives. The cooperatives were 
formed by circles of energetic entrepreneurs in the local rural communities and 
‘valuable social capital was created bottom-up’ (p.243). The cooperative dairies 
became very successful and the quality of the butter was increased. Milk was delivered 
in good condition because the social control mechanism guaranteed that none of the 
members would cheat. It is worth noticing that the milk quality was secured under 
complete pooling while no quality measurement and incentive were provided in such 
an early stage of Danish dairy cooperatives: ‘a single horse-drawn carriage collected 
the milk from every farm’ (p.244). This study shows that social mechanisms have 
been effective in influencing the product quality by eliminating the free-riding 
problem in the provision of product quality. In addition, cooperatives nowadays are 
75_Erim Deng BW stand.job
61
also able to achieve higher product quality than IOFs under similar quality incentive 
structures. Cechin et al. (2013b) point out that some important differences regarding 
relationship characteristics between the farmers and processors could account for the 
higher quality performance of Brazilian broiler cooperatives. Ruben and Heras (2012) 
also find that the productive and economic performance of Ethiopian coffee 
cooperatives is enhanced by intra-community bonding social capital. Therefore, it is 
desirable to include the role of social capital in the study of the provision of product 
quality by cooperatives. 
According to Granovetter (2005:43), ‘a firm cannot be viewed simply as a formal 
organization, but must also be understood as having the essential elements of any 
social community’. Granovetter’s argument is particularly true of agricultural 
cooperatives, which are jointly owned and controlled by a society of farmers. 
According to Valentinov (2004:5), ‘every cooperative represents simultaneously an 
association of persons in the sense of sociology and social psychology, i.e. social 
group, and a joint enterprise, owned and operated by the same members of this group’.
Cooperatives are therefore with ‘double nature’ (Valentinov, 2004:5) or regarded as 
‘dual organization’ (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011:339).
Social capital has been defined in a number of ways. Payne et al. (2011) categorise
social capital by distinguishing the external (bridging) and internal (bonding) aspects 
and the individual and collective aspects of social capital. The issues typically related 
to the notion of internal social capital in cooperatives include ideology, culture, value,
trust, identity, norms, etc. (e.g. Valentinov, 2004; Feng, Nilsson, Ollila and 
Karantininis, 2011; Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). Member loyalty and 
commitment are often expressed as important indicators of social capital in 
cooperatives (Feng, Nilsson, Ollila and Karantininis, 2011). Previous research on 
cooperative’s social capital has referred to the different facets of internal social capital 
and they can be clustered into three dimensions: structural, cognitive, and relational 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The structural dimension reflects ‘the patterns and 
strength of ties between the members of a group’ (p.244). The cognitive dimension is 
the ‘shared representations, interpretations and systems of meaning among parties,
which reflects the members’ collective understanding of the organisation’s culture, 
shared vision and purpose, common language and codes, etc.’ (p.244). The relational 
dimension refers to ‘those assets created and leveraged through relationships, 
including trust and trustworthiness, norms and sanctions, obligations and expectations, 
and identity and identification’ (p.244). In essence, the relational dimension serves as 
the key resource that can create comparative advantages for cooperatives by 
facilitating members’ collective actions. In this chapter, our analysis of social capital 
in cooperatives will focus on the collective-internal perspective and the function of its 
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relational dimension in mitigating free-riding problems in cooperatives. As such, 
social capital in this study is conceptualised as ‘the ability of a group of agents linked 
by horizontal social relations to discipline individual behaviour’ (Putnam, 1993; in 
Spagnolo, 1999:3).
The importance of social capital for cooperatives has been well recognised. However, 
to our knowledge, a theoretical analysis of social capital in cooperatives is still missing. 
Moreover, prior studies on cooperatives’ income rights structure generally do not 
consider the interplay between economic incentives and social capital. This chapter
fills the gap by presenting a model regarding the interaction between cooperative’s 
social capital and economic incentives and its influence on product quality. Prior 
models on social capital have explicitly highlighted the value of social motivation 
generated by the relational dimension of social capital. These models emerge from the 
standard economic models by introducing a social (dis)utility term into the utility 
function of agents. This social utility term can be specified in different ways but all 
serve as a non-pecuniary source of agents’ motivation. The modelling approach in this 
chapter is mainly adapted from Casadesus-Masanell (2004), Akerlof and Kranton 
(2005) and Uzea and Fulton (2009). According to Casadesus-Masanell (2004), an 
effort-averse agent will observe three significant bases for trust, i.e. norms, ethical 
standards, and altruism, which create intrinsic motivation and result in larger total 
surplus. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) develop a model of identity and work incentives. 
Their principal-agent model incorporates the notion of identity, where employees may 
have identities that lead them to behave more or less in concert with the goal of their 
organisations. The analysis shows that with such an identity, workers are willing to put 
in high effort rather than low effort with limited wage dispersion. Similarly, Uzea and 
Fulton (2009) develop a model to demonstrate how the core firm in a strategic network 
can use identity to deter opportunism by network members. Their main argument is 
that when members identify strongly with their network, they lose utility if they 
deviate from the network norm. 
In this chapter, our model highlights not only the value of social capital in a 
cooperative, but also the necessity of changing the cooperative income rights structure 
when the level of social capital changes. In our model, social capital generates social 
motivation for the members to abide by the product quality standard of the cooperative. 
The members will lose utility if their actions deviate from the standard. We 
demonstrate how the social motivation, based on cooperative’s social capital, and the 
economic motivation, based on the pooling policy and quality premiums formulated in 
the contract between members and processor, jointly influence members’ decisions 
regarding product quality. The results show that when the level of social capital is high, 
the social motivation in the cooperative can support high product quality under a
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collective income rights structure with low quality incentive intensity, and complete 
pooling can be efficient; as social capital declines, the social motivation alone is 
incapable of supporting the cooperative’s quality performance, and an income rights 
structure must with stronger economic incentives must be adopted. Additionally, the 
value of social capital in a cooperative is highlighted by comparing the cooperative 
with an IOF in terms of their product quality and payoff. Social capital makes the 
cooperative uniquely efficient when the farmers are very risk averse and the product 
quality is highly uncertain. We show that when the social capital level in the 
cooperative is higher than a threshold, which is decreasing in members’ subjective risk
towards production uncertainty, the product quality of the cooperative will be higher 
than that of the IOF.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we specify the game between the 
processor and farmers. Section 4.3 determines the equilibrium. Section 4.4 compares 
the product quality and payoff of processors in different governance structures. In 
Section 4.5, we discuss the results and present some empirical implications. The last 
section presents conclusions and suggestions for future research.
4.2 Model
This section presents a non-cooperative game regarding product quality. The decision-
making parties, the choices, the payoffs, the information structure and the sequence of 
the decisions will be specified. 
There are two parties: a group of ݊ upstream farmers and a downstream processor. The 
farmers are identical and produce a raw commodity that needs to be processed before 
reaching the final market. Each farmer produces one unit and supplies it to the 
processor. Each farmer decides individually regarding the quality of his or her product.
The product quality decision of farmer  ݅ is  ݍ௜ , where  ݅ = 1,2, … ,݊ , and the cost 
associated with the quality provision is
ܥ(ݍ௜) =
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
The quality provision cost coefficient ܿ is identical for all farmers and is treated as a 
constant. Without loss of generality, the production costs of the raw produce are sunk 
and will not enter into the analysis (Saitone and Sexton, 2009). We assume that one 
unit of the raw product will be processed into one unit of the final product. 
We model the transactions between the processor and the farmers in a principal-agent 
framework (Holmström, 1979). The processor acts as a risk-neutral principal, and the 
farmers are risk-averse agents who are rewarded by the outcome of their efforts 
78_Erim Deng BW stand.job
64
invested in the product quality. The efforts per se are not observable, but the quality of 
the delivered raw produce from the farmers to the processor is observable and 
verifiable. The processor offers the farmers a linear contract
ܲ = ߙ + ߚݍ. 
ܲ is the unit price of the raw product that the processor will pay for. ߙ (൒ 0) is the 
base (guarantee) price and ߚ (൒ 0) is the quality premium. An important function of 
the linear contract between the principal and agent is to ‘balance the costs of risk 
bearing against the incentive gains’ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:207). This form of 
contract is commonly used in agribusiness, whether the processor is an IOF or a 
cooperative (Gow et al., 2000; Levy and Vukina, 2002; Dubois and Vukina, 2004; 
USDA, 2004; Cechin et al., 2013b). The farmers are risk-averse, and their von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an uncertain payoff ߨ௜  (݅ = 1,2, … ,݊) is
௜ܷ = െ exp(െݎߨ௜).
Parameter ݎ, which is assumed identical for all farmers, is the farmers’ coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion, i.e. the higher ݎ is, the more risk averse the farmers are. The 
payoff uncertainty results from the risks in agribusiness. Agricultural production and 
marketing are subject to different types of risks, including biological risk, price risk 
and institutional risk (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). We focus on the risk of quality 
uncertainty in agricultural production. The realised product quality after harvest is 
ݍ௜ + ߳௜ , where ߳௜ is a normally distributed random noise term, with mean zero and 
variance ߩ௜ଶ , representing the uncertainty in the production. We assume that the 
uncertainty regarding product quality is identical for all farmers, i.e. ߳௜ = ߳, ߩ௜ଶ = ߩଶ.
The variance ߩଶ represents the objective risk of production.
The processor further processes the raw product supplied by the famers and sells the 
final product in the market, which is assumed to be competitive. The market 
differentiates product quality and the processor receives a unit price ௠ܲ from the 
market based on the average product quality ܳ (Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013):
௠ܲ = ଴ܲܳ 
ܳ =
1
݊
෍(ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ ߳).
଴ܲ(> 0) measures the market’s marginal preference for quality and can be understood 
as the aggregated ‘taste parameter’ of the market (Mussa and Rosen, 1978:301). We 
refer to the difference in the quality as in the realm of vertical product differentiation 
(Mérel et al., 2009). The quality of the raw product determines the quality of the final 
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product, and the processing itself cannot change the product quality. The processor’s
aggregate product quality ܳ is thus the average quality of the raw product of all 
farmers.
We compare two governance structures: a marketing cooperative and an investor 
owned firm (IOF). The difference between these governance structures is threefold. 
First, the cooperative, which is collectively owned by a society of farmers, is assumed 
to possess a certain amount of social capital within the organisation. By contrast, the 
social capital, either between the farmers and the IOF processor or among the farmers, 
is assumed low and ignorable as compared with that in the cooperative. In other words, 
the farmers delivering raw produce to the IOF are unsocialised and the relationship 
between the farmers and the IOF is seen as solely seller-buyer. Second, the 
cooperative may apply a pooling policy in its income rights structure while the IOF 
pays each farmer an individualised price for the supply of the raw product. Third, a 
cooperative is characterised by the zero-profit feature, i.e. revenues of the processor 
are returned to its members, while the IOF maximises the processor’s profit. In the 
following, the farmers’ certainty equivalent payoff will be determined for each 
governance structure.
Cooperative
Pooling is a general practice used by traditional cooperatives (LeVay, 1983; Staatz, 
1987). It has a beneficial insurance function for risk-adverse farmers (Hendrikse and 
Feng, 2013). The cooperative can decide on a pooling policy by choosing the pooling 
ratio ߪ, where 0 ൑ ߪ ൑ 1 (Saitone and Sexton, 2009). ߪ denotes the portion of each 
member’s product that is assigned to a common pool. It determines the pooled 
payment received by a member and is contingent on the pooled quality ܳ௖ . 1െ ߪ
denotes the portion of product that receives a member-specific payment based on ݍ௜.
When ߪ = 1, the cooperative applies the complete pooling policy, whereas when ߪ =
0 , the cooperative applies the no-pooling policy. Partial pooling is characterised
by 0 < ߪ < 1 . The cooperative processor retains no profit and maximises the joint 
economic certainty equivalent payoff of the processor and members by choosing the 
base price ߙ௖ , quality premium ߚ௖ , and the pooling ratio ߪ. A cooperative member 
therefore receives 
௖ܲ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖[ߪܳ௖ + (1െ ߪ)(ݍ௜ + ߳)]
ܳ௖ =
1
݊
෍(ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ ߳).
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We suppose that social capital generates a social mechanism making a cooperative 
member internalise the ethical standard in the organisation and will lose utility if his 
action deviates from this standard (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004). Although this is 
indeed an extreme simplification of the concept and functionality of social capital, we 
show that the model is suitable for highlighting the basic function of social capital in 
terms of affecting members’ behaviour. In our model, the cooperative’s ethical 
standard is set as a product quality standard ܳ௦, which is the product quality desired by 
the cooperative. The cooperative’s social capital level, denoted as ο (൒ 0), measures 
the pressure felt by the members to abide by the quality standard. Intuitively, social 
capital in the cooperative results in intrinsic motivation because the further away the 
product quality is from the standard, the larger the social loss the member will suffer. 
This loss in members’ utility can be guilt or the loss of reputation from other members
(Gulati et al., 2000), as a kind of social penalty
ܷ௅௢௦௦ = െ
1
2
ο(ݍ௜ െ ܳ௦)ଶ.
A member’s overall payoff therefore consists of not only an economic but also a social 
part:
ߨ௜(ݍ௜) = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖[ߪܳ௖ + (1െ ߪ)(ݍ௜ + ߳)]െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
ο(ݍ௜ െ ܳ௦)ଶ.
The member’s certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜ = ߙ௖ + ߚ௖ ൥
ߪ
݊
෍ݍ௜
௡
௜
+ (1 െ ߪ)ݍ௜൩ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ߚ௖ଶ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1 െ ߪ)ଶ቉ െ
1
2
ο(ݍ௜ െ ܳ௦)ଶ.
݇ ؠ ݎߩଶ denotes the member’s subjective risk towards the product quality uncertainty. 
The subjective risk is the corresponding objective risk scaled by the farmer’s degree of 
risk aversion (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005: Chap. 4). The term 
ଵ
ଶ
݇ߚ௖ଶ ቂ
ఙమ
௡
+
(1െ ߪ)ଶቃ is the risk premium, which is the disutility of risk.
IOF
When the processor is an IOF, it pays for individual product quality of each farmer. 
The IOF will maximise its total profit subject to the farmers’ participation constraints
by deciding on the linear contract
௙ܲ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜ .
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It is assumed that social capital plays no role in the transactions between the farmers 
and the IOF, i.e. the social (dis)utility does not enter into the farmers’ certainty 
equivalent payoff. The payoff of a farmer ݅ is
ߨ௜ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙(ݍ௜ + ߳)െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ.
Both the quality premium and risk premium in farmer ݅’s certainty equivalent payoff 
are individualised. The certainty equivalent payoff of a farmer trading with the IOF 
processor is therefore
ܥܧ௜ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ െ
1
2
݇ߚ௙ଶ.
We assume that the farmers’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion, quality provision 
cost coefficient, quality uncertainty in production, and the market’s preference for 
quality are common knowledge. The product quality can be perfectly measured. The 
cooperative’s social capital level is also known and treated as exogenous. The game 
consists of three stages. The efficient governance structure (cooperative or IOF) is 
determined in the first stage. The linear contract (and pooling ratio of the cooperative) 
is decided by the processor in the second stage. In the third stage, the farmers decide 
their product quality. The game will be solved by backward induction.
4.3 Equilibrium Quality Incentive
In this section, we derive the equilibrium linear contract (and the equilibrium pooling 
ratio of the cooperative) in the two governance structures.
Cooperative
Member ݅’s decision of product quality in the third stage of the game is obtained via
the FOC (first-order condition) of his certainty equivalent payoff:
ݍ௜כ =
ߚ௖ ቀ
ߪ
݊ + 1െ ߪቁ+ οܳ௦
ܿ + ο
.
Because ܥܧ௜ is concave, the member will choose a product quality between the selfish 
option and the quality standard. As all members are identical, the average product 
quality of the cooperative is
ܳ௖כ =
ߚ௖ ቀ
ߪ
݊ + 1െ ߪቁ + οܳ௦
ܿ + ο
+
1
݊
෍߳
௡
௜
.
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We assume that the cooperative’s product quality standard is the product quality that
generates the first-best cooperative economic payoff:
ܳ௦ =
଴ܲ
ܿ
.
The pooling ratio ߪ and the quality premium ߚ௖ are determined in the second stage of 
the game. Assume that the processing costs and value-added of the cooperative 
processor are sunk. The joint certainty equivalent payoff of the processor and 
members is
ߨ௖ = ܧ ቊ݊ ଴ܲܳ௖כ െ
݊
2
ܿݍ௜כଶ െ
݊
2
݇ߚ௖ଶ ቈ
ߪଶ
݊
+ (1െ ߪ)ଶ቉ቋ.
The cooperative maximises ߨ௖ by choosing  ߪ (0 ൑ ߪ ൑ 1) and ߚ௖  (0 ൑ ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ)12 .
The FOC of ߪ leads to
ߪכ =
ܿ( ଴ܲ െ ߚ௖)
(ܿ + ο)ଶ ቀ
1
݊ െ 1ቁ+ ݇ߚ௖
ܿߚ௖
(ܿ + ο)ଶ ቀ
1
݊ െ 1ቁ
ଶ
+ ݇ߚ௖ ቀ
1
݊ + 1ቁ
.
When ݊ is large, ଵ
௡
ൎ 0 and
ߪכ ൎ 1െ ଴ܲ
ቂ1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶቃ ߚ௖
.
Because 0 ൑ ߚ௖ ൑ ଴ܲ, the pooling ratio the cooperative can choose is
0 ൑ ߪכ ൑
ܿ݇ ቀ1 + οܿቁ
ଶ
1 + ܿ݇ ቀ1 + οܿቁ
ଶ.
And the FOC of ߚ௖ leads to
ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
ൎ
1
ቂ1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶቃ (1െ ߪ)
.
Because 0 ൑ ߪכ ൑
௖௞(ଵାο೎)
మ
ଵା௖௞(ଵାο೎)
మ
, we have
12 The quality premium will not be larger than the market’s marginal preference for quality
because the cooperative has a zero-profit feature.
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1
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
൑
ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
൑ 1.
Combining the solution of ߪכ and ߚ௖כ, we denote the optimal income rights structure of 
the cooperative as
ܵכ ؠ  
ߚ௖כ
଴ܲ
(1െ ߪכ) =
1
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
.
Because the cooperative operates with a zero-profit constraint, the base price can be 
obtained by 
ߙ௖כ = ݍ௜כ( ଴ܲ െ ߚ௖כ).
ఉ೎כ
௉బ
is the ratio between the quality premium of the linear contract and the marginal 
market price with respect to product quality. It measures the absolute strength of the 
cooperative’s quality premium provided by the linear contract. 1െ ߪכ denotes the 
portion of a member’s product that receives a price according to the member’s 
individual product quality. It measures the extent to which the quality premium is 
individualised and the strength of the connection between the quality premium and 
quality provision effort of each member. Therefore, ܵכ essentially measures the overall 
quality incentive intensity of the cooperative’s income rights structure.
The optimal income rights structure is determined by the social capital level ο in the 
cooperative and members’ subjective risk towards quality uncertainty ݇. When the 
cooperative has a very high level of social capital, ܵכ approaches zero. It entails that 
the cooperative can adopt the income rights structures with very low quality incentive 
intensity or even without economic incentive at all if the social capital level is very 
high. At the same time, the cooperative is able to produce high product quality given 
that every member’s quality decision will be close to the quality standard: 
݈݅݉ο՜ஶ ݍ௜כ = ܳ௦ . A high level of social capital thus plays a role of substituting 
economic incentives for product quality. This function is manifested through the 
potential utility loss the members will suffer if their quality decisions deviate from the 
quality standard. However, as the cooperative’s social capital level ο declines, the 
cooperative should increase ܵכ. It entails that when social motivation fades away, the 
cooperative should compensate for the loss by increasing the incentive intensity in its 
income rights structure. This increase can be achieved either by increasing the quality 
premium  ߚ௖כ or by decreasing the pooling ratio ߪכ. The relationship between ܵכ and ο
is stated in Proposition 1 and depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Proposition 1: When the cooperative’s social capital level declines, the quality 
incentive by the cooperative will be stronger.
Figure 4.1: The relationship between social capital and quality incentive intensity
Proposition 2 formulates the comparative statics result regarding the members’ 
subjective risk towards quality uncertainty. Given any level of social capital, a higher 
level of subjective risk  ݇ requires the cooperative to adopt the income rights structures 
with lower quality incentive intensity. This is because a strong quality incentive results 
in substantial risk bearing of the members and generates large disutility. The 
cooperative thus should choose a high pooling ratio, which shares more risks among 
members, or a large base payment, which makes the processor bear more risk. This is 
in line with the results of the classic principal-agent framework (Holmström, 1979).
Proposition 2: When members’ subjective risk towards quality uncertainty increases, 
the cooperative chooses lower quality incentive intensity, given the level of social 
capital.
The choice of  ߚ௖כ and ߪכ in ܵכ is pairwise because the cooperative is faced with a 
trade-off between providing a quality premium and sharing production risk. Figure 4.2
illustrates the values of ߚ௖כ and ߪכ in the optimal income rights structure of the 
cooperative. ܵ଴ represents the value  ߚ௖כ and ߪכ when there is no social capital in the 
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cooperative, while ଵܵ represents the case when the level of social capital ο is higher 
than zero. ܵ଴ serves as a benchmark in highlighting the effect of social capital. In both 
cases, we assume that the members’ subjective risk is equal to ݇.
Figure 4.2: Trade-off between pooling ratio and quality premium in the quality 
incentive intensity
In the case that the cooperative has no social capital, i.e. ο = 0, the optimal income 
rights structure ܵכ converges to ܵכ = ଵ
ଵା௖௞
. The solid part of the curve ܵ଴ is the
efficient frontier of the optimal income rights structures and the dashed part represents 
the unfeasible choices (Deng and Hendrikse, 2013). In the trade-off between ߚ௖כ and 
ߪכ, while a high pooling ratio reduces the risk premium term ଵ
ଶ
݇ߚ௖ଶ ቂ
ఙమ
௡
+ (1െ ߪ)ଶቃ in 
the members’ certainty equivalent payoff via sharing more risk, it also reduces the 
members’ incentive to improve product quality and boosts free-riding. Hence, the 
cooperative needs a large quality premium ߚ௖כ in the linear contract to maintain the 
product quality provisions from the members when the pooling ratio is high. On the 
other hand, when the pooling ratio is low, the quality premium must decrease. When 
the pooling ratio is low, its risk-sharing function will decrease whereas the quality 
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premium will become more effective because of less free-riding. The low pooling ratio 
individualises not only the risk of production uncertainty but also the rewards for 
product quality. Therefore, with a low pooling ratio, the cooperative needs a relatively
low incentive premium to support product quality but a high base price to decrease the 
members’ disutility from the risk of production uncertainty. When ο = 0, the highest 
pooling ratio that the cooperative can enact is 
௖௞
ଵା௖௞
, whereby the cooperative will pay 
no base price to the members and the quality premium of the linear contract will be at 
the highest level, i.e.  ߚ௖כ = ଴ܲ . If the cooperative chooses the no-pooling policy, 
i.e. ߪכ = 0, the lowest quality premium ߚ௖כ =
௉బ
ଵା௖௞
must be chosen and the highest 
base payment must be paid in order to reduce the members’ utility loss due to quality 
uncertainty. The range of the efficient pooling ratio is ቂ0, ௖௞
ଵା௖௞
ቃ , and the range of the 
efficient quality premium is ቂ ௉బ
ଵା௖௞
, ଴ܲቃ. A pooling ratio larger than 
௖௞
ଵା௖௞
is unfeasible 
because, under such circumstances, the cooperative has to use ߚ௖כ > ଴ܲ to maintain the 
product quality level. However, as the cooperative operates on a zero-profit condition, 
choosing ߚ௖כ > ଴ܲ entails that ߙ௖כ < 0. This means that the cooperative charges the 
members a base fee for each unit of produce they deliver. Therefore, the values of ߚ௖כ
and ߪכ on the dashed part of the curve should not be chosen by the cooperative. 
Now we consider the situation when a certain level of social capital exists in the 
cooperative, i.e. ο > 0. With social capital, the frontier of the efficient income rights 
structures expands from ܵ଴ to ଵܵ. The highest efficient pooling ratio is correspondingly 
increased from 
௖௞
ଵା௖௞
to 
௖௞(ଵାο೎)
మ
ଵା௖௞(ଵାο೎)
మ
, and the lowest quality premium is decreased from 
௉బ
ଵା௖௞
 to  
௉బ
ଵା௖௞(ଵାο೎)
మ
. These changes show the value of social capital as it gives the 
cooperative more flexibility in the income rights structure choice. Other conditions the 
same, the cooperative can choose a higher level of pooling or a lower quality premium. 
This makes it possible to boost risk sharing among the members or have the 
cooperative processor bear more risk. Social capital therefore reduces the members’ 
utility loss due to quality uncertainty in production and increases the joint certainty 
equivalent payoff of the cooperative. The social capital in a cooperative is thus 
valuable in response to the quality risk in agribusiness. Proposition 3 formulates the 
relationship between the level of social capital and the flexibility in designing the 
optimal income rights structure of the cooperative.
Proposition 3: The frontier of efficient income rights structure expands when the 
level of social capital increases, i.e.  ࣌כ א ቈ૙,
ࢉ࢑(૚ାοࢉ)
૛
૚ାࢉ࢑(૚ାοࢉ)
૛
቉ and ࢼࢉ
כ
ࡼ૙
א ቈ ૚
૚ାࢉ࢑(૚ାοࢉ)
૛
, ૚቉.
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When the social capital level is very high, i.e.  ο ՜ λ, curve ܵכwill further expand and 
its end points will approach Point A and Point O in Figure 4.2. On Point A, the income 
rights structure consists of ߙ௖ = 0,ߚ௖ = ଴ܲ,ߪ = 1. It entails that the cooperative is 
able to adopt the equitable principle of complete pooling when a very high level of 
social capital exists in the organisation. Complete pooling distributes the net revenue 
to members completely based on delivered volume, regardless the quality of the 
product. The members share the revenue equally and there is no need to pay a base 
payment. Or, the cooperative can simply adopt another type of equitable principle by 
paying each member a fixed price for their deliveries and the pooling is unnecessary, 
i.e. ߙ௖ = ଴ܲܳ௦,ߚ௖ = 0,ߪ = 0 (Point O). In both situations, the high level of social 
capital in the cooperative prevents the members from free-riding. Their decisions on
product quality will be consistent or very close to the quality standard ܳ௦ set by the 
cooperative. 
The existence of a high level of social capital thus explains why some cooperatives are 
able to maintain high product quality while maintaining an equitable principle such as 
complete pooling. Under these circumstances, the members act in their collective 
interests even when they have the chance to behave opportunistically. A high level of 
social capital creates a large certainty equivalent payoff for the members because the 
risk premium is minimised under equitable principles. In addition, as the intensive 
quality control and supervision is avoided, a high level of social capital in the 
cooperative also saves on monitoring and measurement costs. This result is stated in 
the next corollary.
Corollary: A necessary condition for cooperative equitable principles of complete 
pooling is that there exists a very high level of social capital in the cooperative.
IOF
Given the linear contract offered by the IOF processor, farmer ݅ makes the decision of 
product quality by maximising his certainty equivalent payoff. According to the FOC 
of ܥܧ௜:
߲ܥܧ௜
߲ݍ௜
= ߚ௙ െ ܿݍ௜ = 0
ݍ௜כ =
ߚ௙
ܿ
.
Assuming that the processing costs and valued-added of the IOF processor are sunk, 
the IOF will maximise its profit subject to the farmers’ participation constraint as a
reservation certainty equivalent payoff ܴ. The participation constraint of the farmers to 
deliver his raw produce to the IOF is
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ܥܧ௜כ = ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ݍ௜כ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜כଶ െ
1
2
݇ߚ௙ଶ ൒ ܴ.
The IOF will simply pay the lowest possible base payment so that the farmers are 
willing to deliver:
ߙ௙כ = ܴ െ
ߚ௙ଶ
2ܿ
+
1
2
݇ߚ௙ଶ.
The total expected profit of the IOF is
ߨ௙ = ܧൣ݊ ଴ܲݍ௜כ െ ݊൫ߙ௙כ + ߚ௙ݍ௜൯൧ = ݊(
଴ܲߚ௙
ܿ
െ
1
2
݇ߚ௙ଶ െ
ߚ௙ଶ
2ܿ
െ ܴ).
The IOF maximises its profit by choosing  ߚ௙  (0 ൑ ߚ௙ ൑ ଴ܲ):
߲ߨ௙
߲ߚ௙
= ݊( ଴ܲ
ܿ
െ ݇ߚ௙ െ
ߚ௙
ܿ
) = 0
ܵכ =
ߚ௙כ
଴ܲ
=
1
1 + ܿ݇
.
The optimal linear contract the IOF shall offer can be represented by Point B in Figure 
4.2.
4.4 Governance Structure Choice
We now compare the cooperative with the IOF in terms of the equilibrium product 
quality and certainty equivalent payoff. With the optimal income rights structures, the 
cooperative’s expected aggregate product quality is
ܳ௖ = ܧ[ܳ௖כ] = ܳ௦ ቎1െ
ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏.
Each member’s certainty equivalent payoff is
ܥܧ௜כ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
቎1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏.
The cooperative retains no earnings: ߨ௖ = 0. The joint certainty equivalent payoff of 
the farmers and the processor for each unit of product is
89_Erim Deng BW stand.job
75
ߨ௖
௃
= ܥܧ௜כ + ߨ௖ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
቎1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏.
As for the IOF, given the equilibrium linear contract offered by it, the expected 
average product quality of the IOF is
ܳ௙ = ܧ ൭
ߚ௙כ
ܿ
+
1
݊
෍߳
௡
௜
൱ = ܳ௦ ൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰.
Each farmer’s certainty equivalent payoff is equal to the reservation payoff and the 
IOF keeps the remaining part of the payoff for each unit of the product:
ܥܧ௜כ = ܴ
ߨ௙ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰ െ ܴ.
The joint certainty equivalent payoff of the farmers and the processor for each unit of 
product is
ߨ௙
௃
= ܥܧ௜כ + ߨ௙ =
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰.
Table 4.1 summarises the product quality, the farmer’s certainty equivalent (CE)
payoff, the processor’s payoff and the joint payoff per unit of product in each 
governance structure. 
Table 4.1: Product quality and CE payoff per unit of product
Cooperative IOF
Product Quality ܳ௦ ቎1െ
ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏ ܳ௦ ൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰
Farmers’ CE Payoff
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
቎1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏ ܴ
Processor’s Payoff 0 ଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰ െ ܴ
Joint Payoff
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
቎1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇(1 + οܿ)
ଶ
቏ ଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
൬1െ
ܿ݇
1 + ܿ݇
൰
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The comparison of the product quality of the cooperative and IOF is illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3a compares the product quality of the cooperative and IOF 
when 0 < ݇ < ଵ
௖
and ο varies. First, if there is no social capital in the cooperative, i.e. 
ο = 0, or if the social capital is equal to a threshold level ο°= ଵ
௞
െ ܿ, the cooperative 
and IOF will have the same product quality. Second, the sufficient condition for the 
cooperative to have higher product quality than the IOF is ο > ο°, which is obtained 
by solving the inequality of ܳ௖ > ܳ௙. Especially, when ݇ ൒
ଵ
௖
, the threshold level ο°൑
0, the existence of any level of social capital in the cooperative, i.e. ׊ο > 0, will lead 
the cooperative to have higher product quality. This situation is highlighted in Figure 
4.3b. Third, the sufficient condition for the IOF to have higher product quality than the 
cooperative is obtained by solving the inequality of ܳ௖ < ܳ௙ and it is 0 < ο < ο°. The 
results are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The cooperative and IOF will have the same product quality when 
ο = ૙ or ο = ૚
࢑
െ ࢉ. The cooperative will supply lower quality than the IOF if and 
only if ο א ቀ૙, ૚
࢑
െ ࢉቁ.
Figure 4.3a: Quality comparison 0 < ݇ < ଵ
௖
Figure 4.3b: Quality comparison ݇ ൒ ଵ
௖
The comparison of product quality yields the following insights. First, the cooperative 
maximises the members’ certainty equivalent payoff by reaching an optimal trade-off 
between incentivising the product quality and reducing the disutility of risk. Higher 
quality incentive intensity will increase product quality but at the same time decrease
the members’ certainty equivalent payoff because the members are exposed to more 
risk. When  ο = 0 , there is no social motivation in the cooperative and the two 
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governance structures have the same quality incentive intensity (
ଵ
ଵା௖௞
) under the 
optimal income rights structure. The cooperative and IOF thus will have the same 
product quality (
ொೞ
ଵା௖௞
). However, the cooperative has more flexibility than the IOF in 
determining the payment structure by choosing different pairs of  ߚ௖כ and ߪכ on the 
solid part of the curve ܵ଴. To the contrary, the IOF can only choose Point B (Deng and 
Hendrikse, 2013). 
Second, when ο > 0, the cooperative is able to choose weaker quality incentives than 
the IOF does because the social capital in the cooperative serves as a social motivation 
substituting economic incentives for the members’ quality provisions. There is a 
difference of quality incentive intensity between the cooperative and IOF: ܵ௖כ െ ௙ܵכ =
െ
ο௞ቀଶାο೎ቁ
൤ଵା௖௞ቀଵାο೎ቁ
మ
൨(ଵା௖௞)
< 0. When ο = ο°, the quality loss due to the weaker economic 
incentive in the cooperative is exactly offset by the social motivation geared by social 
capital, the cooperative and IOF thus have the same product quality. When ο > ο°
( 0 < ο < ο° ), the quality improvement due to the social motivation exceeds 
(undergoes) the quality loss due to the weaker economic incentive, the cooperative 
thus has the higher (lower) product quality than the IOF. 
Third, the threshold social capital level  ο°= ଵ
௞
െ ܿ is determined by the members’ 
subjective risk towards quality uncertainty. In essence, it reflects the relative 
effectiveness of economic incentive and social motivation in different contexts. The 
solid curve in Figure 4.4 provides a graphical illustration of ο°. The area above curve 
ο° and the horizontal axis represents the range of social capital, with which the 
cooperative will have higher product quality. The area surrounded by curve ο°, the 
horizontal and the vertical axis represents the situations where the IOF will have 
higher product quality. When ݇ is large, the economic incentive is less effective in 
eliciting quality provisions because the highly risk-averse farmers will be reluctant to 
invest efforts in quality improvement as the payoff is treated as highly uncertain. 
Therefore, a low level of social capital in the cooperative is sufficient to generate 
social motivation that compensates the weaker economic quality incentive. ο° will 
then be low. To the contrary, when ݇ is low, the economic quality incentive becomes 
more effective. A high level of social capital is needed to supplement the weaker 
economic incentive and support the product quality and ο° will be high. Cooperatives 
therefore do not always benefit from social capital in product quality provisions. Only 
when the social capital within the organisation is higher than the threshold level ο°,
can the cooperative produce higher product quality than the IOF. As the product 
quality of cooperatives depends on both social capital and members’ subjective risk 
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towards quality uncertainty, comparison of the product quality of the cooperative and 
IOF provides a potential explanation to the fact that cooperatives and IOFs coexist in 
most agricultural markets, some of which ‘have lower quality products provided by 
cooperatives, whereas other markets have high quality products provided by 
cooperatives’ (Liang, 2013:65). As  ο° is decreasing in  ݇ , the advantage of the 
cooperative’s social capital for product quality provisions is more prominent when the 
subjective risk of the farmers is high. This result is formulated in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5: In the agribusiness with high (low) quality uncertainty in production, 
high-quality products are mainly produced by cooperatives (IOFs).
Figure 4.4: Product quality, social capital and subjective risk
Straightforward comparison of the joint certainty equivalent payoff shows that when 
an optimal income rights structure is chosen by the cooperative, the joint certainty 
equivalent payoff of the cooperative will always be higher than that of the IOF if the 
cooperative’s social capital level is higher than zero. The existence of social capital in 
the cooperative replaces economic incentives and helps reduce disutility from the risk 
of production uncertainty when the farmers are risk averse. Therefore, with social 
capital, the cooperative is always more efficient than the IOF. Proposition 6 states the 
result:
Proposition 6: The cooperative is uniquely efficient when ο> ૙.
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4.5 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the results of our model and link the propositions with the 
empirical observations in previous cooperative studies. While there are no direct tests 
of our theory, there is some related evidence that is worth mentioning. First, we review 
the relationship between social capital and the practices and success of cooperatives. 
Second, we discuss the change in social capital when cooperatives develop and the 
consequences of this change in cooperatives’ performance and income rights structure. 
Finally, we highlight the need for maintaining and recovering social capital in 
cooperatives and discuss how to achieve it.
Social Capital and Cooperative Success
Cooperative social capital has long been recognised as a main comparative advantage 
of the cooperative form (Røkholt, 1999; Spear, 2000; Hogeland, 2006). According to 
Borgen (2001), control and coordination in cooperatives cannot be fully accomplished 
by means of prices or authority. Successful cooperatives are characterised by their 
capacity to overcome this gap with social capital. With the informal control and 
coordination geared by social capital, monitoring and transaction costs can be saved 
(Chloupkova, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003; Volentinov, 2004), and the problem of
coordination and aligning preferences can be alleviated (Castiglione, van Deth and 
Wolleb, 2008). The model in this chapter highlights the informal control function of 
cooperatives’ social capital and captures its values in three aspects.
First, as a substitute for formal control, social capital mitigates the free-riding problem 
and generates social motivation for members’ quality provisions. Proposition 3 and its 
Corollary show that the equitable principles adopted by most traditional cooperatives, 
especially those in the early stage of the lifecycle, is based on the high level of social 
capital they possess. As cooperatives usually start on a small scale, members are 
usually well acquainted and there is strong social relationships among them (Nilsson, 
Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The trust among members makes them believe that no 
one will shirk their duties. Social sanctions and reputational effects in the cooperative 
community make opportunistic behaviour costly. Members are loyal to their 
cooperatives and have high commitments. 
With a high level of social capital, traditional cooperatives enjoy the benefits of 
complete pooling by sharing production risk among members to the largest extent and 
achieving economy of scale. At the same time, high product quality can still be 
sustained because a high level of social capital diminishes the tendencies to free-ride 
and default for individual advantage (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). As demonstrated 
by the Danish dairy cooperatives case, farmer cooperatives were historically superior 
94_Erim Deng BW stand.job
80
in the production of large and homogeneous volumes of high-quality agricultural 
products. Social capital provides a foundation for their success. By contrast, if there is 
insufficient social capital, complete pooling becomes inefficient and should not be 
adopted by cooperatives. Actually, if there is only weak social capital within the 
membership, the members tend to be ignorant and free-riding behaviour will prevail. 
Empirical evidence from Macedonia, Russia and Eastern Europe shows that if there 
exists insufficient social capital between potential members, especially the mutual 
trust between individual farmers, cooperatives will not be founded or be successful 
because no collective actions can be enabled and sustained (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 
2011). Social capital is thus regarded as the ‘point of departure’ in the governance of 
traditional cooperatives (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012:190) and the ‘sine 
qua non’ for the success and adaptation of cooperative enterprises (Feng, Nilsson, 
Ollila and Karantininis, 2011:1). Social capital provides a social explanation to the 
common practice of complete pooling in traditional cooperatives, which appears 
difficult to explain when being analysed purely on the grounds of economic incentives.
Second, Proposition 2, 4 and 5 indicate that social capital is especially valuable when
economic incentives are less effective for product quality provisions. As stated in 
Proposition 2, when farmers’ subjective risk towards quality uncertainty is high, the 
risk attitude of farmers imposes large constraints on the applicability of economic 
incentives. The processor has to adopt a limited strength of economic incentive under 
these circumstances, and high product quality is difficult to obtain. Social capital gives 
cooperatives an additional degree of freedom to incentivise their members and make 
cooperatives capable of achieving high product quality. This argument can be 
generalised to other situations where economic incentives fail. In our model, farmers’ 
subjective risk is the scale of their absolute risk aversion level and the objective 
quality risk in production. The objective quality risk is assumed to be adhered to the 
nature of agricultural production per se. However, there are also other sources of 
uncertainty in the agribusiness value chain that will contribute to the quality risk. 
When this uncertainty exists, economic incentives will also become ineffective and 
give rise to the role of social capital. For example, the uncertainty in grading and 
testing mechanisms will cause a systematic underinvestment of farmers in farm-level 
quality control when a price-grade type incentive structure is applied (Hennessy, 1996). 
The case of the US sugar beet industry also shows that, when trading with an IOF, the 
farmers may face additional uncertainty towards the IOF’s quality measurement and 
payment (Balbach, 1998). This uncertainty in the agribusiness value chain makes 
farmers less willing to invest in improving product quality. In both situations, the 
social motivation geared by social capital may help cooperatives overcome the 
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impediment of economic incentives and support high product quality. Nevertheless, 
this prediction is subjected to more empirical tests.
Third, as stated in Proposition 6, social capital can generate a higher certainty 
equivalent payoff for cooperative members. Agricultural production is usually 
uncertain and farmers are generally risk averse. Although linear contracts are designed 
to optimally trade off risk bearing against quality incentives, the risk premium the 
farmers bear will increase with the quality incentive intensity. As social capital 
provides social motivation for quality improvement, it plays a role of reducing the use 
of economic incentives or even completely substituting them in the case that the social 
capital level is very high. This is beneficial for cooperative members because weaker 
quality incentives imply a larger pooling ratio or a larger base payment in the linear 
contract, which expose the members to less risk from quality uncertainty and make the 
processor bear more risk. The loss of certainty equivalent payoffs due to risk premium 
is reduced by social capital, which justifies the advantage of the cooperative business 
form. 
Cooperative Growth, Social Capital, and Failure
Nowadays, cooperatives tend to adopt market-oriented strategies in order to respond to 
increasing competitive pressure and changing market situation. While facilitating their 
growth, cooperatives often expand horizontally by merging with others and/or 
vertically by moving forward in the value chain (van der Krogt, et al., 2007). However, 
the social capital level in cooperatives is supposed to decline as they become large and 
complex cooperatives (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The reasons are 
multifaceted. First, horizontal expansions tend to create a large and heterogeneous 
membership (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012), which is detrimental to 
cooperative social capital. According to Hogeland (2006), the culture in traditional
cooperatives will be changed as the cooperative expands. When cooperatives become 
large and complex, the social interactions between members, which serve as the 
mechanism to develop and maintain shared beliefs, values and vision, become less 
frequent. Without sufficient social interactions, the conditions for building personal 
trust are no longer in place either (Granovetter, 1985). In addition, according to 
Granovetter (2005:34), ‘the larger the group, the lower is its ability to crystallize and 
enforce norms, including those against free-riding’. Second, vertical integration 
strategies drive cooperatives enter into value-added business which is far away from 
members’ on-farm activities. Cooperatives’ business becomes so complex that
members have difficulty in understanding it (Nilsson and Hendrikse, 2011). At the 
same time, as more decision power is allocated to professional managers, members 
have limited influence on the cooperatives’ decision making (Bager, 1996, Hart, 1997; 
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Bhuyan, 2007, Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). The shrinking members’
control in large cooperatives not only changes the governance of cooperatives, but also 
makes them act more like IOFs and more corporate-oriented (Hind, 1997, 1999;
Hendrikse, 2005), thereby weakening identification of members with the cooperative 
(Borgen, 2001). Third, ideology plays a less prominent role in cooperatives nowadays. 
According to Fulton (1995), changes in society’s values are likely to make cooperation 
more difficult. Farmers today are more pragmatic about their cooperatives and 
members’ decisions are based mainly on economic terms (Karantininis and Zago, 
2001). The behavioural constraints that social capital can set on members are much 
weaker. 
Low social capital in the organisation has been used to explain the failure of large and 
complex cooperatives in the past decades. Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012:187)
summarise that the drain of social capital is reflected in ‘less involvement for mutual 
benefits, less collaboration and members’ decreasing trust in their cooperatives’ 
leaders, as well as in each other’. With a low level of social capital, members forgo 
cooperative value and care mainly about individual economic benefits; members lose 
their loyalty to their cooperative; members are not willing to sacrifice any short-term 
loss for long-term gain; members tend to be free riders and they are unwilling to 
provide equity to cooperatives; members do not trust managers and make inadequate 
commitment to control the management; collaboration in cooperatives becomes 
cumbersome and efficiency is lost, to name a few.
Regarding product quality provisions, low social capital in large and complex 
cooperatives will lead to weak social motivation. Weak social motivation and an 
income rights structure with weak economic incentives is a misalignment in the 
incentive system. Members will have insufficient motivation to deliver high quality 
products and it leads to low product quality of cooperatives. According to Proposition 
1, when the cooperative’s social capital level declines, the cooperative must provide 
stronger economic incentives for product quality provisions. To do this, the 
cooperative can change the income rights structure either by increasing the quality 
premium in the linear contract or by decreasing the pooling ratio. Proposition 3 
specifies the highest efficient pooling ratio a cooperative can enact. As the social 
capital level in the cooperative declines, the highest efficient pooling ratio will also
decrease. It entails that the income rights structure needs to become more 
individualised. In addition, when the cooperative’s social capital level declines, the 
necessary condition for the complete pooling policy does not hold anymore. With 
severe free-riding problems, the complete pooling policy becomes very inefficient and 
should be abandoned. 
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The change of income rights structure of The Greenery provides an example of 
conversion from collective to more individualised forms of income rights structure.
The Greenery is the outcome of a merger of nine Dutch regional fruit and vegetable 
auction cooperatives. Besides the large size, The Greenery’s membership 
heterogeneity increased (Hendrikse, 2011). In the first few years after the merger, 
some large growers left the cooperative because of ‘cross-subsidization of small 
growers’ (Bijman and Hendrikse, 2003:102). Meanwhile, some innovative producers 
left because the equality principle of pooling limits the payoff they could receive for 
their innovation efforts (Hendrikse, 2011). Explained from the social capital 
perspective, as a large and complex cooperative, The Greenery has very limited social 
capital in the organisation. Members’ patronage commitment is no longer associated 
with social motivation but with economic incentives. The Greenery later introduced 
the member benefit programmes, which increased the number and extent of quality 
attributes covered by specific clauses in the incentive contracts. Members receive the 
payoff for higher product quality in terms of a quality-specific price (Hendrikse, 2011). 
With the member benefit programmes, the cooperative increased the economic 
incentive density for product quality. After that, innovative producers did not leave 
The Greenery anymore and some even came back to the cooperative (Hendrikse, 
2011). The Greenery case shows the necessity of adjusting the income rights structure 
according to the level of cooperative social capital. As a large and complex 
cooperative with heterogeneous membership, The Greenery has to introduce strong 
economic incentives, as its social capital seems to have played no role in providing 
motivation for quality provisions.
Maintain and Recover Cooperative Social Capital
Although we argue that changing the income rights structure is necessary when 
cooperative’s social capital level declines, it is also important to emphasise that 
cooperatives should never forgo the potential value of social capital in bringing
comparative advantages to cooperatives. Besides providing social motivation and 
bringing larger welfare to members, social capital can generate other benefits for 
cooperatives and members. For instance, social capital also helps cooperatives obtain 
financial resources and stability. Since cooperatives generally have to obtain 
additional equity from their members (Hansmann, 1996), members who trust their 
cooperative are more willing to invest in the cooperative. In addition, the cooperative
ideology of members makes them more willing to accept a large amount of 
unallocated equity capital (Fahlbeck, 2007).
Maintaining social capital during the development of the cooperative may become 
increasingly difficult as the membership base expands and becomes more 
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heterogeneous (Valentinov, 2004). Nevertheless, it can still be very successful. Social 
capital in organisations mainly relies on the factors that shape the evolution of the 
social relationship between members, namely, time, interaction, interdependence, and 
closure (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Horizontal and vertical expansion of a 
cooperative may change all or most of these factors by modifying the social network 
structure of cooperatives, decreasing the possibility of interactions among members, 
lowering the interdependency between members, and weakening the identity of 
membership. In other words, the growth of cooperatives goes at the expense of social 
capital (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). If cooperative members and 
managers can identify the detrimental trends of declining social capital and initiate 
proper membership strategies to counter it, social capital in cooperatives can be 
maintained.
Uzea and Fulton (2009) provide empirical evidence of the Co-operative Retailing 
System (CRS) in Canada, where identity management has successfully been applied,
together with economic mechanisms, to manage opportunisms in the network, such as 
shirking on quality maintenance of the brand name, patronising outside and 
overexpansion. CRS is a network of about 264 retail cooperatives and their wholesaler, 
Federated Co-operatives Limited (FCL). The strategy of FCL to maintain social 
capital mainly consists of ‘identity management’ (p.16), which includes establishing 
CRS identity, fostering retails’ identification with the system and establishing 
succession planning. Empirical study has shown that strong identification is a 
significant trust-making mechanism in cooperative organisations (Borgen, 2001). CRS 
successfully removed individualistic norms, created cooperative norms, enhanced 
common and mutual understanding, shared knowledge and promoted loyalty. By 
inducing the members to identify with the network, members have the desire to ‘act in 
compliance with one’s own identity’ (p.5). The robust cooperation among members is 
promoted. In combination with the identity management, the economic mechanisms of 
CRS such as the patronage refund system and the marketing programme are also 
introduced to deter opportunisms by the retails. For example, the patronage refund 
system, which distributes part of the net savings to members in proportion to their 
patronage, ‘providing retails strong incentive to operate in the system’ (p.23). The 
well-designed combination of social and economic mechanisms brought great success 
to CRS. It is worth noting that the social capital in CRS, represented by retails’ 
identification with the system, is reinforced by the success of the CRS, ‘providing the 
retails with even stronger incentives to co-operate in patronising their wholesaler’
(p.32). The success of CRS demonstrates cooperative success achieved by strategically 
building cooperative’s social capital in combination with proper economic incentives.
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4.6 Conclusion and Further Research
A model is formulated to study the value of social capital in cooperatives and the 
importance of the balance between social capital and the income rights structure of
cooperatives. It highlights the value of social capital in the provision of product quality 
by cooperatives. Social capital generates social motivation for members to abide by 
the product quality standard of the cooperative. With social capital, the cooperative is 
able to adopt low-powered economic incentives for product quality, and expose 
members to less quality uncertainty. The existence of a very high level of social 
capital supports the equitable principle of complete pooling in traditional cooperatives. 
With social capital, cooperatives are more attractive than IOFs because they can 
generate a larger joint certainty equivalent payoff for farmers. However, social capital 
may change with the development of cooperatives. The increasing prevalence of a 
market-oriented perspective has led marketing cooperatives to assign increasing 
importance to expansion strategies (van der Krogt, et al., 2007). Cooperatives tend to 
lose social capital when they expand horizontally and vertically. We argue that when 
social capital in cooperatives is incapable of supporting product quality by providing 
sufficient social motivation, the change in cooperatives’ income rights structure 
becomes necessary. When the cooperative’s social capital level declines, stronger 
quality incentives will be introduced by the cooperative.
Social capital provides social motivation for cooperative members in the provision of 
product quality; however, it will not always lead cooperatives to have higher product 
quality than IOFs. Whether cooperatives have higher product quality depends on the 
social capital level and the subjective risk aversion level of farmers. When farmers 
have a high subjective risk towards quality uncertainty, the economic quality incentive
becomes less effective in eliciting their quality efforts. The social motivation geared 
by the social capital becomes more advantageous. As an IOF is less able to elicit high
quality supplies from the farmers by using economic incentives, a low level of social 
capital in the cooperative is already sufficient to make the cooperative supply higher 
product quality than the IOF through the mechanism of social motivation. To the 
contrary, when the farmers have a low subjective risk toward quality uncertainty, the 
economic quality incentive will become more effective, and a high level of social 
capital will be needed to supplement the weaker economic incentive in the cooperative. 
Therefore, social capital is supposed to make cooperatives more competitive in the 
agribusinesses with higher quality uncertainty in production. 
In this chapter, our notion of social capital is much more basic and elementary than 
those discussed in the voluminous literature on social capital. However, the value of 
our model lies in its explanatory power of the functional aspects of relational social 
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capital, the behaviour mechanism behind it, and what social capital can accomplish for 
a cooperative. This chapter offers a rigorous theoretical explanation of the value of 
cooperative social capital and indicates various possibilities for further research. First, 
the members’ social motivation to act according to the cooperative’s standard is treated 
as exogenous and is determined by the social capital level of the cooperative in the 
model. There is the possibility that pooling policies may influence social capital as 
well, i.e. the two-way interaction between the economic incentives and social
motivation. Partial pooling represents a higher intensity of individualised quality 
incentives for members than complete pooling. It may, positively or negatively, affect 
the members’ social preference of contributing to the wellbeing of the cooperative. In 
other words, the decrease of the pooling ratio can have the ‘crowding-in’ or 
‘crowding-out’ effect on the cooperative’s social capital, which provides intrinsic 
motivation for members’ quality provisions (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012:368). 
The next step is therefore to model the interaction between the cooperative income 
rights structure and social capital by making the latter as an endogenous attribute of 
the cooperative. Second, the members’ cost parameter of product quality and their risk 
aversion level are assumed identical. We do not investigate the adverse selection 
problem caused by the decreasing social capital in this chapter (Hendrikse, 2011).
Further modelling is called for to address heterogeneous members’ decisions. Third, a 
longitudinal study of the evolution of social capital in a single large cooperative along 
its lifecycle is lacking. Such studies are helpful to provide cooperative practitioners 
and researchers with a better understanding of the balance of the cooperative’s social 
and economic attributes. 
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5. The Impact of Pooling on Structural Social 
Capital and Product Quality in Cooperatives
Abstract
Decisions by members in cooperatives are driven by economic as well as social 
concerns. They value the income resulting from the (quality of) products delivered to 
the cooperative as well as the interactions with other members and the concern for 
their wellbeing. We investigate in a game theoretic model the consequences of 
members’ social interactions on their product quality decisions. It is shown that the 
amount of the members’ social interactions depends upon, and increases with, the 
cooperative’s pooling ratio. We show that the complete pooling is not only 
economically efficient but also socially advantageous when it can stimulate frequent
social interactions among members. However, when the social context of the 
cooperative is no longer conducive to social interactions, the complete pooling policy 
will become sub-optimal. The cooperative should abandon the pooling policy. In 
particular, the model offers an alternative explanation for several of the commonly 
observed phenomena relating to the pooling policy of cooperatives.
Keywords: Social Capital, Social Interaction, Cooperatives, Pooling Policy
‘Most behaviour is closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations.’
(Granovetter, 1985:504)
5.1 Introduction
Voluntarily formed by a group of producers to achieve their collective economic goals 
and interests, every cooperative represents an association of persons in the sociological 
and social-psychological sense (Valentinov, 2004). A cooperative is therefore a joint 
enterprise collectively owned by a social group. The members are not anonymous 
financiers but real persons who run their own agricultural enterprises (Nilsson, 
Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012). The local nature of cooperative membership entails 
that the members are likely to know each other and have social relationships (Cropp 
and Ingalsbe, 1989; Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). Therefore, there exists a social 
network among the members of a cooperative.
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Sociologists have forcefully argued that the embeddedness of economic activities in 
networks of social ties has a profound impact on the economic performance of 
organisations (e.g. Coleman, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Turner, 1999). Nowadays, this 
is also reflected in economic models of social networks (e.g. Goyal, 2007). It seems 
therefore appropriate to model the social connections among members in cooperatives.
In this chapter, we investigate the social ties between members in cooperatives, which
can be characterised as the structural dimension of social capital. According to 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, (1998), structural social capital reflects the overall pattern of 
social connections between the members in the organisation. A high level of structural
social capital featured by the existence of strong social ties among members is 
beneficial for cooperatives in various aspects. It not only facilitates the exchange of 
information between the members but also supports the formation of the cognitive and 
relational dimension of social capital, such as shared vision, trust, and norms in the 
cooperative (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998).
Furthermore, social ties in a cooperative community carry personal attachments 
between the members. According to van Dijk and van Winden (1997:325), a social tie 
between two individuals consists of their ‘sentiments’ about each other, which are 
defined as ‘the extent to which one person cares about the other’s welfare and derives
satisfaction from it’. Social ties thus give rise to altruism between members. Similar to 
the altruism between colleagues in a workplace or in a team (Rotemberg, 2006), the 
altruism between cooperative members may promote reciprocal behaviours. That is, an
altruistic member will care about the fellow members’ wellbeing, and then adapts his
or her future actions accordingly. Therefore, in addition to other benefits, social ties
between cooperative members may serve as a source of social motivation for their
production activities and have potential impacts on cooperative’s economic 
performance.
Social ties between people are not always constant. Instead, ‘they depend on the 
history of interaction between the individuals’ (van Dijk and van Winden, 1997:324).
In cooperatives, members are socially connected to each other and the altruism
between them is rooted in the social ties. Following Dur and Sol’s (2010:295) work on 
the formation of social ties, we assume that a member’s altruistic feelings towards 
others depend on the ‘attention’ the member has received. The formation and strength
of the altruism in a cooperative thus depend on the amount of the members’ social 
interactions. By adopting Coleman’s (1988) approach of incorporating agents’
purposive actions in social contexts, we argue that cooperative members’ social 
interactions are driven by the net utility they can derive. Two aspects are likely to play 
an important role in members’ decisions regarding social interactions. First, the 
income rights structure of the cooperative may influence the members’ willingness to 
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interact because it determines the externality of their economic payoff on their social 
interactions. The members will interact more if the externality is larger because the 
economic benefits of social interactions are better internalised. Second, the social 
utility and costs of social interactions will be considered by the members. It is natural
to expect that the members will interact less if social interactions are more costly or 
bring less social utility.
According to Singh (2012:107), ‘there are two main classes of social interaction 
models in economics, one that uses non-cooperative game theory to study the strategic 
interaction among agents, and another that uses empirical models to determine the 
existence of social interaction effects reflecting the role of nonmarket influences on 
individual decision-making’. In this chapter, our approach belongs to the first class. 
Specifically, we present a game theoretic model to capture the members’ social 
interactions and product quality decisions under different pooling policies. We obtain 
two main results. First, the model shows that the income rights structure of 
cooperatives influences the social interactions of members and social ties in the 
cooperative. The amount of the members’ social interactions and the strength of social 
ties depend upon, and increase with, the cooperative’s pooling ratio. In addition, the 
increase of the marginal cost of social interaction activities will deter the formation of 
social ties. Second, the social ties have a positive impact on the members’ production 
activities, economic payoff, and total utility. With strong social ties, the cooperative 
can approach the first-best level of product quality and joint economic payoff under 
the complete pooling policy. When considering the members’ total utility instead of 
merely their economic payoff, the complete pooling policy is economically and 
socially desirable if strong social ties can be formed in the cooperative. However, 
when complete pooling cannot facilitate sufficient social interactions between the 
members due to increasing social interaction costs, the cooperative should abandon the 
complete pooling policy and adopt the no-pooling policy. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we present the model and 
derive the equilibrium. In Section 5.4, we provide the comparative statics analysis. In 
Section 5.5, we discuss the empirical implications and the final section concludes.
5.2 Model
We study a cooperative with two identical members.13 In this model, we consider the 
members’ production activities as well as social interaction activities. Members decide 
13 This setting can be extended to a cooperative with n (>2) members in order to analyse
richer network structures.
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on their social interaction activities simultaneously in the first stage of the game, while 
production activities are determined in the second stage. The equilibrium social 
interaction activities and product quality decisions are determined by backward 
induction.
Each member produces one unit of raw product and supplies it to the cooperative. The 
cooperative sells the product in a functioning market and pays the members. We focus 
on the members’ production activities regarding their quality provisions. The members 
decide the product quality ݍ௜  (൒ 0;  ݅ = 1 ݋ݎ 2) individually, which is assumed to be 
fully contractible. The cooperative’s aggregate product quality ܳ஼ is the average 
quality of the raw product of both members
ܳ஼ =
1
2
(ݍଵ + ݍଶ).
The cooperative’s income rights structure is represented by its pooling policy. It is 
captured by the pooling ratio ߪ  (0 ൑ ߪ ൑ 1) , which denotes the portion of each 
member’s product that is assigned to a common pool (Saitone and Sexton, 2009). It 
determines the pooled payment received by a member and is contingent on the pooled 
quality  ܳ௖ . 1െ ߪ denotes the portion of product that receives a member-specific 
payment based on ݍ௜ . When  ߪ = 1 , the cooperative applies the complete pooling 
policy, whereas the cooperative applies no pooling when ߪ = 0. Partial pooling is 
characterised by 0 < ߪ < 1. The cooperative’s pooling ratio is known and treated as 
exogenous. Assume that ଴ܲ(> 0) is the marginal price of product quality, which can 
be understood as the aggregated ‘taste parameter’ of the market (Mussa and Rosen, 
1978:301), and ܿ is the cost coefficient of the quality provision, the economic payoff 
of a member’s production activity is
ߨ௜ = ߪ ଴ܲܳ஼ + (1െ ߪ) ଴ܲݍ௜ െ
1
2
ܿݍ௜ଶ , ݅ = 1 ݋ݎ 2.
The members’ social interaction activity ݏ௜  (൒ 0;  ݅ = 1 ݋ݎ 2) is modelled as the social 
interactions initiated by member ݅ . According to Dur and Sol (2010:294), social 
interactions can be modelled as an exchange of ‘attention’ between agents. A member 
initiates social interactions by giving social attention to the other member. It can be the 
‘kind gestures’ the member gives to the other (p.294), e.g. an invitation for coffee or a 
conversation about family issues. The members’ social interaction activities ݏ௜ are not 
contractible but costly in terms of time, money, and efforts. The cost is assumed to be 
݀ݏ௜, where ݀(> 0) is the marginal cost coefficient of social interaction activities.
Social interactions generate two types of benefits (van Dijk and van Winden, 1997;
Dur and Sol, 2010). First, it brings direct social utility to the receiver. For example, 
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when member 1 initiates social interactions, member 1’s social interaction activities
will bring member 2 a direct social utility of ݇ݏଶ (݇ > 0) because people enjoy being 
treated kindly by others. Second, social interactions lead to altruistic feelings among 
the members. That is, when member 1 initiates social interactions, his social 
interaction activities will lead to member 2’s feeling of altruism towards him. When 
member 2 is altruistic towards member 1, member 2 cares about member 1’s economic 
payoff in addition to member 2’s own economic payoff. Sheldon (1971) claims that 
this effect is increasing in the time and effort invested in a relationship. Likewise, the 
more frequently agents interact, the more cooperative behaviours will emerge and 
sustain (Duffy and Ochs, 2009). We thus assume that the strength of the altruistic
feeling member 2 will develop towards member 1 is proportional to the social 
interactions member 2 receives from member 1. An altruism utility term ݏଵߨଵ is 
incorporated in member 2’s utility function. ݏଵ thus measures the strength of the 
developed social ties from member 2 to member 1. It is assumed that the members 
appreciate social interactions similarly. Social interactions thus have the same 
altruism-creating effect on both members. These features are presented in the members’
utility functions
ଵܷ = ߨଵ െ ݀ݏଵ + ݇ݏଶ + ݏଶߨଶ
ܷଶ = ߨଶ െ ݀ݏଶ + ݇ݏଵ + ݏଵߨଵ.
We assume that the members’ quality provision cost coefficient, social interaction 
activity cost coefficient, and the market’s preference for product quality are common 
knowledge.
5.3 Equilibrium
In the second stage of the game, member 1’s product quality is determined by the FOC 
(first-order condition) of his utility function:
߲ ଵܷ
߲ݍଵ
=
߲ߨଵ
߲ݍଵ
+ ݏଶ
߲ߨଶ
߲ݍଵ
=
ߪ ଴ܲ
2
+ (1െ ߪ) ଴ܲ െ ܿݍଵ + ݏଶ
ߪ ଴ܲ
2
= 0.
ݍଵכ =
଴ܲ
ܿ
ቂ1െ
ߪ
2
(1െ ݏଶ)ቃ.
Similarly, member 2’s quality decision is ݍଶכ =
௉బ
௖
ቂ1െ ఙ
ଶ
(1െ ݏଵ)ቃ.
The cooperative’s equilibrium product quality is
ܳ஼כ =
଴ܲ
ܿ
ቂ1െ
ߪ
4
(2െ ݏଵ െ ݏଶ)ቃ.
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Substitute ݍ௜כ and ܳ஼כ in ߨ௜:
ߨଵכ =
ߪ ଴ܲଶ
ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
4
(2 െ ݏଵ െ ݏଶ)ቃ +
(1 െ ߪ) ଴ܲଶ
ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
2
(1െ ݏଶ)ቃ െ
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
2
(1 െ ݏଶ)ቃ
ଶ
ߨଶכ =
ߪ ଴ܲଶ
ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
4
(2 െ ݏଵ െ ݏଶ)ቃ+
(1 െ ߪ) ଴ܲଶ
ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
2
(1െ ݏଵ)ቃ െ
଴ܲ
ଶ
2ܿ
ቂ1 െ
ߪ
2
(1 െ ݏଵ)ቃ
ଶ
.
In the first stage of the game, the social interaction activity of each member is 
determined by:
߲ ଵܷ
߲ݏଵ
=
߲ߨଵכ
߲ݏଵ
െ ݀ + ݏଶ
߲ߨଶכ
߲ݏଵ
=
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
4ܿ
െ ݀ െ
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
4ܿ
ݏଵݏଶ = 0
߲ܷଶ
߲ݏଶ
=
߲ߨଶכ
߲ݏଶ
െ ݀ + ݏଵ
߲ߨଵכ
߲ݏଶ
=
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
4ܿ
െ ݀ െ
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
4ܿ
ݏଵݏଶ = 0.
We obtain ݏଵݏଶ = 1െ
ସ௖ௗ
ఙమ௉బ
మ. The symmetric solution of the members’ equilibrium
social interaction activity is 
ݏ௜כ = ݏכ = ඨ1െ
4ܿ݀
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
.
Social interactions will occur and social ties will be formed when ߪ > ଶξ௖ௗ
௉బ
.
Substitute ݏ௜כ in ܳ஼כ :
ܳ஼כ =
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ ଴ܲ
ܿ
቎1െ
ߪ
2
(1െඨ1െ
4ܿ݀
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
)቏ , ߪ >
2ξܿ݀
଴ܲ
଴ܲ
ܿ
(1െ
ߪ
2
),  ߪ ൑
2ξܿ݀
଴ܲ
.
We denote ߨ஼ = ߨଵ + ߨଶ as the joint economic payoff of the cooperative. It is equal to
ߨ஼כ =
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ଴ܲଶ
ܿ
൦1െ
ߪଶ
4
ቌ1െඨ1െ
4ܿ݀
ߪଶ ଴ܲଶ
ቍ
ଶ
൪ , ߪ >
2ξܿ݀
଴ܲ
଴ܲ
ଶ
ܿ
ቆ1െ
ߪଶ
4
ቇ ,   ߪ ൑
2ξܿ݀
଴ܲ
.
The members’ total utility in equilibrium is
ܷ஼כ = ଵܷכ + ܷଶכ = ߨ஼כ + [ߨ஼כ + 2(݇ െ ݀)]ݏ௜כ.
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5.4 Comparative Statics Analysis
In this section, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium outcome. 
We first analyse the influence of the cooperative’s pooling policy on the members’ 
social interactions. Next, we study how the pooling ratio and social ties jointly 
determine the cooperative’s product quality and economic payoff. Finally, we consider
the members’ total utility in the justification of the cooperative’s pooling policy. This 
analysis permits us to formulate propositions regarding the members’ behaviour and 
the optimal pooling practices of cooperatives.
Social Interactions and Social Ties
Figure 5.1 presents a graphical illustration of the members’ social interactions as a 
function of the pooling ratio.
Figure 5.1: Members’ social interactions
Members’ social interactions are highly dependent on the cooperative’s pooling policy.
First, there exists a threshold pooling ratio ߪ் =
ଶξ௖ௗ
௉బ
. Only when ߪ > ߪ் will the 
members undertake social interaction activities. Otherwise, no social interactions will 
take place and no social ties will be formed. Second, if social interactions occur, then 
they are increasing in the pooling ratio. ݏכ can be rewritten as ට1െ ఙ೅
మ
ఙమ
when ߪ > ߪ்.
When the cooperative enacts the complete pooling policy (ߪ = 1), the members will 
undertake the maximum amount of social interactions: ݏ௠௔௫כ = ඥ1െ ߪ்ଶ, and develop 
the strongest social ties and the highest level of altruism towards each other. The 
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following proposition summarises the relationship between the pooling ratio and social 
interaction:
Proposition 1: Cooperative members will undertake social interactions only when 
࣌ > ૛ξࢉࢊ
ࡼ૙
and it is increasing in the pooling ratio.
Pooling creates an externality in cooperative members’ production activities, which 
means that ‘the actions of one party result in benefits or costs for another party’ (Feng, 
2011:7). In our model, if a member increases (decreases) his product quality, the other
member will benefit (suffer) through the pooling. A larger pooling ratio entails a larger 
externality because one member’s quality decision will have more impact on the 
other’s economic payoff and vice versa. An altruistic member’s utility depends 
positively on the economic payoff of the other member. He will partly internalise the 
effect of his production activity on the other member, therefore adjusting his product
quality decision in the desired direction in response to the receipt of social interactions.
As such, the members will attempt to make others feel altruistic towards them by 
investing in social interactions. The larger the pooling ratio, the more willing are the 
members to invest in social relationships with their fellow members because the 
benefits from social interactions are more internalised. The cooperative’s income 
rights structure influences the members’ social interactions via the economic 
incentives it offers. Since the social ties between the members are based on their social 
interactions, the income rights structure thus has an influence on the cooperative’s
structural social capital.
Different pooling ratios reflect different levels of collectivism in the cooperative’s
income rights structure. The presence of a pooling ratio threshold ߪ் entails that if the 
income rights structure of the cooperative is too individualistic, it will not be able to 
stimulate social interactions between the members. ߪ் is determined by three 
parameters: the members’ quality provision cost coefficient ܿ , social interaction 
activity cost coefficient ݀, and the market’s preference for product quality ଴ܲ. The 
members will undertake social interaction activities if doing so will increase their 
equilibrium utility ௜ܷ
כ . The benefit of social interactions is determined by the 
economic payoff of quality provisions and the extent of externality, whereas the cost is 
determined by the cost coefficient ݀. If ܿ and ܲ are constant, the economic payoff of a
certain level of quality provision is fixed. A larger ݀ will require a larger pooling ratio 
in order to increase the externality. ߪ் will thus be proportional to ݀. Conversely, if ݀
is fixed, the decrease of ܿ and increase of ܲ both will raise the payoff of quality 
provisions. The benefits of social interactions under the same level of externality are
larger. A smaller pooling ratio is thus sufficient to stimulate social interactions. Either 
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a smaller ܿ or a larger ଴ܲ (or both) will decrease ߪ் , making social interactions more 
attractive.
The pooling ratio threshold  ߪ் also determines the amount of the social interactions
and the strength of the social ties. Given a certain pooling ratio ߪ (> ߪ்), the larger 
the ߪ் , the smaller the ݏכ . Likewise, the maximum amount of social interactions
ݏ௠௔௫כ  depends on ߪ் . When ߪ் is close to 0, ݏ௠௔௫כ approaches 1. The members will 
develop the strongest ties between each other. However, when ߪ் increases, ݏ௠௔௫כ will 
decline, and the ݏכ curve will converge towards the point ߪ = 1 on the horizontal axis 
of Figure 5.1. In other words, the social interactions and social ties between the 
members diminish when ߪ் increases. Especially, when ߪ் ൒ 1, i.e., 
௉బమ
ସ௖ௗ
൒ 1, there 
will be no social interactions and no social ties between the members even under the 
complete pooling policy. ߪ் is increasing in ܿ and ݀ but decreasing in ܲ. As we focus
specifically on the social interactions of members, we derive the range of ݀ in that the 
social interactions will not occur, and social ties cannot be formed. 
Proposition 2: Cooperative members will undertake no social interactions under any 
pooling policy if ࢊ ൒ ࡼ૙
૛
૝ࢉ
.
Figure 5.2 depicts the range of ݀ and ܿ, in which social interactions can occur.
Figure 5.2: Parameter range of social interactions
Because ߪ் is increasing in ݀, the formation of social ties will become more difficult 
or even impossible when ݀ increases. The intuition is that, besides the income rights 
structure, the formation of social ties in the cooperative fundamentally depends on the 
social context of the cooperative community since it determines the marginal cost of 
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the members’ social interaction activity. The following aspects may lead to an increase
of ݀ . First, ݀ is positively associated with the distance between the members. For 
instance, if the members are living in a close neighbourhood or attend the same church 
regularly, they can interact with each other easily. By contrast, if the members live far 
apart or don’t know each other, it will be much more costly to initiate social 
interactions. Second, ݀ increases with the heterogeneity of members. If the members 
are very different in terms of background, interest, production scale, product portfolio,
and so on, there is less proximity to enable smooth social interactions. Third, ݀ may 
also depend on the opportunity costs of time. Social interactions are time consuming.
If the members perceive that the time they spend on social interactions could have
generated higher payoffs by investing it in other activities, this translates into a larger 
cost of social interaction activities.
Cooperative Product Quality and Economic Payoff
Because the cooperative can neither contract on the members’ social interaction 
activities nor measure the costs and social utility of social interactions, its attention is 
confined to the product quality ܳ஼ and joint economic payoff of the members’ 
production activities: ߨ஼ = ߨଵ + ߨଶ. They are important for the cooperative because, 
as a business firm, the cooperative competes with the other types of firms in the 
market and aims to achieve the highest possible economic payoff.
For the purpose of comparison, it is useful to derive the equilibrium results of the 
standard economic model, in which the social interactions and the related effects are
ignored. The equilibrium product quality and joint economic payoff of the standard 
economic model are 
௉బ
௖
(1െ ఙ
ଶ
) and 
௉బమ
௖
ቀ1െ ఙ
మ
ସ
ቁ. Furthermore, we can derive the first-
best product quality. The FOC of ߨ஼ leads to ܳி஻ =
௉బ
௖
, and therefore the first-best 
joint economic payoff ߨி஻ =
௉బమ
௖
. A direct comparison of the first-best results and the 
equilibrium results of the standard economic model indicates that the pooling policy 
reduces the cooperative’s efficiency by decreasing product quality.
The equilibrium product quality ܳ஼כ and joint economic payoff ߨ஼כ can be normalised
by using ܳி஻ and ߨி஻ , respectively. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 present the normalised
equilibrium results ܳ஼כᇱ and ߨ஼כᇱ . The first-best product quality and joint economic 
payoff are represented by the horizontal lines equal to 1 in each figure. The dotted
curves represent the normalised equilibrium results of the standard economic model.
Because the cooperative’s joint economic payoff relies on the cooperative product 
quality, its change along ߪ has a similar pattern to that of the cooperative product 
quality. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are thus similar in form except for the scales of the y-axis. 
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Figure 5.3: Cooperative’s product quality
Figure 5.4: Cooperative’s joint economic payoff
112_Erim Deng BW stand.job
98
Several implications regarding the cooperative’s choice of pooling policy can be 
drawn. First, when the cooperative adopts the no-pooling policy, the first-best product 
quality and joint economic payoff can be realised. In such a circumstance, each 
member is paid individually according to his or her own product quality. There will be 
no free-riding in the product quality provisions, but in the meantime, there will be no 
social interactions between the members. By contrast, when the cooperative applies a
pooling policy, the cooperative’s equilibrium product quality and joint economic 
payoff are determined by the joint effect of economic and social motivation. The 
former is directly decided by the pooling ratio whereas the latter is geared by social 
ties between the members.
Second, the cooperative’s equilibrium product quality and joint economic payoff will 
fall below the first-best levels when there is pooling. Pooling facilitates the members’ 
free-riding behaviours in their product quality provisions. The larger the pooling ratio, 
the more severe the free-riding problem. As Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show, the 
cooperative’s equilibrium product quality and joint economic payoff will decrease 
continuously in ߪ when ߪ ൑ ߪ் , where no social interactions take place and the 
equilibrium results are the same as what the standard economic model predicts. When 
ߪ ൑ ߪ் , there is only economic motivation for the members, which is weaker than 
under the no-pooling policy. Therefore, the cooperative should not choose a pooling 
ratio ߪ א (0,ߪ்]. Instead, it should adopt the no-pooling policy. In other words, if a 
pooling policy only leads to free-riding and does not stimulate social interactions, it 
should not be enacted.
Third, when ߪ > ߪ், pooling will elicit social interactions between the members. With 
social interactions, the members develop social ties and altruism starts to play a role in 
their decision making regarding product quality. With social motivation based on 
altruism, the cooperative’s equilibrium product quality and joint economic payoff will
be above the standard economic equilibrium outcomes and increase in ߪ when ߪ א
(ߪ், 1] . The pooling policy is indispensable for social motivation because the 
externality of production activities is dependent on the pooling ratio. Although a larger 
pooling ratio leads to more free-riding, it also stimulates more social interactions and 
facilitates the development of stronger social ties. They will reach their maximum
levels when ߪ = 1. Therefore, if the cooperative decides to enact a pooling policy, 
complete pooling is the best choice.
Finally, when the cooperative chooses the complete pooling policy, the equilibrium 
product quality and joint economic payoff rely on the maximum amount of social 
interactions it can elicit. When ߪ = 1, we rewrite ܳ஼כᇱ = 1െ
ଵ
ଶ
(1െ ݏ௠௔௫כ ) and ߨ஼כᇱ =
1െ ଵ
ସ
(1െ ݏ௠௔௫כ )ଶ , where  ݏ௠௔௫כ = ඥ1െ ߪ்ଶ . As we have discussed above,   ߪ் is 
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ultimately decided by ݀. When ݀ is very low,  ߪ் approaches 0, and ܳ஼כᇱ and ߨ஼כᇱ will 
be close to the first-best levels. The reason is that, when   ߪ் decreases to 0, the 
members’ social interactions under complete pooling ݏ௠௔௫כ will increase to 1. Member
1’s utility ଵܷ will be almost equal to ߨଵ + ߨଶ + ݇. It entails that member 1 puts the 
same weight on the economic payoff of member 2 as on his own economic payoff. 
Member 1 will not free ride and the same reasoning applies to member 2. Therefore, 
the economic incentives under an egalitarian distribution such as the complete pooling 
policy are perfectly efficient when the ‘complete social consciousness’ is obtained in 
the agricultural cooperative (Sen, 1966:369). When  ߪ் increases with ݀, ܳ஼כᇱ and ߨ஼כᇱ
will decline. When ݀ is larger, the members’ social interactions will become less 
because they are more costly. As a consequence, the social ties become weaker and 
less altruism is developed. The members care less about the other’s economic payoff 
and become more willing to free ride on product quality provisions. When ݀ increases 
to 
௉బమ
ସ௖
, ߪ் will be close to 1. The members’ social interactions disappear, and ܳ஼כᇱ and 
ߨ஼כᇱ converge on the equilibrium results of the standard economic model. In this 
situation, it is better for the cooperative to choose no pooling.
We summarise the analysis of Figure 5.3 and 5.4 in the following proposition
regarding the choice of cooperative pooling policy:
Proposition 3: If the cooperative decides to enact pooling, it should choose the 
complete pooling policy, which facilitates the strongest social ties between the 
members. With complete pooling, the cooperative can approach the first-best 
product quality and joint economic payoff when the marginal cost of social 
interactions is very low. However, if pooling cannot stimulate (sufficient) social 
interactions due to the large marginal cost of social interactions, the cooperative 
should choose the no-pooling policy. 
Total Utility
According to LeVay (1983:3), ‘cooperatives are known to appeal to people not merely 
as a means of running a business but also as an instrument of social amelioration’.
Therefore, the social utility resulting from social interactions and social ties should not 
be ignored when we evaluate the cooperative’s pooling policy. The members’ total 
equilibrium utility is ܷ஼כ = ଵܷכ + ܷଶכ = ߨ஼כ + [ߨ஼כ + 2(݇ െ ݀)]ݏ௜כ. The first term of ܷ஼כ
is the economic payoff of production activities and the second term is the social utility 
originated from the members’ social interactions and social ties. The social utility 
includes the members’ satisfaction derived from other members’ economic payoff and 
the net benefits of social interactions. In Figure 5.5, the members’ total utility is 
represented by the dashed curve. When ߪ ൑ ߪ், there are no social interactions in the 
114_Erim Deng BW stand.job
100
cooperative, the utility curve is the same as the economic payoff curve. When ߪ > ߪ்,
the total utility curve starts to increase and will dominate the first-best economic 
payoff due to the additional social utility.
Figure 5.5 indicates that the cooperative’s pooling policy, especially the complete 
pooling policy, can be better justified when the members’ social utility is taken into 
account. If the members have strong social ties, i.e. ݏכ being close to 1, the members’ 
total utility ܷ஼ approaches 2(ߨி஻ + ݇), which is higher than the first-best economic 
payoff ߨி஻. The members enjoy the social interactions and develop strong social ties
between each other. In turn, the altruisms make them better off when seeing other 
members achieving high economic payoffs, and drive them to invest optimal efforts in 
the quality provisions. As such, the pooling policy can lead to the members’ total 
utility being much higher than the first-best economic payoff under the no-pooling 
policy. In particular, in the presence of social interactions, the members receive the 
highest total utility under the complete pooling policy.
Figure 5.5: Members’ total utility
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When ߪ் increases with a larger ݀ , the members’ total utility will decrease 
consequently. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, less social interactions result in 
weaker social ties and less altruism. The cooperative’s economic payoff drops due to 
increasing free-riding in product quality provisions. On the other hand, the social 
utility drops as well, because the members appreciate others’ economic payoffs less 
and receive lower net social benefits due to the lower social attention from others and 
higher costs of social interaction activities. Under the complete pooling policy, when 
 ߪ் increases to 1, the ܷ஼כᇱ curve converges to the standard economic payoff. As shown 
in Figure 5.5, when  ߪ்  is larger than a certain value ߪԢ்  (< 1), the members’ total 
utility will fall below the first-best economic payoff. 14 This makes the complete 
pooling policy sub-optimal even when we consider its social effect. In such a situation, 
the best strategy of the cooperative is to abandon the complete pooling policy and 
adopt no pooling. In so doing, the members receive individualised economic quality 
incentives and there will be no free-riding. The members can obtain the first-best 
economic payoff but there will be no social interactions between them. They receive 
no social utility any more. We summarise this insight in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: The complete (no) pooling policy maximises total utility when 
 ࣌ࢀ < (൒)࣌Ԣࢀ.
5.5 Discussion
Our model incorporates several important stylised facts of a traditional cooperative’s 
development along its lifecycle. In particular, the model explains some of the 
commonly observed phenomena regarding the pooling policy of cooperatives. 
In a pooling arrangement, ‘revenues and costs are to a certain extent allocated 
independent of quantity and/or quality’ (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:509). Under the 
assumption of self-interest or opportunism, due to the free-riding behaviours of 
individual members, collectively optimal quality outcomes will not arise under 
pooling. The pooling policy is regarded as detrimental to product quality and 
economic performance of cooperatives (Saitone and Sexton, 2009; Liang, 2013). 
However, when the marginal cost of social interactions is low, the pooling policy,
especially complete pooling, is actually desirable instead of sub-optimal due to its
prominent social effect. Cooperative members may be motivated by more than 
economic benefits. Our model shows that, the pooling policy can stimulate social 
interactions among members and thus support the formation of social ties in the
14 ߪԢ் can be obtained by solving the equation: ܷ஼כᇱ = 1. However, it is not possible to 
derive an analytical expression of the solution.
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cooperative. When cooperative members are socially connected, they develop
altruistic feelings towards each other. The members will be reluctant to free ride on the 
efforts of others when they are altruistic. The social interactions among the members 
generate not only social utility but also social motivation for members’ production 
activities. The cooperative can be efficient under the complete pooling policy and the 
members can obtain a high total utility.
The benefits of the pooling policy largely depend on the social context of the 
cooperative community. The complete pooling policy is common in the early stage of 
a cooperative’s development. According to Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen
(2012:189), ‘practically all cooperatives started on a small scale’. Members are usually 
well acquainted and there are strong social ties among them. In a small community, 
the members can easily undertake frequent social interactions between each other,
which foster the altruism within the membership. Meanwhile, the complete pooling 
policy creates a large positive externality in the members’ production activities. With 
the social motivation based on altruism, the members will not free ride. As such, the 
cooperative is efficient under the complete pooling policy. The members not only 
enjoy the economic payoffs comparable to the first-best level but also derive large 
social utility. Therefore, when the cooperative is in the early stage of the lifecycle, 
given the very low social interaction costs in the cooperative community, it is always 
beneficial to apply the complete pooling policy. This result offers an additional 
justification for the complete pooling policy of traditional cooperatives other than the 
explanation of economies of scale (Staatz, 1987) and production risk sharing (Deng 
and Hendrikse, 2013).
The complete pooling policy will become inefficient when it cannot elicit sufficient
social interactions among the members. This may occur when the social context of the 
cooperative community changes, for example, when the cooperative expands and the 
membership becomes large and heterogeneous. In some large cooperatives, the 
members are no longer from the same village or community. Instead, they are from 
different regions or even from different countries (Bijman, 2010). As the members are 
becoming anonymous, it is more difficult and costly for them to interact with each 
other. As a consequence, they feel alienated to each other and the social ties in the 
cooperative become weaker (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009; Österberg and Nilsson, 
2009). The industrialisation of agribusiness also contributes to diminishing social ties 
in cooperatives. The members of some cooperatives have become large and modern 
farming enterprises instead of small farming households from decades ago. These 
farming enterprises are managed professionally and have large scales of production. 
They focus on the production activities and rarely interact with each other. As there is 
no space for members to develop social ties and altruistic feelings towards each other, 
117_Erim Deng BW stand.job
103
the complete pooling policy will lead to severe free-riding problems and low economic 
performance. The cooperative’s best choice is thus to adopt the no-pooling policy. 
When members receive the individualistic economic payoff regarding their production 
activities, they tend to judge their cooperatives on the basis of economic efficiency 
more than its traditional social utility. In this sense, it can explain why cooperatives 
nowadays are losing their social attributes and becoming similar to conventional firms. 
5.6 Conclusion and Further Research
Because a cooperative is simultaneously a firm and a community, one cannot study the 
cooperative without considering its social context. To our knowledge, the theoretical 
explanation of the effects of the social ties among members in cooperatives is still 
missing in the literature. In addition, while such social ties have been claimed to be 
important for cooperatives, the way that they are formed and the factors that determine 
their strength are less well understood. In this chapter, social ties between members 
are viewed as the manifestation of the structural social capital of the cooperative. We
develop a game theoretic model to analyse the dynamics and value of the social ties in 
a cooperative. 
One main result is that the cooperative’s income rights structure has important impacts 
on the members’ social interactions and in turn the formation of social ties. Another 
factor, which powerfully affects the formation of social ties, is the marginal cost of the 
members’ social interactions. While the cooperative’s pooling policy results in an
externality regarding the members’ production activities, the marginal cost of social 
interactions determines the amount of social interactions that will occur. Large pooling 
ratios and a low marginal cost of social interactions will boost the formation of strong 
social ties. We also show that the social ties are beneficial for the cooperative because
altruism among the members carried by the social ties has a positive impact on the 
cooperative’s economic performance and members’ utility. Therefore, the complete 
pooling policy is not only economically efficient but also socially advantageous when 
the marginal cost of social interactions is low. However, when the social context of the 
cooperative does not allow for low-cost social interactions, the complete pooling 
policy will become sub-optimal. The cooperative should abandon the complete 
pooling policy and adopt the no-pooling policy. The results correspond with the 
common feature of a cooperative’s development along its lifecycle regarding the 
pooling policy choice.
Several topics for future research may be pursued. First, the cooperative product 
quality in our model is the average of the members’ product quality. There is no 
complementarity between the members’ productive efforts. In addition, we did not 
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capture the complementarity between the social interaction activities and production 
activities, which may exist because social interactions lead to the exchange of 
information and experience (Peterson and Anderson, 1996). As such, although our 
model allows us to show the prominent altruistic effect of social ties, it will be worth 
investigating the above-mentioned complementary effects as well. Second, the
marginal costs of the social interactions have been modelled as an exogenous variable 
in the current study. This assumption is reasonable because the change in the social 
structure in cooperatives has been largely driven by the trend of increasing 
competition and industrialisation in agribusiness (e.g. Bijman, 2010). However, the
marginal cost of social interactions might be endogenously affected by the members’ 
social interactions. After cooperative members have developed social ties, social 
interactions may become less costly since they have known each other better. Third, 
some cooperatives have started to organise social events to create opportunities for 
members to interact with each other. These events can be understood as the measures 
the cooperatives undertake to decrease the costs of social interactions. Members may 
develop social ties through these organised social events more easily. The effect of 
these social events in cooperatives is an interesting topic for further empirical research.
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6. Managerial Vision Bias and Cooperative 
Governance15
Abstract
What causes firms to behave the way they do when they face different investment 
opportunities? We argue that both people and processes are behind the decision-
making of project implementation. Member and professional CEOs of cooperatives 
differ regarding their managerial vision towards upstream and downstream projects. 
Cooperatives with member CEOs are upstream focused and it is reflected by the 
cascading effect of negative vision bias towards downstream projects. When 
downstream activities become more important, cooperatives need to replace the 
member CEOs with professional CEOs. However, a cooperative with a professional 
CEO may still be in a disadvantageous position if the member-dominated Board of 
Directors’ negative bias towards downstream projects is too strong, which may result 
in an investor owned firm (IOF) being the efficient governance structure.
Keywords: Vision Bias, Cooperatives, Governance 
‘There is thus ample reason to think that any particular organisational
structure will bias policy-making toward some outcomes and away from 
others.’
(Hammond and Thomas, 1989:158)
6.1 Introduction
What causes firms to behave the way they do when they face different investment 
opportunities? We argue that both processes and people are behind the decision-
making of project implementation. First, the income and decision rights allocation of a 
governance structure shape the impact of decision-makers’ discretion in the decision-
making process (Hansmann, 1996). Second, as strategies are closely linked to the 
upper echelons of governance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), human factors of 
15 A version of this chapter was published in the proceedings of the EAAE 2014 Congress, 
Ljubljana, Slovenia (https://www.conftool.pro/eaae2014/); the Workshop on Producers’ 
Organizations in Agricultural Markets, 2014, Toulouse, France. This chapter has been 
accepted for publication by the Journal of European Review of Agricultural Economics.
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decision makers must be taken into consideration when we study decision-making in 
organisations. In the cooperative literature, each of these factors has attained much 
attention, but they are not analysed within the same model. In this chapter, we 
incorporate the decision-making characteristics of different governance structures and 
decision makers’ identity into one model. We compare cooperatives managed by 
different types of CEOs, and identify the circumstances under which professional 
CEOs will be efficient and create cooperatives’ competitive advantages over IOFs.
Decision-making processes and decision makers are important in cooperatives. A
prominent feature of traditional cooperatives’ decision rights allocation is member 
dominance (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). 16 The General Assembly (GA) of 
cooperatives has more extensive decision-making power than the annual shareholders 
meeting of IOFs do (Hendrikse, 1998). In addition, according to Feng (2011:21), ‘the 
cooperative board of directors, democratically chosen by and from the membership, 
was the main body governing the activities and investments of the cooperative firm’.
Because CEOs of cooperatives have almost no influence on the board composition 
(Cook and Burress, 2013), the BoD enjoys the independence to ‘question management
decisions and reject its recommendations’ (USDA, 2002:11). Burress, Livingston and 
Cook’s (2012) survey shows that cooperative boards are intensively involved in the 
development and evaluation of cooperatives’ strategic decisions. By contrast, in an 
IOF, ‘the CEO often has a large, if not dominant voice, in selecting the Board of 
Directors’ (USDA, 2002:11). As an organisation can be perceived as a collection of 
decision-making bodies, a traditional cooperative is characterised by two independent 
decision-making bodies regarding project decisions: the CEO (of the cooperative firm)
and the BoD (representing the members). While the CEO of the cooperative decides 
whether to submit an investment project proposal to the BoD, the BoD has the power 
to veto the proposal. Conversely, an IOF consists of only one decision-making body
dominated by the CEO (Hendrikse, 1998:204). 
Another feature of cooperatives is the identity of the BoD and CEO, which refers to 
the BoD’s and CEO’s group affiliation based on their career background (Liang and 
Hendrikse, 2013). The identity of cooperative BoD is determined by the ownership 
16 The term ‘traditional cooperative’ refers to the cooperatives in which the board of the 
cooperative holds the real decision-making power. Conversely, if the decision-making 
power has shifted from the board to the managers, the cooperative is not regarded as a 
traditional cooperative anymore. Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen (2013) describe the 
traditional mode of cooperative governance and the other two non-traditional modes in the 
Netherlands. Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013:12) categorise agricultural cooperatives into 
three broad types of governance models along a ‘member control’ continuum – traditional 
model, extended traditional model, and managerial and corporate model.
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nature of cooperatives. The BoD of cooperatives is dominated by farmer members 
(Hendrikse, 1998; Cornforth, 2004; Burress, Livingston and Cook, 2011). Although 
this board composition secures members’ trust in the BoD (Hendrikse and Veerman,
1997), it may make cooperatives less efficient than IOFs because the member directors 
may lack the necessary skills and knowledge needed on the board (Staatz, 1987; Lang, 
2002; USDA, 2002; Bond, 2009). Cooperatives have responded by hiring outside 
directors with specific expertise, while securing member dominance. Similar concerns 
also apply to member CEOs of cooperatives. Although member CEOs are somehow 
advantageous for cooperatives in that they are closely connected to the member 
community and are often professional in agricultural production management, they 
may lack the knowledge of market and other managerial skills compared with 
professional CEOs. These worries about the competence in the governance of 
cooperatives were already pointed out by LeVay (1983:20; see also Vitaliano, 1983)
more than 30 years ago based on the ‘… presumption that most farmers cannot see any 
further than the farm gate and that directors of agricultural co-operatives, unless the 
executive or outside expertise are co-opted onto the board, are production, rather than 
market, orientated’. More recently, USDA (2002) calls for highly professional 
leadership for cooperatives and Bijman et al. (2012) highlight the relevance of outside 
directors and board training.
The CEO of a cooperative, as the head of the management team, can be either a farmer 
member of the cooperative or a professional manager employed from outside. 
Historically, cooperatives usually start on a small scale and one of the members 
assumes the role of CEO (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012; Feng, 2011).
However, the CEO identity may change along the cooperative’s lifecycle. As the 
cooperative develops and grows, it will need full-time professional executives because 
the experience and competence of most members are insufficient for the cooperative 
management (Feng, 2011). Nowadays, more and more cooperatives recruit CEOs and 
the rest of the management team from the labour market (Nilsson, Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2012; Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013; Chaddad and Iliopoulos,
2013; Bijman, Hanisch and van der Sangen, 2014). The CEO identity also varies 
across cooperatives in different countries due to different legislation, culture and 
development stages of cooperatives. For instances, many cooperatives in China have a
member as CEO, while in Western countries, especially in the USA, most cooperatives 
employ outside CEOs (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013). 
The market conditions in the agrifood business have been changing quickly over the 
past decades (e.g. Bijman, 2002, 2010; Hendrikse, 2011; Liang, 2013). According to 
Bijman (2002:8), ‘the most fundamental one is the shift from production-orientation to 
market-orientation in the strategy of producers’. It entails that downstream activities 
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become more and more important in agribusiness. These downstream activities include 
the vertical expansion into value-added business, exploitation of market opportunities, 
creation of superior customer value, and so on. Cooperatives have been criticised as 
being too focused on bulk production and too slow in responding to the market and 
competitors (Nilsson, 2001). With the changes in market conditions, a common 
concern is whether the cooperative is still an efficient governance structure. Due to the 
production orientation and upstream focus, traditional cooperatives may be 
disadvantageous in competition with IOFs when downstream projects are more
important. In addition, cooperative scholars have argued that the traditional decision-
making mechanism in cooperatives are more arduous and time-consuming, leading to 
a competitive disadvantage (Henehan and Anderson, 1994) and lost opportunities 
(Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2010). In order to become market-oriented, many 
cooperatives have gone through restructuring by replacing member CEOs with 
professional CEOs and allocating more decision power to CEOs (Bijman, Hendrikse 
and van Oijen, 2013).
These observations raise the question when professional CEOs are beneficial for 
cooperatives? We address this question in a project rectification and selection model 
by considering decision maker’s managerial vision. Decision makers of a firm are 
confronted with many business ideas and opportunities and need to make decisions 
regarding project implementation. Decision makers with different identities are 
featured by different managerial visions. We suppose that a decision maker is 
‘consistently biased towards certain types of projects and against others’ (Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 2000:695). The positive (negative) vision bias entails that the decision 
maker favours (dislikes) the project and makes the decision maker’s judgement of the 
project payoff differs from the true value positively (negatively). Translated into the 
context of agricultural marketing cooperatives, a member CEO and a professional 
CEO may have different managerial visions towards upstream and downstream 
projects. We are interested in how the vision biases of different CEOs may influence 
the cooperative’s behaviour and performance, under what circumstances a member or 
professional CEO is beneficial for the cooperative, and when cooperatives outperform 
IOFs?
Our results show that managerial vision leads to inefficiency in project 
implementation because it results in the decision errors of abandoning sometimes good 
projects and implementing sometimes bad projects. Moreover, managerial vision and 
governance structure of the firm jointly shape the decision outcome and organisational
performance. The upstream focus of traditional cooperatives is reflected by the 
cascaded negative vision bias towards downstream projects forged by the double 
screening feature of cooperative decision-making. When downstream activities 
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become more important, cooperatives need to replace member CEOs with professional 
CEOs. While a professional CEO proposes more downstream projects to the BoD than
a member CEO does, the member-dominated BoD’s negative vision bias and the 
double screening feature of cooperative decision-making can reduce the errors of 
implementing bad downstream projects. Hiring a professional CEO thus generates the 
cooperative’s advantage in competing with an IOF in downstream activities. However, 
a cooperative with a professional CEO may still be less attractive than an IOF if the 
cooperative’s BoD has a strong negative bias towards downstream projects. Therefore, 
it is necessary for the cooperative to include outside directors on the board not only to 
bring specific expertise but also to ease the negative vision bias.
We begin by reviewing the previous research on related topics in more detail in 
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the model. Section 6.4 derives the equilibrium 
payoffs of the different governance structures. Section 6.5 identifies the efficient 
governance structure featured by the CEO identity and vision bias. Section 6.6
provides some discussion on our results. Conclusions and future research directions 
are formulated in the final section.
6.2 Literature
The management of a marketing cooperative is faced with more complex and difficult 
tasks than its counterparts in IOFs are (Cook, 1994; Royer, 1999). According to Feng 
and Hendrikse (2012:242), ‘a cooperative is an enterprise collectively owned by many 
independent farmers as input suppliers’, who have formal authority regarding 
investment decisions at the downstream processing stage of the cooperative
(Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001b). The vertical ties between the members and the
cooperative firm consist of both a transaction element and an ownership element (Feng 
and Hendrikse, 2012). By contrast, an IOF is a firm owned by outside investors and 
the input suppliers have merely a transactional relationship with it. Therefore, while 
the management of an IOF mainly focuses on maximising the investment return for its 
investors, the management of a marketing cooperative has to consider members’ two 
sets of concerns, bringing the downstream processor to value and in the meantime 
serving upstream member interests regarding their own farms (Feng and Hendrikse, 
2012; Liang, 2013). This challenge in cooperative management has two implications 
for decision-making in cooperatives regarding the rectification and selection of 
projects. 
First, members formally participate in the decision-making process of the cooperative. 
Because more extensive decision-making power is retained by cooperative members 
via the GA and BoD, the investment decisions in cooperatives are thus subject to 
124_Erim Deng BW stand.job
110
double screening (Hendrikse, 1998). A cooperative is more conservative than an IOF 
in terms of project selection because each investment proposal requires approval of the 
society of members as well as the CEO of the cooperative (Hu, 2007). However,
double screening makes cooperatives more efficient in environments with a relatively 
high percentage of poor projects or relatively high costs of adopting poor projects
(Hendrikse, 1998; Hu, 2007).
Second, CEOs of cooperatives face the challenge of balancing upstream and 
downstream activities. Since cooperative members have both ‘owner concerns’ and 
‘user concerns’, they have expectations in both upstream and downstream activities
(Feng and Hendrikse, 2012:242). Previous studies suggest that CEOs’ decisions 
regarding upstream and downstream activities are subject to the incentives they 
receive and their cognitive ability. From an incentive perspective, Feng and Hendrikse 
(2012) address the decisions of a cooperative CEO regarding upstream and 
downstream activities in a multi-task principal-agent model. Their results show that 
not having a public listing prevents the cooperative CEO from focusing too much on
downstream activities. In addition, cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the 
interdependency between upstream and downstream activities is complementary and 
above a certain level. From a bounded cognition perspective, Feng (2011) examines
the influence of governance structure on decision makers’ performance in identifying 
upstream and downstream states. In an upstream (downstream) state, the environment 
requires upstream (downstream) projects to be implemented. The decision makers
with bounded cognition accept or reject proposals of projects based on the expected 
benefit (loss) due to identifying the state correctly (wrongly). The governance 
structure shapes the decision makers’ ability of identifying various states and 
determines their decision-making errors under different circumstances. The results 
show that a cooperative is uniquely efficient when upstream states are more likely to 
occur. In addition, because the cooperative processor is more conservative in the 
project selection, cooperatives are efficient when the costs of selecting the wrong state 
are relatively high. 
The direct relationship between CEO identity and cooperatives’ decision-making 
regarding upstream and downstream activities has been largely neglected in the 
cooperative literature. One recent contribution is Liang and Hendrikse (2013). They
examine the efficient CEO identity of cooperatives from an incentive alignment 
perspective. In their model, the main difference between a member CEO and an 
outside CEO is that ‘a member CEO not only devotes attention to member interests 
and cooperative enterprise value, but also dedicates efforts to his or her own
farm’(p.26). CEOs with different identities thus respond differently to the incentives 
they are faced with. They show that cooperative CEO’s identity has an impact on the 
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choice of upstream and downstream activities, and ‘whether a member or outside CEO 
is more efficient depends on the marginal productivities of upstream and downstream 
value-adding tasks as well as the size of the substitution effect between them’ (p.35).
In this chapter, we argue that decision makers’ identity may impact their decisions 
regarding upstream and downstream activities through the managerial vision they have. 
A few theoretical studies have discussed how managerial vision influences the 
selection of projects and the consequences. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) present a 
formal model, in which vision is conceptualised as a bias of the CEO that makes him 
in favour of certain projects. By changing the likelihood of which projects get 
implemented, the vision of the CEO affects the incentives of employees face in terms 
of generating project proposals. Another study of managerial vision in the 
organisational economics literature is by Van den Steen (2005). He defines managerial 
vision as ‘a strong belief by the manager about the future and about the right course of 
action for the firm’ (p.257). In his model, manager and employee vision is transformed 
into their belief about the likelihood of the state of the world. The model shows that a 
CEO or a firm with strong managerial beliefs attracts people with similar beliefs, 
causing an alignment of beliefs within the firm that has important implications for the 
firm’s behaviour and performance. On the empirical side, researchers find that 
executives with different identities may differ in their visions about what is right
strategy and confirm that these vision differences have material consequences. For 
instance, Barker and Mueller (2002) find that firms managed by CEOs with career 
experience in marketing/sales or R&D/engineering generally spend more on R&D 
than firms led by CEOs without this background. 
This chapter builds on Rotemberg and Saloner’s (2000) conceptualisation of 
managerial vision and Hendrikse’s (1998) model of double screening decision-making 
in cooperatives. We follow Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and suggest that a member 
CEO and a professional CEO will have different managerial visions, which bias them 
towards certain types of projects and against others. As a producer, the member CEO’s 
experiences and dispositions create a potential positive vision bias favouring upstream 
projects, which are the tasks organised by the cooperative for members’ farming 
production activities, such as service to support on-farm production, improvement of 
farming technology, member collaboration, and so on. Similarly, a cooperative board 
dominated by members may also favour upstream projects. By contrast, a professional 
CEO hired from the labour market is not a producer but has superior information about 
product markets, which may result in his or her preference for investment projects 
with a high downstream value. The professional CEO thus has a positive vision bias 
favouring downstream projects, which are focused on the value-added tasks at the 
downstream processing stage, including the activities of improving processing 
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efficiency, marketing campaigns, new product development, etc. These vision biases 
of different CEOs can affect the decisions of the cooperative regarding the selection of 
upstream and downstream projects and in turn affect the efficiency of the cooperative. 
We differ from Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Hendrikse (1998) as follows. First, 
Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) study the role of CEO vision in ameliorating the 
incentive problems in organisations. In their model, CEO vision affects which projects 
are implemented and therefore the incentives of employees to innovate. By contrast, 
our model is a decision theoretic model based on team theory (Marschak and Radner, 
1972), in which decision makers pursue the same objective but may have different 
judgements when seeing the same business opportunity. In our model, essentially, 
different visions cause different judgements instead of different incentives. Second, 
Hendrikse (1998) captures the advantage of cooperative governance structure by 
accepting less poor projects when there are more poor projects or when the costs of 
adopting poor projects are high. The double screening process in the current model 
differs in four ways. First, we make a distinction between upstream and downstream 
projects, whereas Hendrikse (1998) does not make this distinction. Second, we assume 
that a decision maker observes the payoff of a project, whereas Hendrikse (1998) 
assumes that the payoff of a project is not observable. Third, the two decision-making
bodies screen a candidate project independently (Hendrikse, 1998:206). In our model, 
we capture the sequential project screening, i.e. the BoD’s decision regarding a project 
is based on the project proposal generated by the CEO. This is a common practice in 
cooperatives (Henehan and Anderson, 1994; Cook, 1994). Therefore, we assume that 
the CEO’s vision bias will be incorporated in the project proposal he or she summits to 
the BoD. This will have an impact on the BoD’s judgements.17 Fourth, in our model, 
decision-making bodies sequentially evaluate a candidate project by considering the 
perceived project payoff. The vision bias makes their perceived project payoffs deviate 
from the true values. The double screening thus has an effect of aggregating the 
deviations in the perceived project payoffs of the two decision-making bodies. The
decision outcome depends on the particular sequence of the decision-making process.
In fact, the double screening in our model determines the payoff range of the projects 
that will be implemented. By contrast, the project screening in Hendrikse (1998) is 
based on the probability of correctly recognising good and bad projects. The outcome 
of the double screening is thus the multiplication of the probability of the correct 
17 Because the decision maker’s judgement regarding a project is not about the probability 
of whether the project is good or bad, there is no Bayesian updating in the current model.
We assume that the BoD is unaware of the vision bias of the CEO and there is therefore no 
inference from the decision made by the CEO. Sah and Stiglitz (1988) address architecture 
choice and Bayesian updating.
127_Erim Deng BW stand.job
113
(incorrect) judgements of the two decision-making bodies. Therefore, the effect of the
double screening highlighted in each model is different. In our model, we highlight the 
combined effect of the characteristics of governance structure and the identity of 
decision makers when firms face different types of investment opportunities.
6.3 Model
A three-stage game theoretic model is formulated to address the efficiency of three 
governance structures: a cooperative with a member CEO, a cooperative with a
professional (outside) CEO, and an IOF. These three governance structures are 
distinguished in the first stage of the game. Second, Nature chooses the type of the 
project, either upstream or downstream with a random payoff. Finally, the decision-
making bodies decide regarding the acceptance of the project in the third stage of the 
game. This game is solved for its sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium by the method of 
backward induction.
A cooperative consists of two decision-making bodies and it aggregates the decisions 
into a project implementation decision of the organisation only when both decision-
making bodies accept the project (Hendrikse, 1998). Figure 6.1a presents the decision-
making process of a cooperative.18 The cooperative has a certain amount of capital at 
its disposal, which is to be invested in the projects for the development of the 
cooperative. The cooperative CEO first screens the candidate projects and then 
proposes the one with a positive perceived payoff to the cooperative’s BoD. The BoD, 
as the representative of the members, evaluates the project proposal submitted by the 
CEO and makes the decision of approval or rejection based on whether their perceived 
payoff is also positive.19 If the proposal is approved, the project is implemented and its 
payoff is realised. If the proposal is rejected, no payoff will be generated. The 
cooperative CEO and BoD pursue the same objective of maximising expected project 
18 The figure is adapted from Hendrikse (1998:208). Our main point is that the number of 
decision-making bodies and the identity of decision makers may have an effect on the
behaviour and performance of organisations. The actual cooperatives in a specific country,
in a specific sector, and in a specific period may differ from our stylised specification but 
we think our framework is sufficiently general and flexible to tailor it to a specific setting.
19 According to Fama and Jensen (1983), decision rights can be separated into decision 
management (the initiation and implementation of decisions) and decision control (the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions). For modern firms, including cooperatives and 
IOFs, this separation of decision rights is common. It is observed in cooperatives that 
CEOs propose investment projects to BoDs (Henehan and Anderson, 1994; Cook, 1994). 
Usually, a cooperative will have regular board meetings and one or two general assembly 
meetings per year to discuss and approve the proposals prepared by the CEO. We thus 
focus on the situation that the CEO first reviews the investment opportunities.
128_Erim Deng BW stand.job
114
payoff but may have different managerial visions. Burress, Livingston and Cook (2011)
reports that less than 1% of cooperatives in their sample have more than one outside
director. We therefore assume that the member-dominated cooperative BoD favours 
upstream projects. The cooperative can choose a member CEO, who favours upstream 
projects too, or a professional CEO from outside, who favours downstream projects. In
contrast to the cooperative, an IOF consists of only one decision-making body
(Hendrikse, 1998). The IOF has a dominated professional CEO who favours
downstream projects. Figure 6.1b presents the decision process of the IOF. 
Figure 6.1a:
Decision process of a cooperative
Figure 6.1b:
Decision process of an IOF
Each time Nature generates one project. The composition of the portfolio of projects is 
characterised by ݌ , which is defined as the proportion or percentage of upstream 
projects in the portfolio of available projects. The complementary probability 1െ ݌
defines the portion of downstream projects. ݌ is therefore an important measure of the 
agribusiness environment. The larger (smaller) the ݌ , the more important are the 
upstream (downstream) activities. The payoff of the project, either upstream or 
downstream, is a random variable  ߱ decided by Nature. The project payoff has a 
normal distribution with the density function: ݂(߱) = ଵ
ఙξଶగ
݁ି
భ
మ
ቀഘ
഑
ቁ
మ
,߱ א (െλ, +λ),
and ߪ is the standard deviation of ߱.20
The decision-making bodies can correctly identify the type of projects (upstream or 
downstream), but their judgements of the project payoff is distorted by their vision 
bias. We capture the vision bias by supposing that a decision maker’s judgement of the 
project payoff differs from the true value by ܤ௝
௜(൒ 0), where ݅ = ݉, ݌ and ݆ = ܷ,ܦ.
When a member CEO sees an upstream (downstream) project opportunity, he 
20 The assumption of a normal distribution of project payoffs is an accepted approximation 
of investment returns (Markowitz, 1952; Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006).
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perceives the payoff of the project to be ߱ , = ߱ + ܤ௎௠ (߱ െ ܤ஽௠), i.e. the member
CEO is biased in favour of the upstream project (against the downstream project).
Conversely, when a professional CEO sees an upstream (downstream) project, she 
perceives the payoff of the project to be ߱ , = ߱ െ ܤ௎
௣
 (߱ + ܤ஽
௣
), i.e. the professional 
CEO dislikes the upstream project (favours the downstream project). When the CEO’s 
perceived project payoff  ߱ , > 0, the CEO believes the project is a good one and 
submits a project proposal to the BoD for approval. The estimated project payoff 
reported in the proposal is ߱ , . We regard the BoD as one decision-making body. 
Therefore, its vision should be the aggregation of all board members’ vision. As the 
member-dominated BoD has the same bias as the member CEO, when the BoD 
reviews an upstream (downstream) project proposal with a reported payoff of ߱ ,, its 
decision regarding the project will be based on  ߱ , + ܤ௎௠ (߱, െ ܤ஽௠).
We assume that the CEO and BoD are unaware of the vision bias, both their own and 
the other decision-making body’s. This assumption is central for the results because a 
decision maker will be able to make objective judgements if he knows how he is 
biased. In addition, if he knows the other decision-making body’s vision bias, he can 
adjust his decision by considering that bias. For instance, if the BoD knows the 
magnitude of the CEO’s bias and its own bias towards a project when they review the 
proposal, they can simply subtract the bias from the proposal and calculate the 
objective payoff. If this is the case, the perceived project payoff will be equal to the 
true value and there will be no decision errors. In addition, because the BoD obtains 
the information of a project opportunity only from the project proposal submitted by 
the CEO, the BoD is not able to identify the CEO’s bias incorporated in the proposal.
The characteristics of the three governance structures are summarised in Table 6.1.
COOP1 and COOP2 both have two decision-making bodies. The BoDs of COOP1 and 
COOP2 are member-dominated. COOP1 has a member CEO, whereas COOP2 has a 
professional CEO. The IOF has only one decision-making body controlled by a
professional CEO.
Table 6.1: Three governance structures
COOP1 COOP2 IOF
CEO Member Professional
Professional
BoD Member Member
6.4 Equilibrium
In this section, the equilibrium outcomes are determined. We start with the equilibrium 
decisions in each governance structure and then present the equilibrium payoffs.
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Equilibrium Decisions
IOF
Figure 6.2 presents the extensive form of the game when an IOF is chosen in the first 
stage. 
Figure 6.2: Choices in the extensive form of the game with the IOF
Because the IOF has only one decision-making body, it will implement the project if 
the professional CEO perceives the project payoff to be positive, i.e. ߱ , > 0 .When an 
upstream project is generated, the project has a payoff of ߱, but the CEO perceives the 
payoff of the project to be  ߱ , = ߱ െ ܤ௎
௣ . The professional CEO’s negative bias 
towards upstream projects implies that only those upstream projects with a payoff 
߱ > ܤ௎
௣ will be implemented. The professional CEO thus commits type I errors by
rejecting the good projects with a positive payoff ߱ א (0,ܤ௎
௣
]. When a downstream 
project is generated, the perceived project payoff of the professional CEO is ߱ , =
߱ + ܤ஽
௣ . The positive bias of the professional CEO will make her implement the 
downstream projects with a payoff ߱ > െܤ஽
௣, which include some bad projects. The 
professional CEO commits type II errors by accepting the bad projects with a negative 
payoff ߱ א (െܤ஽
௣
, 0].
Cooperative 
In a cooperative, any project is subject to double screening. Figure 6.3 presents the 
extensive form of the game when a cooperative is chosen in the first stage.
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Figure 6.3: Choices in the extensive form of the game with a cooperative
COOP1 and COOP2 differ by having the different types of CEO (m or p) in the first 
decision-making body. In COOP1, when an upstream project is generated by Nature,
the member CEO observes the project opportunity. His perceived project payoff 
is ߱ , = ߱ + ܤ௎௠. He will propose the project to the BoD if ߱ , > 0, i.e. ߱ > െܤ௎௠. Due 
to the member CEO’s positive bias towards upstream projects, some bad projects will 
be proposed. The member CEO thus commits type II errors by proposing the upstream 
projects with a negative payoff. When the CEO proposes a project to the BoD, he 
reports his perceived project payoff  ߱ , in the proposal. Because the BoD is also 
subject to vision biases, when it reviews the upstream project proposal with a reported
payoff of ߱ , , its perceived project payoff is ߱ , + ܤ௎௠ > 0. Therefore, the member-
dominated BoD will always approve the proposed upstream projects given its same 
positive bias towards upstream projects as what the CEO has. When a downstream 
project is generated, the member CEO’s perceived project payoff is ߱ , = ߱ െ ܤ஽௠ .
Only the downstream projects with a payoff ߱ > ܤ஽௠ will be proposed to the BoD.
The member CEO thus commits type I errors by abandoning the downstream projects 
with a positive payoff. When the BoD reviews the downstream project proposal, its 
perceived project payoff becomes ߱ , െ ܤ஽௠. The downstream project will be approved 
by the BoD if ߱ , > ܤ஽௠. Because ߱ , = ߱ െ ܤ஽௠, only the downstream projects with a
payoff ߱ > 2ܤ஽௠ will be implemented. In other words, only the downstream projects 
with the payoff exceeding the cascaded negative bias of the member CEO and BoD 
will be implemented by COOP1.
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Because COOP2 has a professional CEO, the results of its project screening in the first 
decision-making body are the same as the outcome of the project decisions of the IOF. 
The upstream projects with a payoff ߱ > ܤ௎
௣ and the downstream projects with a
payoff ߱ > െܤ஽
௣ will be proposed to the BoD. Similar to the BoD of COOP1, the 
BoD of COOP2 will always approve the proposed upstream projects due to its positive 
bias in the evaluation of upstream project proposals. However, when the BoD reviews
the downstream project proposal with a reported payoff of ߱ ,, its perceived project 
payoff becomes ߱ , െ ܤ஽௠ due to the negative bias. The project will be implemented 
if  ߱ , > ܤ஽௠ . Because  ߱ , = ߱ + ܤ஽
௣ , those downstream projects with a payoff ߱ >
ܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ will be implemented by COOP2. It entails that whether the proposed 
downstream project will be implemented is determined by the relative strength of the 
positive bias of the professional CEO and the negative bias of the member-dominated 
BoD.
A direct comparison of COOP1 and COOP2 indicates that the effect of the double
screening in the project decisions differs with respect to the type of project. Regarding 
upstream projects, because the member-dominated BoD will always approve the 
proposed upstream projects, only the screening of the CEO plays a role in the selection
of upstream projects. There is in fact only single screening in the project decisions 
regarding upstream projects. As such, COOP1 suffers upstream payoff losses due to 
type II errors made by the member CEO, whereas COOP2 suffers upstream payoff 
losses due to type I errors made by the professional CEO. Regarding downstream 
projects, while the double screening in COOP1 cascades the congruent negative vision 
bias of the CEO and BoD, it allows the opposite vision bias of the CEO and BoD to 
cancel each other out in COOP2. In other words, the CEO and BoD of COOP1 both 
commit type I errors, which cause relatively large payoff losses in COOP1. In COOP2, 
the CEO commits type II errors by proposing some bad projects but the BoD’s
negative bias offsets part of these errors and alleviates the downstream payoff losses.
However, whether COOP2 will commit type I or type II errors and the size of the 
errors depend on the relative strength of the CEO’s positive bias and the BoD’s
negative bias. If ܤ஽௠ > ܤ஽
௣, the BoD of COOP2 rejects not only the bad projects but 
also some good projects. COOP2 starts to suffer downstream payoff losses from type I 
errors.
Equilibrium Payoffs
IOF
The payoff of the IOF depends on ܤ௎
௣ and ܤ஽
௣, both of which cause payoff losses by 
leading to wrong decisions. The mechanisms of decision errors are different. ܤ௎
௣ leads 
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to type I errors of missing some good upstream projects, while ܤ஽
௣ leads to type II 
errors of implementing some bad downstream projects. The payoff range of the 
implemented upstream and downstream projects is ൫ܤ௎
௣
, + λ൯ and ൫െܤ஽
௣
, + λ൯ ,
respectively. The expected payoff of the IOF is
ߨூைி = ݌න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
஻ೆ
೛
+ (1െ ݌)න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
ି஻ವ
೛
=
1
ߪξ2ߨ
቎݌݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
+ (1െ ݌)݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
቏.
ܤ௎
௣ and ܤ஽
௣ also determine the effect of the project composition ݌ on ߨூைி. If ܤ௎
௣
= ܤ஽
௣,
the expected payoff of the IOF is invariant with ݌ because the IOF’s decision outcome
regarding upstream and downstream projects are the same. If ܤ௎
௣
> ܤ஽
௣, the IOF makes 
relatively better decisions regarding downstream projects. The IOF’s payoff will
decrease in ݌. The IOF will become less attractive when upstream projects dominate 
in the portfolio of projects. The reverse holds when ܤ௎
௣
< ܤ஽
௣.
COOP1
The payoff range of the implemented upstream projects is (െܤ௎௠, + λ). Due to the 
positive bias of the member CEO towards upstream projects, some bad upstream 
projects with a negative payoff െܤ௎௠ < ߱ < 0 will be proposed and implemented by 
the cooperative, leading to type II errors. Conversely, the cascaded negative bias of the 
CEO and BoD towards downstream projects leads to type I errors. The payoff range of 
the implemented downstream projects is (2ܤ஽௠, + λ) . Some good downstream 
projects with a positive payoff 0 < ߱ < 2ܤ஽௠ will be abandoned. The expected payoff 
of COOP1 is 
ߨଵ = ݌න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
ି஻ೆ
೘
+ (1െ ݌)න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
ଶ஻ವ
೘
=
1
ߪξ2ߨ
൥݌݁ି
ଵ
ଶ൬
஻ೆ
೘
ఙ ൰
మ
+ (1 െ ݌)݁ି
ଵ
ଶ൬
ଶ஻ವ
೘
ఙ ൰
మ
൩.
How COOP1’s payoff changes with ݌ depends on the relative strength of ܤ௎௠ and ܤ஽௠.
If ܤ௎௠ = 2ܤ஽௠, the expected payoff of COOP1 is invariant with ݌. When ܤ௎௠ < 2ܤ஽௠,
COOP1’s payoff is increasing in ݌, as the percentage of upstream projects in the 
project portfolio become higher. The reverse holds when ܤ௎௠ > 2ܤ஽௠.
COOP2
The payoff range of the implemented upstream projects is ൫ܤ௎
௣
, + λ൯ . The 
professional CEO’s negative bias towards upstream projects determines that some 
good upstream projects with a positive payoff 0 < ߱ < ܤ௎
௣ will be missed, leading to 
type I errors. When faced with a downstream project, COOP2 will implement the 
project if ߱ > ܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣. The payoff range of the implemented downstream projects is 
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൫ܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣
, + λ൯. The type of decision error depends on the relative strength of the
biases of the CEO and BoD. If ܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣
> 0, i.e. ܤ஽
௣
< ܤ஽௠, the BoD’s negative bias 
is larger than the CEO’s positive bias, and some good downstream projects will be 
missed (type I errors). Conversely, if ܤ஽
௣
> ܤ஽௠, some bad downstream projects will be 
implemented (type II errors). The expected payoff of COOP2 is
ߨଶ = ݌න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
஻ೆ
೛
+ (1െ ݌)න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
஻ವ
೘ି஻ವ
೛
=
1
ߪξ2ߨ
቎݌݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
+ (1െ ݌)݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೘ି஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
቏.
The relationship between ߨଶ and ݌ is straightforward. If ܤ௎
௣
= หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห , the 
expected payoff of COOP2 is invariant with ݌. If ܤ௎
௣
> หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห, COOP2’s payoff
will decrease in ݌ . It entails that COOP2 will become less attractive when the 
percentage of upstream projects is higher. The reverse holds when ܤ௎
௣
< หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห.
6.5 Efficient Governance Structure
According to Williamson (2000:601), ‘an extant mode of organisation for which no 
superior feasible form of organisation can be described and implemented with 
expected net gains is presumed to be efficient’. As we compare three different 
governance structures in our model, the one with the highest expected payoff will be 
regarded as efficient. Before we compare the three different governance structures, it 
is useful to describe the first-best payoff, i.e. the expected payoff a firm can attain if 
all the good projects that bring a positive payoff are implemented:
ߨி஻ = න ݂߱(߱)݀߱
ାஶ
଴
= න
߱
ߪξ2ߨ
݁ି
ଵ
ଶቀ
ఠ
ఙቁ
మାஶ
଴
=
1
ߪξ2ߨ
.
The expected payoffs of the different governance structures can be normalised
by ߨி஻ =
ଵ
ఙξଶగ
. The normalised expected payoffs are listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: The normalised expected payoffs of three governance structures
૙ ൑ ࢖ ൑ ૚ when ࢖ = ૙ when ࢖ = ૚
First-best 1 1 1
COOP1 ݌݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೘
ఙ ቇ
మ
+ (1െ ݌)݁ି
ଵ
ଶ൬
ଶ஻ವ
೘
ఙ ൰
మ
݁ି
ଵ
ଶ൬
ଶ஻ವ
೘
ఙ ൰
మ
݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೘
ఙ ቇ
మ
COOP2 ݌݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
+ (1െ ݌)݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೘ି஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೘ି஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
IOF ݌݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
+ (1െ ݌)݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ವ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
݁
ିଵଶቆ
஻ೆ
೛
ఙ ቇ
మ
135_Erim Deng BW stand.job
121
It is immediately clear that neither the cooperatives nor the IOF can realise the first-
best payoff if the CEO and BoD have vision biases, i.e. when ܤ௝
௜ > 0, then ߨ < 1.
Nevertheless, there is one exception. That is, when ݌ = 0, COOP2 can realise the first-
best payoff if the positive bias of the professional CEO (ܤ஽
௣) and the negative bias of 
the BoD (െܤ஽௠) towards downstream projects cancel each other exactly (ܤ஽
௣ െ ܤ஽௠ =
0). We suggest that managerial vision bias in general leads to inefficient project 
investment, which is formulated in the first proposition.
Proposition 1: If the magnitudes of the vision bias of the professional CEO and 
member BoD towards downstream projects differ, i.e. ࡮ࡰ
࢖ ് ࡮ࡰ࢓ , no governance 
structure is first-best efficient.
The normalised expected project payoffs of the three governance structures are
depicted in Figure 6.4. The first-best payoff is represented by the horizontal line with 
the normalised payoff of 1. 
Figure 6.4: The normalised payoff
From Figure 6.4, it follows that the efficient governance structure is jointly determined
by the managerial vision biases and the project composition ݌. For instance, when 
݌ = ݌ଵ, COOP1 and COOP2 are both efficient and have a higher payoff than the 
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IOF. 21 When ݌ > (<) ݌ଵ , COOP1 (COOP2) becomes the efficient governance 
structure. When ݌ = ݌ଶ, the IOF and COOP1 have the same payoff but it is lower than 
that of COOP2.22 COOP2 is thus the efficient governance structure. The values of ݌ଵ
and ݌ଶ are endogenously determined by the relative strength of decision makers’
vision biases. ݌ଵ and ݌ଶ will approach 1 when ܤ௎௠ is equal to ܤ௎
௣, i.e.
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ = 1. ݌ଵ will
approach 0 when 2ܤ஽௠ is equal to หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห, i.e. ஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ =
ଵ
ଷ
. Similarly, ݌ଶ will approach 
0 when 2ܤ஽௠ is equal to ܤ஽
௣, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ =
ଵ
ଶ
. In addition, ݌ଵ ൒ (൑)݌ଶ holds when ܤ஽௠ ൑
(൒) 2ܤ஽
௣, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൑ (൒) 2. Therefore, given a certain value of ݌, we can identify the 
ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ in which a governance structure is efficient.
Figure 6.5 summarises the main results regarding the efficient governance structure. 
The detailed analysis and propositions are presented in the appendix of this chapter.
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ on the vertical axis represents the ratio of the upstream vision biases of the member 
and professional executive, while
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ on the horizontal axis represents the ratio of the 
downstream vision biases of the member and professional executive. The quadrant is 
divided into three areas by a curve with a kink at point C and an upward vertical line 
starting from point C. The efficient governance structure in each area is highlighted. 
COOP2 and the IOF are equally efficient under any value of ݌ on the vertical line, 
while the curve represents the situations when COOP1 and COOP2 (IOF) are equally 
efficient given a certain value of ݌ and ஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < (>)2. The curve approaches the vertical 
(horizontal) axis when 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ (
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ) increases. At point C, the three governance structures 
are equally efficient.
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௘
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ಳವ
೛
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మ
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Figure 6.5: The efficient governance structure
Several important implications can be drawn from Figure 6.5. First, COOP1 is 
efficient in the area below the curve. It entails that COOP1 is more attractive when 
member executives have relatively smaller vision biases. Given 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, the efficient 
governance structure will change from COOP1 to COOP2 if 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ ,
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ , or both increase. 
The switch of the efficient governance structure between COOP1 and COOP2 
highlights the effect of different CEOs in cooperatives. Regarding upstream projects, 
different CEOs lead to the different types and sizes of upstream decision errors.
Because the BoDs of COOP1 and COOP2 have no impact on the screening of 
upstream projects, the upstream decision outcome of COOP1 and COOP2 are solely 
determined by the vision biases of their CEOs. COOP1 commits type II errors due to 
the member CEO’s positive bias, whereas COOP2 commits type I errors due to the 
professional CEO’s negative bias. Therefore, when 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ increases, COOP1’s upstream 
payoff losses will increase in comparison with that of COOP2. When 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ > 1, COOP2 
makes better upstream decisions than COOP1 because of the smaller upstream vision 
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bias of the professional CEO. Regarding downstream projects, the CEO type 
determines the amount and quality of the projects that will be proposed to the BoD. In 
COOP1, due to the negative bias of the member CEO, the bad projects and some good 
downstream projects are filtered out. By contrast, due to the positive bias, the 
professional CEO in COOP2 will propose more downstream projects to the BoD,
which include some bad projects. The BoD in COOP2 will reject some of the 
downstream proposals. While the double screening in COOP1 cascades the congruent
negative vision bias of the CEO and BoD, it allows the opposite vision bias of the 
CEO and BoD to cancel each other out in COOP2. Therefore, when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ increases, the 
downstream project payoff of COOP1 will drop more quickly compared with COOP2.
When 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ >
ଵ
ଷ
, the opposite downstream vision biases of the member BoD and 
professional CEO results in a smaller aggregate vision bias in COOP2. COOP2 thus 
makes better downstream decisions than COOP1. Therefore, the increase of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ ,
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ , or 
both, will decrease the efficiency of COOP1 in comparison with COOP2.
Second, in the area above the curve, the efficient governance structure will change
from COOP2 to the IOF when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ increases above 2. The IOF and COOP2 both have a 
professional CEO. The only difference between these two governance structures is that 
COOP2 has an additional screening bureau featured by the member-dominated BoD. 
The switch of the efficient governance structure between COOP2 and the IOF thus 
highlights the value of (abandoning) the second screening bureau. Regarding upstream 
projects, COOP2 and the IOF have the same decision outcome. The professional CEO 
of the IOF and COOP2 both commit type I errors of missing some good upstream 
projects. Because the BoD of COOP2 will always approve upstream project proposals 
submitted by its CEO, the second screening bureau in COOP2 has no actual impact on 
the decision outcome of upstream projects. In fact, the decision outcome of COOP2 
and the IOF regarding downstream projects will determine their relative efficiency. 
When 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൑ 1, the negative vision bias of the BoD of COOP2 towards downstream 
projects rejects some bad projects. COOP2 commits thus less type II errors than the 
IOF. When 1 <
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, the BoD of COOP2 rejects also good projects and commits 
type I errors. However, the aggregate vision bias of COOP2 is still smaller than that of 
the IOF. The downstream payoff losses of COOP2 due to type I errors are smaller than 
that of the IOF due to type II errors. Therefore, when  
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, COOP2 makes better
downstream decisions and dominates the IOF. When  
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ > 2, the aggregate vision 
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bias of COOP2 becomes larger than that of the IOF. COOP2 rejects too many good 
downstream projects and suffers larger downstream payoff losses than the IOF does. 
The IOF becomes more attractive when  
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ > 2. Therefore, in the area above the 
curve, when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ > 2, the efficient governance structure is the IOF. In general, the 
second screening bureau in COOP2 influences COOP2’s decision outcomes by 
changing its equilibrium project selection towards downstream projects. When the 
relative strength of the vision biases of the BoD and CEO of COOP2 is in a proper 
range, it results in a smaller aggregate downstream vision bias than that of the IOF. 
However, when the BoD’s vision bias is too strong compared with that of the CEO, 
COOP2 becomes less attractive than the IOF.  
Third, the project composition ݌ determines the steepness of the curve and then the
shapes of the areas in which a governance structure is efficient. The curve decreases in 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ . The intuition is that, COOP1’s downstream performance will decrease compared 
with COOP2 and the IOF when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ becomes larger. COOP1 must make better 
upstream decisions to compensate for the increasing downstream payoff losses in 
order to remain equally efficient as COOP2 and the IOF. Therefore, 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ must become
smaller. The curve declines slowly if ݌ is large. The reason is that, when there are 
more upstream projects, the payoff loss effect of the increase of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ is smaller for 
COOP1. Especially, when the value of ݌ is close to 1, the curve will converge to the 
horizontal line 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ = 1. This means that, This means that, when the available projects 
are mainly upstream projects, whether COOP1 can be dominant depends mostly on the 
value of  
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ . The relative strength of executives’ vision biases towards downstream 
projects, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ , has little impact on efficiency. Conversely, if ݌ is smaller, the curve 
will become steeper. The increase of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ has a larger payoff loss effect for COOP1 
when the percentage of downstream projects become higher. When the value of ݌ is 
decreasing to 0, the curve will converge to the vertical line 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ =
ଵ
ଷ
. The efficient area 
of COOP1 is mainly determined by the relative strength of executives’ vision biases 
towards downstream projects. We summarise these observations in the following 
hypothesis:
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Proposition 2: COOP1 is efficient for almost all cases where the upstream 
(downstream) bias of the member CEO is smaller than the upstream (one third of 
the downstream) bias of the professional CEO, i.e. ࡮ࢁ࢓ < ࡮ࢁ
࢖ (࡮ࡰ࢓ <
࡮ࡰ
࢖
૜
) when the 
proportion of upstream projects in the pool of available projects increases to 1 
(decreases to 0).
6.6 Discussion
Our model offers insights into the impact of CEO identity on the behaviour and 
performance of cooperatives. The cooperative with a member CEO is featured by the 
cascaded negative vision bias towards downstream projects, which makes the 
cooperative upstream focused. Therefore, when the portfolio of projects contains 
mainly upstream projects, i.e. the industry is featured with production-oriented 
activities, cooperatives with member CEOs are more attractive. However, when the 
portfolio of projects contains mainly downstream projects, i.e. the industry demands 
market-oriented activities, cooperatives with member CEOs will become less 
attractive than IOFs. Cooperatives thus need to replace the member CEOs with 
professional CEOs. Specifically, in a cooperative with a professional CEO, the 
opposite vision biases of the CEO and BoD in combination with the double screening 
decision-making process may generate an advantage for the cooperative by reducing 
type II errors in downstream activities. This keeps the cooperative as a viable business 
form in the competition with IOFs. However, a cooperative with a professional CEO 
will still be less efficient than IOFs if the BoD negative bias towards downstream 
projects is too strong. To solve this problem, the cooperative can ease the BoD’s 
negative bias by including outside directors on the board.  
The comparison of the governance structures shows that the efficiency of a 
governance structure is determined by the joint effect of the vision biases and the 
decision-making process. While vision biases lead to decision makers’ project 
selection errors, the decision-making process determines how these errors are 
aggregated. Under some circumstances, one governance structure is uniquely efficient 
for every value of ݌, whereas under other circumstances, one governance structure’s 
efficient range depends on the agribusiness environment where a certain type of 
project is prominent. While acknowledging the impossibility of distinguishing among 
all scenarios, we interpret some commonly observed evidence in cooperative research 
by using the results derived from the model.
First, traditional cooperatives are featured by a powerful BoD dominated by farmer 
members. It is reasonable to assume that the magnitude of the cascaded bias towards 
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downstream projects in COOP1 is larger than that of a single bias towards upstream
projects, i.e. 2ܤ஽௠ > ܤ௎௠ . The performance of COOP1 will thus increase in ݌ . In 
addition, as Figure 6.5 indicates, when there are more upstream projects, the negative 
effect of the relatively large ܤ஽௠ is weaker. COOP1 is efficient in a larger range of 
parameter values when competing with the IOF. Therefore, COOP1, which represents 
typical traditional cooperatives in the early stage of their development, is an attractive 
governance structure in environments with a relatively high percentage of upstream 
projects in the project portfolio. 
Second, traditional cooperatives may be disadvantageous in competition with IOFs 
when downstream activities become more important. It is quite possible that the 
cascaded negative bias towards downstream projects in COOP1 is larger than the 
single positive bias towards downstream projects in the IOF. The competition between 
the IOF and COOP1 is thus in the area of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ >
ଵ
ଶ
. In this area, although the IOF 
implements some bad downstream projects, COOP1 will suffer more losses because 
the cascaded negative vision bias makes it miss more good downstream opportunities. 
Even COOP1 can make better upstream decisions than the IOF by having  
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ < 1, its 
competitive advantage will diminish as ݌ decreases. As shown by Figure 6.8 in 
Appendix 6.1, the efficient range of COOP1 will converge to 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ <
ଵ
ଶ
when ݌
decreases. When ݌ is small, COOP1 can outperform the IOF only if the member CEO 
and BoD both have very small negative biases towards downstream projects. This 
target is very difficult to achieve given the dominance of farmer members in the BoD. 
The IOF is thus more likely to be efficient when ݌ is small. Our model highlights the 
challenge of cooperatives in changing market conditions, which has been widely 
addressed in the previous studies but from different theoretical perspectives, such as 
incomplete contract theory (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a), investment theory 
(Russo and Sabbatini, 2005), agency theory (Feng, 2011), and cognition theory (Feng, 
2011).
Third, the cooperative has the choice of replacing the member CEO with a 
professional CEO. Different from the member CEO, the professional CEO in COOP2 
has vision biases opposite to those of the BoD. When faced with downstream projects, 
the opposite vision biases of the CEO and BoD can lead to an advantage. The reason is 
that, while a professional CEO proposes more downstream projects than a member 
CEO does, the double screening process of the cooperative featured by the member-
dominated BoD’s negative vision bias will reduce type II errors. The COOP2 is thus 
able to capture more downstream opportunities and values. Proposition 3 in the 
appendix states that, if the cooperative BoD’s vision bias towards downstream projects 
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is smaller than two times of the professional CEO’s vision bias, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, COOP2 
will always dominate the IOF. Therefore, it may be optimal for a cooperative to hire a 
professional CEO while keeping the board dominated by members. However, the 
cooperative BoD’s vision bias towards the downstream project should not be too 
strong. If 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ > 2, the efficiency of COOP2 will become always lower than the IOF 
because too many good downstream projects are rejected. In addition, the efficiency 
difference between COOP2 and the IOF will widen when ݌ decreases. Therefore, 
COOP2 is only attractive when the BoD’s vision bias is limited. One potential strategy 
is to modify the composition of the BoD by including some outside directors with 
different managerial visions. As such, while other cooperative scholars call for outside 
directors to bring the necessary expertise to the cooperative’s boardroom (Cook, 1994; 
USDA, 2002; Lang, 2002), we argue that outside directors might have an additional 
function to moderate the BoD’s vision bias. In addition, we also observe that most 
cooperatives in Europe and North America are providing member education. For 
instance, Friesland Campina spent one year in conveying the message to members 
about the market potential of lactose and explaining them why the cooperative should 
increase the investment of the value-added products in that area. These member 
education programs help members understand and enter the businesses they are 
unfamiliar with. They help alleviate members’ negative bias towards downstream 
projects and reduce the value of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ . In general, these choice possibilities in the 
decision rights structure create substantial flexibility for cooperatives to adapt to the 
new agribusiness environment and justify the competence of them in changing market 
situations.
Finally, the double screening of cooperatives has a great strength as well as a great 
weakness. Although it can reduce type II errors in the downstream project 
implementation, it also decreases the decision-making efficiency of the cooperative.
However, in order to become more responsive to the market, cooperatives may need to 
allocate more decision power to CEOs. One example is the introduction of the so-
called corporation model in the Dutch cooperatives, in which the BoD acts as a 
supervisory body instead of a directing body (van Dijk, 1999; Bijman, Hendrikse and 
van Oijen, 2013). As such, the decision-making structure of COOP2 becomes similar 
to that in the IOF. This shift of control of cooperatives may lead to the dominance of 
the CEO’s managerial vision in the cooperative. One serious consequence is that ‘the 
aspirations of the managers, rather than those of the farmers, are realized’ (Hind, 
1999:536). This explains the facts that the managers’ preferred goals are reflected in 
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the organisational decisions and practices, which make cooperative more and more
akin to IOFs (Hind, 1997; 1999).
6.7 Conclusion 
Our model captures the aspects of people and processes in the decision making of 
enterprises. First, we propose that executives with different identities view upstream 
and downstream projects differently. With respect to cooperatives, the member CEO 
and the member-dominated BoD are supposed to favour upstream projects and dislike 
downstream projects. The reverse holds for professional CEOs. Second, we capture 
members’ involvement in the decision-making process of cooperatives by 
incorporating the double screening of investment project proposals in the model. Our 
analysis shows that managerial vision biases have a pronounced impact on the 
performance of project implementation. The executives’ negative vision bias towards 
a certain type of project may cause the company to commit type I errors by forgoing 
some profitable business opportunities. On the other hand, the positive vision bias will 
cause the firm to conduct type II errors by implementing some bad projects. Therefore, 
the existence of managerial vision bias will lead to certain inefficiencies in project 
implementation. The comparison of the performance of three governance structures (a 
cooperative with a member CEO, a cooperative with a professional CEO, and an IOF) 
shows that the efficiency of a governance structure is determined by the governance 
structure’s decision-making process and the relative strength of executives’ vision 
biases. We identify for each governance structure the situations where it is efficient. 
There are several ways to position this chapter in the literature. First, we extend the 
research regarding the decision rights structure of cooperatives. Cooperative members 
are regarded as conservative and they often favour a conservative investment strategy 
in order to stabilise member returns (Staatz, 1987; Henehan and Anderson, 1994). 
Peterson and Anderson (1996) also claim that only the most secure projects are 
considered as investment options by cooperative members. However, the changes in 
the agribusiness call for necessary and timely responses from cooperatives. In 
particular, extensive discussion has been devoted to whether cooperatives’ traditional 
decision-making structure allows them to become more market-oriented (Bijman, 
Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). We highlight the double screening feature of 
cooperatives by considering decision-making bodies’ managerial vision. 
Circumstances are identified under which a specific configuration of decision rights 
structure and decision makers will be advantageous for cooperatives. Second, 
cooperative scholars and practitioners have emphasised the need for professional 
CEOs and outside directors in cooperatives based on the demand of expertise (e.g. 
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USDA, 2002; Bijman et al., 2012). We depart from these traditional arguments and 
instead examine the influence of cooperative CEO identity on the efficiency of the 
cooperative from a novel angle. It enriches the literature on cooperative governance by 
investigating the implications of executives’ managerial vision for cooperatives. Third, 
this chapter is related to the cognitive dimension of the social capital of cooperatives, 
which represent the ‘shared representations, interpretations and systems of meaning 
among parties’ (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998:244). When a cooperative has a high 
level of cognitive social capital, it gives the decision makers a common perspective 
that enables them to perceive and interpret business opportunities in similar ways. The 
commonality in vision supports the collective decision-making. In addition, a member 
CEO who shares the same cooperative vision and values with the BoD is more 
committed to the cooperative than an outside CEO. However, the common vision of 
the CEO and BoD also indicate their common negative bias towards downstream 
projects. High levels of cognitive social capital in cooperatives can be transformed 
into the resistance to downstream activities even when they become important for the 
cooperative. It leads to the cognitive lock-in (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999) and may 
impede the cooperative’s ability to adapt to changing task environments (Uzzi, 1997). 
Under such circumstances, hiring a professional CEO who has a different vision from 
the BoD will be necessary to respond to the changing market conditions.
There are several possibilities for further research. First, the relevance of managerial 
vision of top executives and performance of cooperatives are worthwhile to be tested. 
It would be interesting to examine whether observed success and failure of 
cooperatives can be better explained by taking both the decision-making process and 
the identity of decision makers into account. For example, Bijman, Hendrikse and van 
Oijen (2013) present empirical results regarding the relationship between board model 
and performance of agricultural cooperatives. However, decision makers’ identities 
are not incorporated in their research. Second, our model shows the strategic 
complementarity between the decision-making process and the identity of decision 
makers. Our suggestion is that cooperatives should choose a CEO tailored to the 
specific business environment. However, we did not address the cooperatives’ 
decision-making process and other important issues of the decision rights structure 
such as the delegation of power. A third possibility is to introduce incentives and 
influence activities in the decision making process. The current model assumes that 
the CEO and BoD have no private benefits when they make their decisions. There is 
no conflict of interests between decision makers, i.e. all decision makers are assumed 
to maximise the same utility function. However, it is more likely that the decision 
makers are also motivated by their own interests rather than merely those of the 
organisation. Given the private benefits, the information the CEO reports when he 
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proposes a project to the BoD may consist of not only the vision bias but also the 
interest bias (Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008). In addition, influence activities 
are important in cooperatives, and are highlighted in Zusman and Rausser (1994) and 
Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2009). They are modelled as a principal-agent problem with 
hidden characteristics and signalling (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). These 
incentive topics are quite different from the theoretic approach in this chapter.
Ultimately, a more general model will have to incorporate various features of an 
incentive system. Under this setup, the cooperative needs to choose not only a suitable 
CEO but also an optimal incentive structure.
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Appendix 6.1: Comparison of Governance Structures
In the following analysis, we first compare the payoffs of the governance structures in 
pairs. Next, we derive the efficient governance structure.
The comparison of the IOF and COOP2
In Figure 6.4, the payoff lines of the IOF and COOP2 both emanate from ݁
ିభమቆ
ಳೆ
೛
഑ ቇ
మ
at ݌ = 1. It entails that they have the same decision outcome regarding upstream 
projects. In fact, the payoffs of COOP2 and IOF regarding downstream projects will 
determine their relative efficiency. It is immediate that, when หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห < ܤ஽
௣, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, the aggregate vision bias of the CEO and BoD in COOP2 is smaller than the 
CEO’s vision bias in the IOF. COOP2 makes better downstream decisions than the 
IOF by committing less decision errors regarding downstream projects. The payoff 
line of COOP2 is thus above that of the IOF and COOP2 dominates the IOF. The 
reverse holds when หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห > ܤ஽
௣. Figure 6.6 depicts the efficient areas of the IOF 
and COOP2 and this result is formulated 
Proposition 3: When ࡮ࡰ࢓ < (>) ૛࡮ࡰ
࢖ , COOP2 (IOF) dominates IOF (COOP2).
Figure 6.6: Efficiency of the IOF versus COOP2
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Comparison of COOP1 and COOP2
The comparison between COOP1 and COOP2 becomes complex because their 
decision qualities regarding upstream and downstream projects can be both different.
There are four possibilities. First, when 2ܤ஽௠ < หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห and ܤ௎
௣
< ܤ௎௠, the payoff 
of COOP1 will be always higher than the payoff of COOP2. COOP1 thus dominates 
COOP2 for every value of  ݌ . Second, when 2ܤ஽௠ > หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห and ܤ௎
௣
> ܤ௎௠ ,
COOP2 will dominate COOP1 for every value of ݌. In these two situations, the payoff 
lines of COOP1 and COOP2 in Figure 6.4 have no intersection and one governance 
structure makes better decisions regarding both upstream and downstream projects.
The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ in which COOP1 or COOP2 will dominate the other for 
every value of ݌ are highlighted by the shaded areas in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7: Efficiency of COOP1 versus COOP2
Third, when 2ܤ஽௠ > หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห and ܤ௎௠ < ܤ௎
௣ , COOP2 makes better decisions
regarding downstream projects whereas COOP1 makes better decisions regarding 
upstream projects. The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ are within the down-right unshaded area 
(
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ >
ଵ
ଷ
and 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ < 1) in Figure 6.7. Finally, when 2ܤ஽௠ < หܤ஽௠ െ ܤ஽
௣ห and ܤ௎௠ > ܤ௎
௣,
COOP2 makes better decisions regarding upstream projects whereas COOP1 makes 
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better decisions regarding downstream projects. The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ are within 
the top-left unshaded area ( 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ <
ଵ
ଷ
and 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ > 1) in Figure 6.7. In these unshaded areas, 
given a certain value of ݌, the dotted curve approximates the combinations of ஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ for which COOP1 and COOP2 are equally efficient. COOP1 (COOP2) has a higher 
payoff in the range below (above) the dotted curve. The dotted curve passes through 
point ܣ (ଵ
ଷ
, 1), at which the payoff lines of COOP1 and COOP2 in Figure 6.4 perfectly 
coincide and they are therefore the same for every value of ݌ . The dotted curve 
decreases in 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ . The intuition is that, COOP1’s downstream performance will 
decrease compared with COOP2 when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ becomes larger. COOP1 must make better 
upstream decisions to compensate for the increasing downstream losses in order to 
maintain equal efficiency as COOP2. Therefore, 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ must be smaller. The dotted curve 
declines slowly if ݌ is large. The reason is that, when there are more upstream projects, 
the payoff loss effect of the increase of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ is smaller for COOP1. This means that, in 
environments with a relatively high percentage of upstream projects in the project 
portfolio, whether COOP1 can dominate COOP2 depends mainly on the value of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ .
The relative strength of executives’ vision biases towards downstream projects, i.e. 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ,
has less impact on efficiency. Especially, when the value of ݌ is close to 1, the dotted
curve will converge to the horizontal line 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ = 1. Conversely, if ݌ is smaller, the 
dotted curve will become steeper. The increase of 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ has a larger payoff loss effect for 
COOP1 when the percentage of downstream projects become higher. The efficient 
areas are mainly determined by the relative strength of executives’ vision biases 
towards downstream projects. When the value of ݌ is close to 0, the dotted curve will 
converge to the vertical line 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ =
ଵ
ଷ
.
Comparison of COOP1 and the IOF
The comparison between COOP1 and the IOF is similar to the comparison between 
COOP1 and COOP2. First, when 2ܤ஽௠ < ܤ஽
௣ and ܤ௎
௣
< ܤ௎௠, the payoff of COOP1 will 
be always higher than the payoff of the IOF. COOP1 thus dominates the IOF for every 
value of ݌. Second, when 2ܤ஽௠ > ܤ஽
௣ and ܤ௎
௣
> ܤ௎௠, the IOF will dominate COOP1 
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for every value of ݌. In these two situations, the payoff lines of COOP1 and the IOF in 
Figure 6.4 have no intersection and one governance structure makes better decisions 
regarding both upstream and downstream projects. The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ in which 
COOP1 or the IOF will dominate the other for every value of  ݌ are highlighted by the 
shaded areas in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Efficiency of the IOF versus COOP2
Third, when 2ܤ஽௠ > ܤ஽
௣ and ܤ௎௠ < ܤ௎
௣ , the IOF makes better decisions regarding 
downstream projects whereas COOP1 makes better decisions regarding upstream
projects. The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ are within the down-right unshaded area (
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ >
ଵ
ଶ
and 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ < 1) in Figure 6.8. Finally, when 2ܤ஽௠ < ܤ஽
௣ and ܤ௎௠ > ܤ௎
௣ , the IOF makes 
better decisions regarding upstream projects whereas COOP1 makes better decisions
regarding downstream projects. The ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ are within the top-left 
unshaded area (
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ <
ଵ
ଶ
and 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ > 1) in Figure 6.8. In these unshaded areas, given a 
certain value of ݌, the dashed curve approximates the combinations of ஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ for 
which COOP1 and the IOF are equally efficient. COOP1 (the IOF) has higher payoff 
in the range below (above) the dashed curve. The dashed curve passes through 
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point ܤ (ଵ
ଶ
, 1), at which the payoff lines of COOP1 and the IOF in Figure 6.4 perfectly 
coincide and they are therefore the same for every value of ݌. Similar to the dotted
curve in Figure 6.7, the dashed curve in Figure 6.8 decreases in 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ and will converge
to the horizontal line 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ = 1 when the value of ݌ is close to 1. When the value of ݌ is 
close to 0, the dashed curve will converge to the vertical line 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ =
ଵ
ଶ
.
Efficient Governance Structure
By synthesising Figures 6.6 – 6.8, Figure 6.9 presents the ranges of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ in 
which a governance structure is efficient. Figure 6.5 is based on Figure 6.9, where the 
curve is equal to the dotted curve when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൑ 2, and equal to the dashed curve when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൒ 2.
Figure 6.9: Comparison of three governance structures
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In the shaded areas, one governance structure is uniquely efficient regardless of the 
composition of projects. In order to be efficient for every value of ݌, a governance
structure must make better decisions than the others do in both upstream and 
downstream projects. The IOF and COOP2 both have a professional CEO. The 
professional CEO’s negative vision bias causes type I errors in the decisions regarding 
upstream projects. By contrast, COOP1 has a member CEO with a positive vision bias 
towards upstream projects, which causes type II errors. Therefore, 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ > 1 must hold if 
the IOF and COOP2 outperform COOP1 in the upstream stage of production. It entails 
that the upstream payoff losses of type I errors in the IOF and COOP2 are lower than 
the payoff losses of type II errors in COOP1. Conversely, if  
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ < 1, COOP1 has 
better performance regarding upstream projects. 
The decision outcome of the different governance structures regarding downstream 
projects depends on 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ . First, proposition 3 states that the IOF will make better 
downstream decisions than COOP2 when  
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ > 2. The reason is that, COOP2 rejects 
too many good downstream projects if the negative bias of the BoD towards 
downstream projects is too strong. The downstream payoff losses of COOP2 due to 
type I errors is larger than the payoff losses of the IOF due to type II errors. Second, 
when 
ଵ
ଷ
<
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < 2, COOP2 has the best performance in selecting downstream projects. 
In this range, the potential downstream payoff losses of COOP2, due to either type I or 
type II errors, are lower than that of the IOF and COOP1. Finally, when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ <
ଵ
ଷ
,
COOP1 will outperform the IOF and COOP2 regarding the decisions of downstream 
projects. The member CEO and BoD have a very small negative bias against 
downstream projects in comparison with the professional CEO’s positive vision bias. 
COOP1 will not reject too many good downstream projects. The downstream payoff
losses of type I errors in COOP1 are thus smaller than that of type II errors in the IOF. 
In COOP2, the relatively small downstream negative bias of the member BoD makes 
it unable to filter out the bad projects efficiently. The downstream payoff losses of 
type I errors in COOP1 are thus also smaller than that of type II errors in COOP2. The 
results are formulated in the following hypothesis:
Proposition 4: When 
࡮ࢁ
࢓
࡮ࢁ
࢖ > ૚ and   
࡮ࡰ
࢓
࡮ࡰ
࢖ > ૛ , the IOF is uniquely efficient; when 
࡮ࢁ
࢓
࡮ࢁ
࢖ > ૚ and  
૚
૜
<
࡮ࡰ
࢓
࡮ࡰ
࢖ < ૛, COOP2 is uniquely efficient; when 
࡮ࢁ
࢓
࡮ࢁ
࢖ < ૚ and  
࡮ࡰ
࢓
࡮ࡰ
࢖ <
૚
૜
,
COOP1 is uniquely efficient.
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In the unshaded areas, a certain governance structure performs better in selecting one 
type of project but is worse regarding the other type. Therefore, the efficient 
governance structure is dependent on the value of ݌. The three unshaded areas are 
divided by the dotted and dashed curve. Given a certain value of ݌, the dotted curve 
approximates the combinations of 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ and
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ for which COOP1 and COOP2 are 
equally efficient. COOP1 (COOP2) has a higher payoff in the range below (above) the 
dotted curve. Similarly, the dashed curve approximates the situations where the IOF 
and COOP1 are equally efficient. COOP1 (IOF) is better in the range below (above) 
the dashed curve. Because the payoff of COOP2 (IOF) is always higher than that of 
the IOF (COOP2) when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < (>) 2, the dotted (dashed) will be lower than the dashed 
(dotted) in the corresponding area because a relatively smaller 
஻ೆ
೘
஻ೆ
೛ is required for 
COOP1 to be equally efficient as COOP2 (IOF). When 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ = 2, the dotted curve and 
dashed curve will cross at point C because the IOF and COOP2 are the same in this 
situation. In addition, the efficient governance structure is chosen among COOP1 and 
COOP2 (IOF) in the unshaded areas when
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ < (>) 2. Therefore, the curve in Figure 
6.5 is a combination of the dotted curve when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൑ 2 and dashed curve when 
஻ವ
೘
஻ವ
೛ ൒ 2.
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7. Conclusion of Part A
In Part A of the dissertation, we conduct a series of theoretical analyses on social 
capital of cooperatives. The major research questions we try to answer include:
x What are the content and value of cooperative social capital?
x How cooperative social capital develops over time?
x How social capital and governance structure interact?
To address these questions, we start with a literature review of cooperative social 
capital based on Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) conceptualisation of the social capital
dimensions. In Chapter 2, we analyse the structural, cognitive, and relational 
dimension of social capital in the organisational context of cooperatives. From the 
perspective of a system of attributes, these social capital dimensions are viewed as the 
social attributes of cooperatives, which must be aligned with cooperatives’ economic 
attributes. Because social capital is tightly bound with the development and strategy of 
the organisation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), we also discuss the change in
cooperative social capital from the perspective of the cooperative lifecycle. The central 
argument is that, when the social capital level in a cooperative decreases, the 
cooperative shall adopt strategies to rebalance its social and economic attributes, either 
by restoring social capital or by changing its governance structure. As each 
governance structure is characterised by its income and decision rights allocation 
(Hansmann, 1996), we first model the income rights structure of cooperatives and its 
interaction with cooperative social capital in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In Chapter 6, we 
model the decision rights structure of cooperatives by considering the visions of the 
cooperative CEO and Board of Directors, which is related to the cognitive dimension 
of social capital. 
The analyses in Chapters 3 – 6 can be summarised in Figure 7.1, which is identical to 
Figure 2.1 except for the additional double lines between the attributes. Each double
line represents the relationship between the two attributes we have investigated. The 
arrows indicate the directions of identified influence of one attribute on another.
Specifically, we model the influence of relational social capital on income rights 
structure (Chapters 3 and 4), the influence of income rights structure on structural 
social capital (Chapter 5), and the relationship between decision rights structure and 
cognitive social capital (Chapter 6). In the following paragraphs, we briefly outline the 
findings in each chapter and provide an integrated view of the relationship between 
cooperative social capital and governance structure. At the end of this chapter, we
discuss limitations of our research and some possibilities for future research.
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Figure 7.1: Investigated relationships between attributes 
In Chapter 3, we develop a baseline model to address the relationship between the 
income rights structure and product quality provisions of cooperatives. We develop a
standard economic model and incorporate no influence of social capital on members’
decisions. In other words, Chapter 3 investigates the optimal income rights structure of 
cooperatives when social capital does not exist. It shows the coherent attribute system 
cooperatives can choose under such circumstances and compare it with that of IOFs.  
The result of Chapter 3 serves as a benchmark for the analyses in Chapter 4, in which 
social capital is explicitly modelled. The major conclusion of the standard economic 
model in Chapter 3 is that the traditional principle of complete pooling makes the 
cooperative in a disadvantageous position in the competition with the IOF in a quality-
differentiated market. The complete pooling policy should by no means be adopted by 
cooperatives. Instead, there is an upper bound on the pooling ratio. We argue that by 
designing an optimal income rights structure featured by partial pooling, cooperatives 
can maintain an optimal product quality level, which is equivalent to the product 
quality level of the IOF.
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Chapter 4 further investigates the cooperative’s choice of pooling policy by taking the 
relational dimension of social capital into consideration. Specifically, we extend the 
economic model of Chapter 3 by incorporating a social term in the members’ utility 
function. Social capital helps a member internalise the ethical standard in the 
cooperative. The member will lose utility if his or her product quality decision
deviates from this standard. We aim to identify the optimal income rights structure of 
the cooperative when a certain level of social capital is present. The result shows that, 
with social capital, the cooperative can adopt an income rights structure with lower 
quality incentive intensity or even without economic incentive at all if the social 
capital level is very high. Other conditions the same, social capital enables the 
cooperative to choose a higher level of pooling. Social capital thus plays a role in
substituting economic incentives to enhance product quality. Different from the results
of the standard economic model in Chapter 3, we show in Chapter 4 that the 
cooperative can enact complete pooling when there is a very high level of social 
capital in the organisation. In the meantime, the cooperative is still able to produce 
high product quality because every member’s product quality decision will be close to 
the quality standard. The model in Chapter 4 also shows that the cooperative should 
introduce stronger quality incentives in its income rights structure when the social 
capital level decreases. In principle, we treat cooperative social capital as an 
exogenous factor that determines the optimal income rights structure of the 
cooperative.
The interaction of social capital and income rights structure is supposed to be 
bidirectional. To investigate the reverse causality, we study the influence of the 
income rights structure on social capital in Chapter 5. Specifically, we construct a 
game theoretic model to capture members’ social interactions and the dynamics of 
members’ social ties under different pooling policies. The model suggests that the 
amount of the members’ social interactions and the strength of social ties depend upon, 
and increase with, the cooperative’s pooling ratio. The income rights structure of the 
cooperative determines the externality of members’ economic payoff. The members 
will interact more and develop stronger social ties between each other when the 
income rights structure is more collective. Social ties can be characterised as the 
structural dimension of social capital, which are regarded as the basis of the other
social capital dimensions. Chapter 5 in general captures the impact of the income 
rights structure on cooperative social capital.
In Chapter 6, we compare the efficiency of cooperatives when the cooperative CEO 
and Board of Directors (BoD) have congruent or divergent visions. When a
cooperative has a member CEO, the CEO and BoD share the same vision towards 
upstream and downstream projects. They have a common perspective that enables 
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them to perceive business opportunities in a similar way. In addition, the double 
screening of the cooperative decision-making process reduces type II errors in project 
decisions. A high level of cognitive social capital thus makes the cooperative attractive
in environments with a relatively high percentage of upstream projects. However, the 
common vision of the CEO and BoD also causes a large negative bias towards
downstream projects. As such, a high level of cognitive social capital in the 
cooperative could be transformed into its focus on upstream projects and resistance to 
downstream activities. This is detrimental to the cooperative when downstream 
activities become important. In such circumstances, hiring a professional CEO with a
different vision from the BoD will be necessary for the cooperative to respond to 
changing market conditions. We argue that, in a cooperative with a professional CEO, 
the opposite vision biases of the CEO and BoD in combination with the double 
screening decision-making process may generate an advantage for the cooperative. 
This keeps the cooperative as a viable business form in the competition with IOFs. 
The results of Chapters 3 – 6 illustrate the coexistence of different coherent systems of 
attributes. High social capital levels and collective governance structure represent one 
coherent system that has been adopted by many traditional cooperatives. Alternatively,
low social capital levels and an individualistic governance structure represent another 
system, which is commonly found in IOFs. The comparison of cooperatives and IOFs 
in our models shows that both systems can lead to efficient outcomes. In addition, by
integrating the results of Chapters 4 and 5, the system of attributes with different 
attribute values can be interpreted as the alternative equilibrium outcome of the 
interaction between social capital and governance structure. Figure 7.2 provides a 
graphical illustration of the reaction functions and equilibrium outcomes. The 
horizontal axis is the income rights structure represented by the pooling ratio. The 
larger the pooling ratio, the more collective is the income rights structure. The vertical 
axis measures the social capital level. Reaction function 1 (the dashed curve) is 
adapted from Figure 4.1. It describes the choice of the pooling ratio based on the 
social capital level. It indicates that the pooling ratio is increasing in the social capital 
level. Reaction function 2 (the solid curve) represents the influence of the pooling ratio 
on social capital, which is based on Figure 5.1. It indicates that a larger pooling ratio is 
more effective in generating social capital. 
The reaction functions in Figure 7.2 have three intersections, indicating three 
equilibria. The first equilibrium is at point O, where no social capital exists and there 
is no pooling, i.e. (οைכ ,ߪைכ). The second equilibrium is featured by a low pooling ratio 
and a low social capital level, i.e. (ο௅כ ,ߪ௅כ). These two equilibria are similar in that both 
of them represent the system featured by low social capital levels and individualistic 
governance structures. Particularly, the equilibrium (οைכ ,ߪைכ) can be seen as the choice 
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of most IOFs. By contrast, the third equilibrium with a high pooling ratio and a high 
social capital level, i.e.  (οுכ ,ߪுכ) , represents the combination of a collective 
governance structure and a high social capital level. Traditional cooperatives are 
usually featured by the equilibrium of (οுכ ,ߪுכ) with ߪுכ close or equal to 1. The 
multiple equilibria of the interaction between social capital and governance structure 
thus explain the different coherent systems of attributes selected by IOFs and 
traditional cooperatives23.
Figure 7.2: Equilibriums of social capital and income rights structure 
Importantly, the equilibrium  (οுכ ,ߪுכ) may shift when the social context of the 
cooperative changes over time. According to the comparative statics analysis in 
Chapter 5, the complete pooling will be less capable of stimulating the formation of 
social capital if the social interactions between cooperative members are too costly.
23 Cooperatives can also choose the equilibrium (οைכ ,ߪைכ) or (ο௅כ ,ߪ௅כ), however, as we have 
argued, they may prefer the equilibrium (οுכ ,ߪுכ) due to benefits of risk-sharing (Chapters
2 – 4) and social utility (Chapter 5).
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When ݀ (the marginal cost of social interactions) increases, the curve of reaction 
function 2 will converge towards the point (1, 0) on the horizontal axis. Its 
intersections with reaction function 1 will change. Specifically, the 
equilibrium (οுכ ,ߪுכ ) will move towards the south-west. As such, the new equilibrium
for the cooperative will be featured by a medium level of social capital and a partial 
pooling policy. Moreover, when the curve of reaction function 2 is lower than the 
curve of reaction function 1, the only intersection of the two reaction functions will be 
point O. The cooperative will thus have the equilibrium (οைכ ,ߪைכ). In this case, the 
cooperative adopts the no-pooling policy and becomes similar to IOFs.
In general, Part A of the dissertation contributes to the literature by formally 
addressing all three dimensions of cooperative social capital and their relationship
with the governance structure. We strive to construct an analytical framework of 
cooperative social capital and advance the understanding of the interaction between 
social capital and governance structure. On the one hand, the income rights structure 
of traditional cooperatives is highly collective. The pooling policy of cooperatives 
largely relies on the high social capital level. On the other hand, the collective income 
rights structure also supports the formation of social capital. We propose that 
cooperatives’ social and economic attributes can be understood as the equilibrium
outcome of the interaction between social capital and governance structure. The social 
context of the cooperative community affects the equilibrium that the cooperative will
choose. In addition, we illustrate the performance implications of the decision rights 
structure and cognitive social capital of cooperatives.
Nevertheless, this study is subject to limitations and there remain many aspects that 
have not been thoroughly examined. First, as shown in Figure 7.1, while we have 
modelled three pairs of relationships between social and economic attributes, how the 
different dimensions of social capital influence each other is not formally analysed. In
addition, our model in Chapter 6 does not capture the causality between the cognitive
social capital and governance structure. More theoretical work is thus warranted for 
enhancing our understanding regarding these issues. Second, the interaction between 
social capital and governance structure is clearly an empirical question. Evidence in 
the cooperative literature does support our general framework, but the specific 
predictions remain to be tested. Thus, further empirical research is highly desirable.
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Part B:
Diversification of Cooperatives
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8. On the Evolution of Product Portfolio of 
Cooperatives versus IOFs: An Agent-Based 
Analysis of the Single Origin Constraint24
Abstract
Agent-based methodology is adopted to analyse the relationship between governance 
structure and product portfolio. One distinction between an investor owned firm (IOF)
and a cooperative is the single origin constraint, which pulls all products of the
cooperative together in one cluster centred on the original product. This effect
decreases the probability of choosing new products and accounts for the lower 
diversification level of the cooperative. By contrast, the IOF’s product portfolio 
develops in a centrifugal way. The double screening in decision making and the 
objective of maximising the joint surplus and serving members at cost do not change 
the impact of the single origin constraint. Although the cooperative and the IOF have 
very different portfolio compositions, the total surplus of the cooperative and the total 
profit of the IOF are close in the monopoly, as well as the duopoly market. However, 
the cooperative has a higher average surplus per product, while the IOF has a higher 
average profit per output unit.
Keywords: Single Origin Constraint, Diversification, Product Lifetime, Cooperatives, 
Agent-based Model.
8.1 Introduction
One of the fascinating aspects of enterprises is the evolution and composition of their 
product portfolios. Product portfolios evolve due to enterprises expanding current 
product lines, adding new products, divesting products, conducting mergers and 
acquisitions, and so on. An important feature of the evolution and composition of 
product portfolios is coherence. ‘Firms are coherent to the extent that their constituent
businesses are related to one another’ and ‘firms over time add activities that related to
some aspect of existing activities (Teece et al., 1994:2-3). In other words, firms seem 
to choose to enter industries that are close to their existing line of business. However, 
coherent product portfolios may follow different paths of evolution. For example, 
24 This chapter is based on the previous working paper of Hendrikse and Smit (2007). The
source code of the simulation models in this chapter is available online at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77449.
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coherent product portfolios of different enterprises may develop in different directions,
or the product portfolio may develop into clusters of related products. Therefore, the 
mechanism driving the evolution and composition of the product portfolio is a central 
issue to understand any firms’ strategy.
Teece et al. (1994) also pose that explaining corporate coherence requires taking
various corporate forms into consideration. This position is supported by empirical 
evidence indicating that there is a relationship between governance structure and 
diversification behaviour, but it seems to depend on the governance structures being 
compared. On the one hand, Kamshad (1994) does not find a statistically significant 
difference between the diversification policies of IOFs and labour managed firms. 
Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) conclude that corporate ownership structure does 
not affect its diversification strategy. On the other hand, there is evidence showing that 
publicly listed firms are more diversified than cooperatives (van Oijen and Hendrikse, 
2002), and family firms diversify less both domestically and internationally than non-
family firms (Gomez-Mejia  et al., 2010). In addition, van der Krogt et al. (2007) find
that dairy cooperatives and IOFs have quite different expansion strategies. In general, 
‘cooperatives prefer mergers, collaboration agreements, joint ventures, and licensing, 
while IOFs focus on take-over strategies – acquisitions and share holdings’ (p.453).
These observations demand further analysis of the influence of specific governance 
structures on the evolution and composition of product portfolios.
In this chapter, we investigate the product portfolio consequences of the governance 
structure of cooperatives versus IOFs. Hansmann (1996) states that governance 
structures are usually characterised by ownership of one group of stakeholders. The 
providers of input are the owners of a marketing cooperative, while the providers of 
capital own the IOF (Hansmann, 1996). Investors of the IOF want it to generate 
maximum value in downstream processing stage, but this is not the case in the
cooperative. According to Hendrikse (2007:139), ‘the formal ownership by the input 
suppliers over the downstream assets is the essential governance structure feature of a 
cooperative’. Therefore, cooperative members have both ‘owner concerns’ and ‘user 
concerns’ (Feng and Hendrikse, 2012:242). The cooperative is supposed to serve 
member interests and generate value in processing simultaneously (Liang, 2013). This 
ownership difference between cooperatives and IOFs is reflected in various aspects, 
like different worldviews or orientations of owners, different ways of financing the 
enterprise, different decision making processes, and so on. Therefore, the governance 
structure differences between cooperatives and IOFs may have a number of 
implications on the evolution and composition of product portfolio.
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The most distinct aspect of a cooperative is the single origin constraint. Cook (1997:87) 
observes that ‘… cooperatives … are “single origin” in that their objective is to 
optimize the utilization of their member owners output, not to originate products in 
another area or country. Most cooperatives have ties to producers/members within a 
particular region, and they do not have the same freedom as IOFs have. Being single 
origin for a cooperative is rational because of the member owners’ high degree of 
physical, site, dedicated assets and temporal asset specificity. This asset specificity 
comes in the form of investment, land, machinery, perishable output, and location 
whereby their value in the next best use is often significantly lower’. The single origin 
constraint entails that cooperatives will never divest products requiring the input of 
members. It may thus account for a number of properties of the diversification 
behaviours of cooperatives, like an input orientation, a tendency to avoid new 
businesses, less flexibility in their input procurement and product portfolio, active in 
fewer industries, and a higher ratio of unrelated to total diversification than 
corporations do due to spreading risks of the farm portfolio of activities (van Oijen and 
Hendrikse, 2002; Hendrikse and Feng, 2013).
In addition, the decision-making process of a cooperative differs from that of an IOF.
A cooperative consists of a society of members and a downstream economic entity. 
The impact of the organisation and representation of the society of members in a 
cooperative may have an impact on the pace of decision making regarding 
diversification projects. As Hendrikse (1998:203) claims, the members of a 
cooperative have incentives to ‘structure the internal organisation in such a way that 
they have confidence that their substantial (financial) stakes are protected and their 
interests are advanced’. In cooperatives, extensive decision-making power is allocated 
to the General Assembly and the Board of Directors which are ‘democratically chosen 
by and from the membership’ (Feng, 2011:21). Therefore, a cooperative is 
characterised by two independent decision-making units with each unit having veto
power regarding investment proposals, whereas an IOF consists of only one decision-
making unit (Hendrikse, 1998).
The third difference between a cooperative and an IOF is manifested in their product 
output decisions. The members of a cooperative want to keep the average member 
profitability high, while an IOF makes output decisions with the objective to maximise
the profits of the processor (Tennbakk, 1995). Therefore, while an IOF determines its 
product output by maximising the profits of the downstream processor, a cooperative 
may maximise the summed profits of the upstream farms and downstream processor
(Staatz, 1987), or maximise the product output by making the downstream processor 
serve the members at cost (LeVay, 1983).
164_Erim Deng BW stand.job
150
We adopt agent-based methodology to address these governance structure differences 
between cooperatives and IOFs. Agent-based models have been increasingly used in 
studying economies, which are modelled as ‘evolving systems of autonomous 
interacting agents’ (Tesfatsion, 2003:263). In an agent-based model, the unit of 
analysis is represented as an agent that possesses some properties, a repertoire of 
actions, and ways of interacting with other agents and with its environment. The three 
main ingredients of an agent-based model are agent, state, and transition rule. Each 
agent is characterised by their states, while actions of agents are governed by transition 
rules (Hendrikse, Smit and de la Vieter, 2007). 
The transition rule of agents’ diversification decisions will be captured by 
incorporating the results from the diversification literature. Studies regarding 
diversification report many failures and there are many prescriptions for successful 
diversification (e.g. Gruca et al., 1997; Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1982), among which
Lowes et al. (1994) formulate the so-called concentric diversification strategy as the 
main general prescription. It entails that the agents diversify only into activities related 
to current products, markets, or processes. The concentric diversification strategy thus 
reflects the concept of corporate coherence suggested by Teece et al. (1994). 
Specifically, when an agent diversifies, the transition rules in the model make the 
agent randomly selects a new product in the local neighbourhood of its current product 
portfolio in each period. The locality of an agent’s decision rules regarding new 
products will therefore serve to capture the feature of concentric diversification, while 
the transition rules will drive the evolution of the product portfolio.
The single origin constraint is modelled by assigning different lifetimes to the first 
product of different governance structures. The first product of an IOF will be divested 
after a finite number of periods, while a cooperative will never divest its first product 
due to the single origin constraint. The lifetime of the first product of a cooperative is
thus set to infinite and the lifetime of that of an IOF is set to a certain number periods.
All other products have the same finite lifetime in both governance structures.
Furthermore, we can also incorporate agents’ decision-making process and product 
output decisions in the model’s transition rules and simulate the product portfolio 
evolution of an IOF and a cooperative in a mixed duopoly market. As such, this agent-
based model is able to address the following question: How does the evolution and 
composition of the product portfolio of an IOF and a cooperative differ? By 
comparing cooperatives with IOFs, this chapter provides an explanation for the impact 
of governance structure on product portfolio.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 presents the basic model and 
formulates the results regarding the impact of the single origin constraint on the 
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evolution and composition of product portfolio. Section 8.3 extends the basic model
by incorporating additional governance structure features. Section 8.4 extends the 
model to a mixed duopoly market setting. Section 8.5 concludes and formulates 
directions for future research.
8.2 Basic Model
We develop an agent-based model to investigate the dynamics of an agent’s product 
portfolio in a competitive environment with rival agents. The features of different 
governance structures need to be incorporated as well. In this section, we start with a
basic model with only one agent and focus merely on the single origin constraint. The 
behaviour of an individual agent that evolves its product portfolio in the basic model is 
useful for interpreting the simulations with more complex settings. In Sections 8.3 and 
8.4, we extend the basic model by including additional governance structure features 
and the competition between an IOF and a cooperative in a duopoly market.
Agent-based Model
An agent-based model consists of three elements: the agent, the state of the agent, and 
the transition rule that governs the evolution of the agent’s state. The agent in our 
model is either a cooperative or an IOF. The agent can add new products to its 
portfolio by diversification. Divestment is captured by removing a product and its 
associated output from the product portfolio when the product reaches its lifetime. The 
agent can also adjust the output of its products. 
The state of an agent is defined as its product portfolio, which is represented as a two-
dimensional grid. We call this grid of products ‘Portfolio Matrix’. A product in the 
product portfolio is represented as a cell in the grid. The distance between cells 
represents the relatedness between products. The product distance is defined in the 
paragraph preceding Figure 8.2a in Appendix 8.2. Each product in the Portfolio Matrix 
is characterised by its output level and lifetime. A product’s lifetime starts at the 
period when it is added to the portfolio. The first product of an agent is called 
‘Original Product’. The single origin constraint of cooperatives is modelled by 
assuming that the lifetime of the Original Product is infinite. By contrast, the Original 
Product of an IOF has a finite lifetime and will be divested when the lifetime is 
reached. Every other product has the same finite lifetime. Notice that a divested 
product can be chosen again by the agent after certain periods when it is in the 
neighbourhood of the products in the Product Portfolio. However, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the agent produces the same product again. It can be that another 
product with the same relatedness to the Original Product is produced.
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The transition rules produce a new state for the agent as a function of the agent’s 
current state. The basic transition rule of an agent is the concentric diversification
strategy, which entails that the agent will only diversify into new products related to 
its current product portfolio. In our model, agents diversify their product portfolio by 
picking one of the cells from the set consisting of the existing products and their 
Moore neighbourhoods (Hegselmann and Flache, 1998). The probability of a cell 
being selected in the next period is calculated based on the content of the current 
product portfolio and is stored in the ‘Probability Matrix’. The transition rules
reflecting other differences between cooperatives and IOFs are introduced in Section 
8.3. Figure 8.0 provides an example of a Portfolio Matrix and a Probability Matrix of 
an agent at the start, period 1 and period 2.25
Portfolio Matrix Probability Matrix
Start
Period 1
Period 2
Figure 8.0: An example of the evolution of the product portfolio during 2 periods
25 This example is adapted from the example in Hendrikse, Smit and de la Vieter
(2007:427).
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At the start, there is only one product (the Original Product) at the centre of the 
Portfolio Matrix with an initial output of 1 unit. The agent will start the evolution of its 
product portfolio from the Original Product. The Moore neighbourhood of the Original
Product consists of all the product’s neighbouring product cells. It consists of 9 cells, 
i.e. the cell of the Original Product and the 8 adjacent cells. Each product cell in the set 
consisting of the Moore neighbourhood and the Original Product has an equal 
probability of 1/9 of being chosen at the beginning of the next period. Suppose that the 
product south of the Original Product in the starting portfolio is chosen at the 
beginning of period 1. It entails that the agent is faced with a diversification project,
and needs to make a decision. In the basic model, we assume that the agent will 
always accept diversification projects. After the agent adds the new product to its 
portfolio, the Probability Matrix at the end of period 1 changes so that the local 
neighbourhood now contains 12 products that have a chance to be chosen in next 
period. Six of these products are within the Moore neighbourhood of both products in 
the current portfolio. Therefore, their chances of being chosen are twice that of the 
other products.
Note that the existing products in the portfolio are also part of the local Moore 
neighbourhood and have a chance to be chosen in the next periods. If an existing 
product is chosen, the agent has to make a decision of changing the product’s output
according to the current market situation. The agent can also maintain its current 
output level. In the basic model, we assume that the agent will always increase the 
output of the existing products. Suppose that at the beginning of period 2, the same 
product is chosen again as in the first period. This product is already in the portfolio, 
thus the agent increases the output of the product by 1 unit. The bottom row in Figure 
8.0 shows the portfolio and the weighed probability distribution at the end of period 2.
Simulation Settings of the Basic Model
Consider two simulation settings. The first (second) setting consists of an agent 
reflecting a cooperative (IOF). The initial output level of the Original Product is set to 
1 for both agents. The lifetime of the Original Product of the cooperative is set to 
infinite, whereas the lifetime of the Original Product of the IOF is set to 40. The same 
lifetime of 40 will be assigned to all other products. The agents evolve the product 
portfolio independently. At the beginning of each period, the agent will choose 
randomly a product from the local Moore neighbourhood of its current product(s) 
according to the Probability Matrix. If the chosen cell is a new product, the new 
product will be assigned an initial output level of 1 unit. If the chosen cell is an 
existing product already in the agent’s portfolio, the agent will increase the output 
level of the product by 1 unit. The agent will keep a product in the portfolio until its 
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lifetime is reached, and then the product and its output will be removed from the 
portfolio. We simulate the process of an agent’s portfolio evolution in 500 periods.
The results of 100 runs of simulation are averaged.
Simulation Results of the Basic Model
Appendix 8.1 presents the product portfolio evolution of an IOF and a cooperative in 
figures. The evolution of the product portfolio of an agent is described by several
measures. We use the number of products, total output, and average output per product
to record the agent’s diversification and output decisions in general. To capture the 
relatedness of products in the evolving portfolio, two measures are defined: the 
average product distance and the average weighted product distance. The average 
product distance assigns the same weight to all products, while the average weighted 
product distance weights according to the output of the product.
Figure 8.1a illustrates the number of products in the agents’ portfolio along the periods.
After the simulation starts, both agents add new products to their portfolio. During the 
first 40 periods, the number of products increases quickly. However, from then on 
some products start to reach their lifetime. The number of products of both agents will 
fluctuate but further increase with a lower speed. For the IOF, the number of products 
in its portfolio will level off gradually. Given the same lifetime for every product, the 
speed of divesting products is related to how many products are in the portfolio. 
Therefore, when the speed of divesting products is equivalent to the speed of adding 
products to the portfolio, the number of products of the IOF will become stable. The 
change of the number of products of the cooperative shows a quite different pattern. In
the course of time, the number of products of the cooperative will decrease
continuously. The reason is that the output associated with the Original Product will 
never be removed due to single origin constraint, while all other products will be 
eliminated when they reach the lifetime. This will have an increasing effect on the 
probability of choosing the Original Product and the products close to it, and thus
decreases the probability of choosing new products. This results in the decreasing 
number of products of the cooperative.
Figures 8.1b and 8.1c depict the total output and the average output per product. Their
development is directly linked to the number of products. For the IOF, the total output 
and the average output per product will level off along the periods as well. This 
indicates that the IOF’s product portfolio will reach a relative stable composition in 
the long term. The IOF will keep a certain number of products and maintain a constant 
output level. By contrast, because the probability of choosing new products is 
decreasing over time for the cooperative, it will focus on increasing the output of the 
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Original Product. Since the Original Product and its associated output will never be 
removed, the output of the cooperative will keep increasing.
The increasing average (weighted) product distance of the IOF depicted in Figures
8.1d and 8.1e indicate that the area covered by the IOF’s portfolio widens over time. It 
entails that after the Original Product of the IOF has reached the lifetime and been 
divested, the IOF’s portfolio gradually moves to those products that with a large 
distance to the Original Product. In other words, the IOF’s product portfolio evolves
into the products that are unrelated to the Original Product. To the contrary, the 
concentration effect of the single origin constraint will keep the product portfolio of 
the cooperative centred on the Original Product. The results of the basic model are
formulated in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: The single origin constraint pulls the products of the cooperative in 
one cluster centred on the Original Product, limits the diversification level of the 
cooperative, and increases the output of the Original Product continuously.
8.3 Extensions
This section extends the basic model by incorporating two additional governance 
structure features into the transition rules: the agents’ project decision-making process
and their output decisions. In addition, we introduce profits as the third characteristic 
of a product next to its output and lifetime, with which we are able to compare the 
performance of different agents. 
Project Screening
The transition rule governing how an agent decides whether it will add a new product 
to its portfolio when faced with a diversification project is adapted from the project
screening process in Hendrikse (1998). Instead of accepting all diversification projects, 
the agents will screen the possible diversification projects and decide to either accept 
or reject a project. Reflected in Figure 8.0, after the product south of the Original 
Product is chosen at the beginning of period 1, the agent has to decide whether to add 
this new product to its portfolio. If the project is accepted, the agent will add the 
chosen new product to its portfolio. Otherwise, the agent will reject the project and 
keep its portfolio unchanged. It is assumed that the pool of diversification projects 
consists of only two types of projects – good or bad. A good project means that 
diversification to this new product is successful and it will generate profits for the 
agent. By contrast, a bad project will bring losses or negative profits. In our simulation, 
the probability of good projects (ߙ = 0.5) and bad projects (1െ ߙ = 0.5) is equal.
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An agent tries to distinguish between good and bad projects, and then accepts the good 
projects and rejects the bad ones. An agent’s bounded capability of making right 
choices is modelled by the conditional acceptance probability of projects. According 
to Hendrikse (1998), we define ݌(ܣ|ܤ) as the probability that a project is accepted, 
given that it is bad, and ݌(ܣ|ܩ) as the probability that a project is accepted, given that 
it is good. Because there is some previous screening, the probability that a bad (B)
project is judged to be good is smaller than the probability that a good (G) project is 
accepted: ݌(ܣ|ܤ) < ݌(ܣ|ܩ) (Hendrikse, 1998). 
Governance structures differ in the decision-making process. According to Hendrikse 
(1998), a cooperative consists of two decision-making units, and it aggregates the 
decisions of both units into an approval decision of the whole organisation only when 
both units accept the project. An IOF is defined as consisting of only one decision-
making unit. Therefore, an IOF accepts a particular good (bad) project with 
probability ݌(ܣ|ܩ)(݌(ܣ|ܤ)), whereas the probability of acceptance for a cooperative 
is ݌(ܣ|ܩ)ଶ (݌(ܣ|ܤ)ଶ). Errors of judgement happen in project screening: rejecting a 
good project is a type I error and accepting a bad project is a type II error. Because
݌(ܣ|ܩ) > ݌(ܣ|ܩ)ଶ and ݌(ܣ|ܤ) > ݌(ܣ|ܤ)ଶ , an IOF accepts a larger percentage of
projects, both good and bad. By contrast, a cooperative is supposed to accept fewer 
projects due to its double screening feature. Hence, an IOF has a relative advantage in 
accepting good projects, whereas a cooperative is better at rejecting bad projects. In 
other words, a cooperative (IOF) is more likely to commit type I (II) errors (Hendrikse,
1998). A cooperative and an IOF’s conditional probabilities of accepting different 
projects are summarised in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Conditional probability of accepting projects
Project Type
Probability of Accepting  the Project
IOF Cooperative
Good Project ߙ݌(ܣ|ܩ) ߙ݌(ܣ|ܩ)ଶ
Bad Project (1െ ߙ)݌(ܣ|ܤ) (1െ ߙ)݌(ܣ|ܤ)ଶ
Output Decisions
In a monopoly market, the raw input for each product is produced by a large number 
of independent farms. There is only one agent in the region as a single processor, 
which is either a cooperative or an IOF. When the agent is a cooperative, it is assumed 
that all farms are members of the cooperative. Whereas when the agent is an IOF, the 
IOF is in a monopolistic position of taking the produce from the farms. The raw input 
an agent takes from the farms is labelled ‘Raw Product’. The agent processes the ‘Raw 
Product’ and sells the ‘Final Product’ in the market. For simplicity, each unit of the 
Raw Product from the farms is assumed to yield one unit of the Final Product 
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(conversion rate of processing is equal to 1). As single seller of the Final Product in
the monopoly market, the agent’s ability to set the Final Product’s price is limited only 
by the product’s demand function, and the rising marginal costs of production. The 
production costs function consists of the processing costs of the processor and the 
price paid to the farms for collecting Raw Product.
Given the market demand function and production costs function, the agent can decide 
the optimal output level for each Final Product in its portfolio. The optimal output 
level in the simulation is also taken as the output constraint of the product. It means 
that the agent will not increase the product’s output beyond this level. The optimal
output of the product varies among different agents because they have different 
objectives. An IOF’s objective is to maximise its profits of processing operations,
whereas a cooperative’s objective and optimising criteria can vary (LeVay, 1983; 
Soboh et al., 2009). Cooperatives choosing different objectives will have different 
market behaviours, which lead to different financial issues in consequence (LeVay,
1983). We simulate two different objectives of a cooperative in our model. The first 
objective (COOP1) is to maximise the members’ total surplus (total profit of both 
cooperative processor and member farms) and the cooperative is assumed to have 
direct control over the Raw Product quantity members supply. A cooperative with this 
type of objective is assumed to behave as a centralised production entity, which 
produces an optimal output to maximise the joint surplus of the cooperative and farms. 
The second type of cooperative objective (COOP2) is to maximise the total output of 
products and serve the members at cost. The cooperative welcomes all eligible Raw 
Product from the members as long as no loss on its operation is incurred. With the 
second type of objective, the payment to member farms and the profit of the 
cooperative is expected to be lower due to overproduction.
The first product in an agent’s portfolio is the Original Product. It means that the farms’ 
initial farming activity at the start is to produce the raw input of the Original Product 
and supply it to the processor. When the processor adds a new product to its portfolio, 
it needs new Raw Product input from the farms. The relatedness of the new product to 
the Original Product is measured by its distance to the Original Product in the 
Portfolio Matrix. The new product’s market demand function and the farms’ 
aggregated cost function of producing the new Raw Product input depend on the 
relatedness of the new product to the Original Product. The larger the distance, the less 
the new product is related to the Original Product and the deeper the demand function. 
The definitions of the demand function and the derivation of the optimal output ܳכ of 
a Final Product is provided in Appendix 8.2. The optimal output ܳכ of the different 
processors is as follows:
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ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܦ = (1 + 0.1)஽௜௦௧௔௡௖௘ , ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = 0, 1, 2, 3 …
a and b are the parameters of the downward-sloping demand function of the Final 
Product; B is the marginal costs of processing the associated Raw Product; c is the 
parameter of the farms’ aggregated cost function of producing the Raw Product. D is 
used to moderate the new product’s demand function and cost function based on its 
distance to the Original Product. When the Distance = 0, D = 1, it represents the 
Original Product. For a specific Final Product, it can be shown that:
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ > ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ > ܳூைிכ .
With a larger output constraint, the cooperative will produce more than an IOF does 
and is likely to ‘overproduce’ (Albaek and Schultz, 1998:397). This phenomenon can 
be explained by several features in the cooperative’s governance structure design, i.e. 
the elimination of the ‘double mark-up’, the output policy driven by the average rather 
than the marginal member, and members’ strong incentive to overproduce, etc.
(Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:508).
Simulation Settings of the Monopoly Market
We first investigate the product portfolio evolution of different agents in a monopoly
market. We use the same lifetime settings as in the basic model. The lifetime of the 
Original Product is set to infinite for the cooperative agent, which highlights the single 
origin constraint, whereas for the IOF agent a finite lifetime of 40 is assigned to the 
Original Product. A finite lifetime equal to 40 will be assigned for all other products.
At the beginning of each period, the agent will choose randomly a product from the 
local Moore neighbourhood of its current product(s) based on the Probability Matrix. 
If the chosen one is a new product, it can be a good project or a bad project. The agent 
must judge the project and decide whether to diversify through the screening process. 
The project screening process is configured under the following parameter setting: 
݌(ܣ|ܩ) = 0.6,݌(ܣ|ܤ) = 0.2 and ߙ = 0.5. If the agent decides not to diversify, the
project is rejected and the product portfolio will remain unchanged in this period. If 
the agent accepts the project and the project is good, the new product will be assigned 
an initial output level. The new product will then start to generate profit for the agent 
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and be kept in the portfolio. To the contrary, if the project is bad, it will then generate 
a loss that is equal to negative profit of the initial output and the agent will divest the 
product in the next period immediately. If the chosen cell is an existing product 
already in the agent’s portfolio, and its current output is still lower than the optimal 
output level defined by Q*, the agent will then increase the output level of the product 
with a fixed growth rate.
The initial output level of the Original Product is set to 2. Given the numerical 
parameters ( ܽ = 0.4;  ܾ = 20;  ܿ = 0.25;ܤ = 0.8 ), we can obtain the output
constraints of the Original Product for different agents:  ܳூைிכ = 4; ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
5.5; ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ = 8. The initial output level of a new product is decided by its distance to 
the Original Product and equal to 2/ܦ. The production constraint of the new product 
is:  ܳூைிכ = 4/ܦ;  ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ = 5.5/ܦ;  ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ = 8/ܦ . A fixed growth rate of 50% is 
chosen. The rationale is that the IOF, COOP1 and COOP2 will reach a product’s 
output constraint after 2, 3 and 4 times the output increase, respectively. When a 
product’s output level has reached its production constraint, the product will not be 
chosen again. The agent will keep a profit-generating product in the portfolio until its 
lifetime is reached, and then the product will be removed from the portfolio. We 
simulate the process of an agent’s portfolio evolution over 500 periods. The results of 
100 runs of simulation are averaged.
Results of the Monopoly Market Simulation
Appendix 8.3 presents and compares the simulation results of the product portfolio 
evolution and performance of different agents in a monopoly market. Particularly, we 
simulate two types of cooperatives with different objective functions: COOP1 is to 
maximise the farmer members’ total surplus and COOP2 is to maximise the output of 
product and serve the members at cost.
Figures 8.3a – 8.3e capture the evolution of the agents’ product portfolio in terms of 
number of products, output, and composition of products. Figure 8.3a illustrates the 
number of products in the agents’ portfolio. After the simulation starts, both the 
cooperative and the IOF add new products to their portfolio by accepting 
diversification projects. Up until the 40th period, the number of products increases
quickly but the increase of the IOF’s number of products is faster. It entails that the 
IOF adds new products more quickly than the cooperative does. The speed of adding 
new products to the portfolio is determined mainly by the agent’s project screening 
mechanism. With two independent decision-making units, the cooperative rejects 
more diversification projects; hence, it adds fewer new products along the periods. By 
contrast, the IOF agent is more willing to accept projects and thus becomes more
diversified than the cooperative. After the 40th period, the number of products in the 
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agents’ portfolios drops steeply because some products start to reach their lifetime. In
the long term, the number of products in the IOF agent’s portfolio fluctuates at around 
9, while the number of products of the cooperative agent, both COOP1 and COOP2,
fluctuates at around 6. This means that the cooperative is less diversified, keeping 
fewer products in the portfolio than the IOF does. Because COOP1 and COOP2 have 
the same screening process, their product numbers are close. Nevertheless, COOP1 
has slightly more products than COOP2. This is because COOP1 has a smaller output
constraint and its product will reach the constraint earlier. When a product has reached 
its output constraint, it will no longer be selected and more probability weight is given 
to the products not in the portfolio yet.
Figures 8.3b and 8.3c illustrate the agents’ total product output and average output per 
product. After the simulation starts, both the cooperative and the IOF increase their
total output quickly by adding new products to the portfolio and by increasing the 
output of the existing products. After the product divesture starts, the agents’ total 
output drops. The total output of the cooperative levels off after some periods, whereas 
that of the IOF declines slowly along the whole periods. An agent’s total output is 
related to the products number in its portfolio and the output of each product. From a 
long-term perspective, the IOF keeps about 9 products in its portfolio but the average 
output per product declines continuously over time. It confirms the results of the basic 
model that after the Original Product of the IOF has reached its lifetime and been 
divested, the IOF’s product portfolio gradually evolves into product clusters that 
deviate from the Original Product. Because of this deviation, the IOF’s portfolio
consists of the products that have smaller market sizes and smaller output constraints. 
Therefore, the IOF has the lowest and a continuously declining average output per 
product and total output. By contrast, the Original Product of the cooperatives will 
remain in the portfolio forever due to the single origin constraint. The consequence is
that the evolution of the product portfolio of the cooperative will be centred on the 
Original Product and the output constraints of individual products will vary in a 
relatively small range. In addition, the products similar to the Original Product are 
modelled to have large market demands. Therefore, the average output per product of 
the cooperative will be larger than that of the IOF. With the highest output constraints, 
it is natural that COOP2 has the largest output per product as well as total output.
Figures 8.3d and 8.3e present the change of the average product distance to the 
Original Product and the average weighted product distance. The cooperative’s 
average (weighted) product distance stays stable after some periods. It confirms that 
the product portfolio of the cooperative remains concentrated around the Original 
Product. By contrast, the average (weighted) product distance of the IOF continues to 
increase when its portfolio evolves to the products that are far away from and less 
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related to the Original Product. In Figure 8.3d we can also see that the average product 
distance of COOP1 is slightly higher than that of COOP2. It entails that although both 
COOP1 and COOP2’s portfolio are centred on the Original Product, COOP1’s product 
portfolio is slightly more dispersed because COOP1 has more products than COOP2
does. It shows that a large output of the products will decrease the diversification level 
of the cooperative.
In the monopoly market, the single origin constraint still plays a dominant role in the 
development of a cooperative’s portfolio. After the 40th period, the limited product life 
time starts to have a divesture effect. For the cooperative, the product that reaches its
lifetime first sits in the Moore neighbourhood of the Original Product. Although the 
cooperative will not continuously increase the output of the Original Product due to 
the output constraint, the Original Product maintains the large chance for the products 
around it to be chosen and thus generates a concentration effect. By contrast, the first 
divested product in the IOF’s portfolio is the Original Product. The divesture of the 
Original Product entails that the probability weights regarding the selection of a new 
activity changes significantly since the centre of the probability distribution has been 
removed and the probability distribution becomes flat. It increases the likelihood that a 
new product, which is far away from the Original Product, is chosen. In consequence, 
the IOF’s portfolio changes to product clusters that deviate from the Original Product. 
Following this deviation, the output of the IOF is declining over time because the 
products that have a large distance from the Original Product are defined to have lower 
production constraints. The results are formulated in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: Compared with the IOF, the cooperative is less diversified and has a 
larger product output. The cooperative’s product portfolio is centred on the Original 
Product, while the IOF diversifies into the product clusters that are not related to 
the Original Product.
The double screening in the decision making of cooperatives indicates more 
conservative project selection. In addition to the single origin constraint, the double 
screening also leads to the cooperatives being less diversified than the IOF. Table 8.2
shows the activity record of the different agents (the average of 100 runs of 
simulation). The cooperatives are good at abandoning bad projects, and seldom make 
type II errors (on average 8 times for COOP1 and 7 times for COOP2). By contrast,
the IOF selected 34 bad projects. However, cooperatives have a higher tendency to
commit type I errors. COOP1 and COOP2 rejected 117 and 114 good projects, much 
higher as compared to the 69 good projects rejected by the IOF. During 500 periods, 
COOP1, COOP2 and the IOF increase product output 136, 149 and 151 times 
respectively. COOP2 increased product output more often than COOP1 did due to its 
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larger output constraint. For the IOF, because it has more products in its portfolio, the 
frequency of the output increase is thus larger. 
Table 8.2: Activity record of the monopolistic agents
Activities COOP1 COOP2 IOF
Abandon bad project 175 167 141
Select bad project 8 7 34
Abandon good project 117 114 69
Select good project 63 63 105
Increase output 136 149 151
The simulation also generates indications for the performance of different processors
in a monopoly market. Figure 8.3f illustrates the total surplus of the cooperative, the 
total profit of the IOF, and the profit of the farms that deliver the raw product to the 
IOF. The total surplus of COOP1 is higher than that of COOP2, and is close to the 
total profit of the IOF. It entails that COOP1, which has direct control over the product
output, can generate a higher total surplus for the member farms than COOP2 does,
which serves the member at cost. The latter type of cooperative suffers a loss of 
surplus due to overproduction. Meanwhile, although the IOF can earn a comparable 
level of profit as compared to the total surplus of the cooperative, the farms that 
deliver the raw product to the IOF can only obtain a very low level of profit. This 
indicates that the farms are exploited by the market power of the monopolistic IOF in 
the region. Both types of cooperatives can improve the wellbeing of the farms in the 
monopoly market, although the cooperative is less diversified.
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 8.3g, the average surplus of COOP1 or COOP2
per product is higher than the sum of the average profit per product of the IOF and the 
profit of the farms delivering the raw product to the IOF. This is due to the 
cooperative’s advantage of being vertically integrated with farms. The vertical 
integration eliminates the double marginalisation and leads to a higher joint surplus of 
the cooperative processor and farms. In addition, Figure 8.3h shows that the average 
profit per output unit of the IOF is higher than that of the cooperative and continues to 
increase during the periods. As the IOF evolves to the products with a large distance
from the Original Product, the IOF moves to the higher value-added products and 
receives a higher profit per output unit. Therefore, although the IOF has a smaller total 
output and average output per product, by having more products in its portfolio that 
enjoy a higher profit per output unit, it is still able to reach an equivalent level of total 
profit as compared to the total surplus of the cooperative. These results are formulated 
in the following proposition:
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Proposition 3: In a monopoly market, the total surplus of the cooperative is close to
the total profit of the IOF. However, the cooperative has a higher average surplus 
per product, while the IOF has a higher average profit per output unit.
8.4 Duopoly Market
In this section, we further extend the model of the product portfolio evolution to an 
environment with two agents – a cooperative and an IOF, which are competing in a 
mixed duopoly market. The simulation of a duopoly market addresses the impact of 
competition between different governance structures on product diversification.
Simulation Settings of the Duopoly Market
There are two different agents in the market. When the simulation starts, each agent 
has only the Original Product in its portfolio and both will evolve the product portfolio. 
However, an agent’s portfolio evolution is now in a competitive environment and 
interacting with the other agent. If both agents are producing the same product, they 
are in competition and each has to choose the optimal output level for the product. 
This is captured by the Coutnot competition game. The single origin constraint of the 
cooperative will still be captured by setting the lifetime of the Original Product to 
infinite for the cooperative agent but finite for the IOF agent. All other products are 
assigned the same finite lifetime.  
Like in the simulation of the monopoly market, an agent will choose a product in the
local Moore neighbourhood of its product portfolio based on the weighted probability
distribution at the beginning of each period. However, additional transition rules are 
required to govern an agent’s interactions with the other agent in the duopoly market. 
In the monopoly market, when an agent chooses a product from its local 
neighbourhood, there are only two possibilities. If the product is already in the 
portfolio, the agent will simply increase its output level until the output reaches the 
output constraint; if the product is a new product, the agent will need to decide 
whether to diversify or not. In the duopoly market, because of the existence of a rival 
agent, two more possibilities exist and thus two new transition rules. The first 
possibility is that an agent chooses a product that is not in its own portfolio but in the 
rival agent’s. In this case, we use the transition rule that the agent will enter into 
competition immediately because the product is proved to be good and adding it to the 
portfolio will generate profit. It is also assumed that the incumbent producer of the 
product cannot prevent the entry of the other agent. The second new possibility is that 
the chosen product is already in the portfolios of both agents. Then the agent will 
adjust its output based on the reaction function of the Coutnot competition game until 
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the output of that product reaches equilibrium. To be more precise, if an agent is 
producing a product alone, the output constraint of the product is decided in the same 
way as in the monopoly market. If an agent is competing with the rival agent in a 
product, the output level of the product is decided by the reaction function. In the
duopoly market, if a product’s output level has reached the output constraint or 
equilibrium, the product will not be chosen again in the next period. The status of the 
chosen product and an agent’s activity is listed in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Status of the chosen product and the activities of agents
Status of the Chosen Product Activities
New product (none of the agents is 
producing at the moment).
Decide whether to diversify or not based on the 
project screening process (Project Screening).
In own portfolio but not in rival 
agent’s portfolio.
Increase output level until production constraint
(Increase Output).
Not in own portfolio but in rival 
agent’s portfolio.
Enter into competition and decide output level 
based on reaction function (Join Competition).
In both agents’ portfolios. Adjust output level based on the reaction 
function (Adjust Output).
The reaction functions are as follows and the derivation is provided in Appendix 8.4.
ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳ஼ைை௉
2(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳூைி
2(ܽ + ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳூைி
(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܦ = (1 + 0.1)஽௜௦௧௔௡௖௘ ,ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = 0,1,2,3 …
Results of the Duopoly Market Simulation
Under the same parameters as in the monopoly market simulation, we simulate the 
process of portfolio evolution of an IOF and a cooperative, which are in competition 
for 500 periods. The results of 100 simulations runs are averaged. 
The first simulation demonstrates the competition between the IOF and the
cooperative that maximises the total surplus (COOP1). The results are in Appendix 8.5.
In Figure 8.5a we can see that the number of products of the IOF is still larger than 
that of COOP1. However, the IOF and the cooperative have around 11 and 8 products 
in their portfolios in the duopoly market. The duopolistic agents’ products numbers are 
larger than what they have when they are monopolists. The reason is that, when an 
agent selects a new product from its existing products’ local neighbourhood, if is not 
179_Erim Deng BW stand.job
165
in its own portfolio but in the rival agent’s, the agent will choose to join in competition 
without project screening because this product is profitable. This increases the chance 
of adding new products and increases the number of products in an agent’s portfolio. It 
entails that the competition may boost product diversification if the agents use the 
strategy of following other agents to produce profitable products. However, in the
duopoly market, the IOF is still more diversified than the cooperative because it is 
more willing to accept diversification projects.
Figures 8.5b and 8.5c illustrate that the cooperative has a higher level of total output
and output per product than the IOF does. Due to the larger production constraints and 
the more aggressive behaviour of the cooperative, although the cooperative agent is 
less diversified and has fewer products in portfolio, the total output of the cooperative 
is larger than that of the IOF.  
Figure 8.5d shows that the average product distance of the IOF is higher than that of 
the cooperative, and it levels off after some periods in the duopoly market. To the 
contrary, the average product distance of the IOF keeps increasing in the monopoly 
market (Figure 8.3d). This means that, when an IOF is competing with a cooperative, 
the competition prevents the IOF’s portfolio from deviating from the Original Product 
continuously. This is because the products in competition are close to the Original 
Product as the portfolio of the cooperative concentrates around the Original Product 
due to the single origin constraint. This part of the IOF’s portfolio continues to evolve 
as a products cluster, which is relatively close to the Original Product. Therefore, the 
average product distance of the IOF doesn’t keep increasing. Therefore, the dispersion 
of the portfolio of the IOF in the duopoly market is lower than that in the monopoly 
market, due to the interaction between agents. However, Figure 8.3e shows that the 
average weighted product distance of the cooperative is higher than that of the IOF 
because of the cooperative’s larger output per product.
The total surplus of the cooperative and the total profit of the IOF are close (Figure 
8.5f). However, the farms that deliver the Raw Products to the IOF still earn a low 
level of profit. It is noticed that the total surplus of the cooperative is higher than the 
total profit of the IOF in the early periods of the simulation, e.g. before the 40th period.
This is because both processors’ portfolio evolution starts from the Original Product, 
and their portfolios have much in overlap at the beginning of the simulation. It entails 
that they compete with more products at the start. The cooperative takes advantage of 
vertical integration into more products and obtains a higher surplus for every product 
in competition. Figure 8.5g illustrates that the average surplus per product of the
cooperative is higher than the average profit per product of the IOF. With fewer 
products in the portfolio, the cooperative’s source of surplus concentrates on fewer 
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products, whereas the IOF obtains its profit from more products. However, the average 
profit per output unit of the IOF is slightly higher (Figure 8.5h). It shows that the IOF 
still diversifies into the products with a larger distance to the Original Product and 
obtains a higher unit profit. Overall, similar to the situation in the monopoly market, 
the IOF has a smaller output per product and lower profit per product, but it enjoys a
higher average profit per output unit. With a more diversified portfolio and a higher 
profit per output unit, the total profit of the IOF reaches a similar level as the total 
surplus of the cooperative along the periods.
Figure 8.5i compares the average market shares of the cooperative and the IOF. For 
those products in competition, the cooperative enjoys 60% of the market share and the 
IOF therefore only 40%. This confirms that the cooperative will produce more than the 
IOF in a mixed duopoly market (Tennbakk, 1995). Figure 8.5j shows that the number 
of products in competition reaches 8 at the beginning of the simulation. It means that 
the competition concentrates on the products around the Original Product at the start. 
After 40 periods, some products reach their lifetime and are divested. In consequence, 
the number of products in competition decreases and levels off. Approximately, the 
agents are competing in 5 products, and the output equilibrium is reached in about 3
products. 
The second simulation of the duopoly market demonstrates the competition between 
the IOF and COOP2, a cooperative that maximises its output and breaks even. The 
simulation results are presented in Appendix 8.6. The agents’ product numbers (Figure 
8.6a) and average product distance (Figure 8.6d) are similar across the two duopoly 
market models, but the weighted average product distance (Figure 8.6e) of COOP2 is 
larger than that of COOP1 due to the larger product output of COOP2. In both duopoly
market models, the total surplus of the cooperative and the total profit of the IOF are 
close. However, the cooperative enjoys a higher surplus per product due to the vertical 
integration, while the IOF obtains a higher level of profit per output unit.
The simulation of the competition between the IOF and COOP2 results also in some 
differences. First, the output of COOP2 is significantly larger (Figures 8.6b and 8.6c), 
and results in the lower total and per product surplus (Figures 8.6f and 8.6g). In
addition, the average surplus per output unit of COOP2 is much lower than that of 
COOP1 due to the overproduction. The IOF’s market share decreases to about 35%
when in competition with COOP2. Second, the total profit and the average profit per 
product of the IOF also decrease when it competes with COOP2. This can be 
explained as follows. The portfolio of the cooperative is concentrated around the 
Original Product due to its single origin constraint and an overproducing cooperative
like COOP2 will pool the large output of these products in the market because its 
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activity is only restricted by the at-cost condition. When the IOF is competing with the
cooperative expanding its output aggressively, it is forced to decrease its output of the 
products and obtain certainly lower profit. This leads to destructive competition. By 
contrast, when the IOF is competing with the cooperative which maximises its total 
surplus (COOP1), the destructive competition is less serious because both agents are 
more interested in higher product prices. The results of the duopoly market simulation 
are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In a mixed duopoly market, the total surplus of the cooperative is
close to the total profit of the IOF. The cooperative is less diversified than the IOF. 
However, due to the competition effect, both the IOF and cooperative will have a 
higher diversification level than in the monopoly market. In addition, the dispersion 
of the IOF’s product portfolio will be lower.
Table 8.4 records different agents’ activities in the simulation of the duopoly market 
(the mean of 100 runs of simulations).
Table 8.4: Activity record of the duopolistic agents
Duopoly Market 1 Duopoly Market 2
Activities IOF COOP1 IOF COOP2
Abandon bad project 136 162 138 159
Select bad project 35 7 34 6
Abandon good project 66 105 69 103
Select good project 103 60 102 59
Increase output 76 56 76 58
Join competition 33 50 34 51
Adjust output 50 59 48 63
Similarly, the cooperatives are good at abandoning the bad projects and they seldom
make type II errors (7 times for COOP1 and 8 times for COOP2). By contrast, the IOF 
selected 35 and 34 bad projects. However, cooperatives have also a higher tendency to 
commit type I errors. COOP1 and COOP2 rejected 105 and 103 good projects, much 
higher as compared to the 66 and 69 good projects rejected by the IOF. During the 500 
periods, COOP1 and COOP2 increase product output 56 and 58 times, respectively. 
During the same periods, the IOF increases product output more often (76 times) than 
the cooperatives due to the larger number of products in the IOF’s portfolio. In general,
the cooperatives are more inclined to enter the competition than the IOF is. When the 
cooperative selects a product in the IOF’s portfolio but not in its own portfolio, it will 
enter the competition by starting to produce the product. Because the IOF has more 
products in its portfolio, the likelihood for the cooperative to join the competition is
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thus higher. It entails that the cooperative acts more as a follower in the competition in 
the mixed duopoly market.
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter formulates a number of results regarding the impact of governance 
structure on the evolution of product portfolio coherence by using agent-based 
methodology. We simulate the product portfolio evolution of a cooperative and an IOF 
in three models: the basic model, the monopoly market model, and the duopoly market 
model.
The basic model focuses on the impact of the single origin constraint of cooperatives 
when agents adopt a concentric diversification strategy. Concentric diversification and 
portfolio coherence are made operational by making the agents diversify into new 
products in the Moore environment of the current product portfolio, while the single 
origin constraint is modelled by assigning an infinite lifetime only to the first product
of the cooperative. The simulation results of the basic model show that the single 
origin constraint pulls the products of the cooperative in one cluster centred on the 
Original Product. This centralisation effect decreases the probability of choosing new 
products while increases the output of the Original Product continuously. Therefore, 
one important result is that the single origin constraint accounts for the lower
diversification level of cooperatives. Without single origin constraint, the product 
portfolio of the IOF evolves in such a pattern that it consists of clusters of related 
products that deviate from the Original Product. In the long term, the IOF will be more 
diversified than the cooperative and keep a stable number of products in its portfolio. 
The output of the IOF is also relatively constant.
In the simulation of the monopoly market, two additional aspects of governance 
structure are addressed explicitly. First, the cooperative and the IOF have different
decision-making processes in project screening. The cooperative is characterised by 
the double screening, whereas the project screening of the IOF consists of only one 
decision-making unit. Second, different governance structures lead to different 
objectives of firms, which have an impact on their output decisions. While an IOF
determines its product output level by maximising the total profits of the downstream 
processor, a cooperative may maximise the summed profits of the upstream farms and 
downstream processor or maximise the product output by making the downstream 
processor serve the members at cost. The results show that, although the cooperative 
will not continuously increase the output of its Original Product due to the output 
constraint, its product portfolio still centres on the Original Product. By contrast, the 
IOF’s product portfolio starts to develop in a centrifugal way after the Original 
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Product is eliminated. The distribution of product lifetime of products is proved to be 
the key factor in determining the coherence of the product portfolio of enterprises. Our 
model indicates that product portfolios evolve into clusters of related products only 
when all products have a finite lifetime. The centripetal effect on portfolio 
composition of one product with an infinite lifetime dominates the centrifugal effect of 
products with finite lifetime, regardless of the number of products with a finite lifetime.
Decision-making processes and objectives of firms have impacts on the evolution and 
composition of product portfolios. The cooperative’s double screening process leads to 
its more conservative project selection. This is thus an additional reason that explains
the cooperative’s lower diversification level. The different objectives of the 
cooperative and the IOF are reflected in their different output decisions. The IOF has 
the lowest product output because it limits the product output to maximise the total 
profit of the processor. The cooperative that maximises its members’ total surplus has 
a larger product output than the IOF does because the vertical integration eliminates 
the double-marginalisation problem. The cooperative that doesn’t control the output 
and serves the members at cost further increases the output but the surplus is decreased
in return. 
In general, the cooperative’s product portfolio is featured as less diversified, centred
on the Original Product, with a larger output, a higher surplus per product, and a lower 
surplus per output unit. The IOF has more products in its portfolio, which deviates
from the Original Product and has a smaller output, a lower profit per product, and a
higher profit per output unit. However, although the cooperative and the IOF have 
very different portfolio compositions, the total surplus of the cooperative and the total 
profit of the IOF are close. The farms that deliver the Raw Products to the IOF obtain 
a much lower profit compared with the surplus received by the cooperative member 
farms. This result indicates the value of cooperatives for farms in terms of establishing 
countervailing power. 
Competition between agents is modelled in the simulation of the mixed duopoly 
market. Competition entails that there is an interaction effect between the two agents, 
which modifies the diversification and divestment process. In the mixed duopoly
market, the cooperative still has fewer products in its portfolio, and has a larger total 
and per product output than the IOF does. Similar to the results of the monopoly 
market, the cooperative has a higher surplus per product, whereas the IOF has a higher 
profit per output unit in the duopoly market. However, both the cooperative and IOF 
are more diversified in the duopoly market than in the monopoly market because of 
the interaction effect. A duopolistic agent will add a new product to its portfolio if the 
product is already in the rival’s portfolio. Another impact is that the interaction
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prevents the IOF’s portfolio from deviating from the Original Product continuously by 
keeping some of the IOF’s products close to the Original Product. Furthermore, it is 
indicated that the cooperative occupies a larger market share in the mixed duopoly
market. The cooperative that serves the members at cost will further expand its market 
share in the competition with the IOF. The results also show that the total surplus of 
the cooperative and the total profit of the IOF are close when they are in competition,
but both types of the cooperative can improve the member farms’ wellbeing in the 
duopoly market.
Various avenues for future research are possible. First, the evolution and composition
of product portfolios have been addressed, but this does not determine the direction of 
the growth activities. Modelling the portfolio problem and the horizon problem along 
the lines of this chapter may generate some directionality in the product portfolio. For 
example, focus on the Moore neighbourhood may account for the difference between 
related and unrelated diversification, while the lifetime parameter is a natural 
ingredient of the model for capturing the difference between short and long run 
projects. A recent study by Ang et al. (2014) shows the background of CEOs has an 
impact on their divestiture decisions. 
Second, according to the resource-based view, resources of firms will shape their 
diversification pattern (Penrose, 1959). Compared with IOFs, cooperatives are 
supposed to be short of two types of resources. Cooperatives have less financial 
resources at their disposal for product diversification because their equity shares are 
not transferable and they are not able to raise capital from stock markets (Vitaliano, 
1983; van Oijen and Hendrikse, 2002). As a consequence, cooperatives may have 
fewer means to diversify than IOFs. In addition, cooperatives may have insufficient 
human resources because member-dominated leaders may lack the skills and 
knowledge needed for diversification strategies (USDA, 2002). This results in the 
hypothesis that the frequency of product portfolio changes is lower for a cooperative 
than an IOF. We intend to investigate the implications of some of these observations 
in future research using agent-based methodology.
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Appendix 8.1: Simulation Results of the Basic Model
This appendix presents various indicators of the evolution of the product portfolio of 
the IOF (dotted line) and the cooperative (solid line).
Figure 8.1: Simulation results of the basic model
Figure 8.1a: Number of Products Figure 8.1b: Total Output
Figure 8.1c: Average Output per Product Figure 8.1d: Average Product Distance
Figure 8.1e: Average Weighted Product Distance 
186_Erim Deng BW stand.job
172
Appendix 8.2: Optimal Output in the Monopoly Market
We first derive the optimal output ܳכ for the Original Product. We assume that the 
Final Product’s downward-sloping demand function is linear. Let p be the market 
price and the inverse market demand for the Original Product is:
݌(ܳ) = െܽ(ܳ െ ܾ),ܽ > 0,ܾ > 0.
In the market under consideration, the Raw Product is produced by a large number of 
independent farms in the region. The aggregated cost function of the farms is 
increasing and convex, being a quadratic function of total output ܳ (Tennbakk, 1995; 
Albaek and Schultz, 1998):
ܥ(ܳ) = ܿܳଶ, ܿ > 0.
All farms have to sell their Raw Product to the IOF, which is in a monopolistic 
position of taking the produce from farms. The IOF has to pay a price according to the 
aggregate marginal cost curve of farmers ܥԢ(ܳ) to get the desired supply (Tennbakk, 
1995; Royer and Matthey, 1999). In addition, in a long-term operation, the IOF 
processor has constant marginal costs ܤ (> 0) for other input in production, thus the 
profit from the operation of the IOF processor and the profit of the farms are:
ߨூைி = െ ܽܳଶ + ܾܽܳ െ ܤܳ െ ܳܥᇱ(ܳ).
ߨி௔௥௠௦ = ܳܥᇱ(ܳ)െ ܿܳଶ = ܿܳଶ.
The IOF’s objective is to maximise ߨூைி . When the Original Product’s marginal 
revenue is equal to the sum of the marginal processing costs and marginal costs of 
purchasing the Raw Product from the farms, ߨூைி is maximised. From the first-order 
condition we obtain:
ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + 2ܿ)
.
If the monopolistic processor in this region is a cooperative, we assume that all the 
farms are cooperative members and supply the Raw Product to the cooperative. The 
cooperative is assumed to have a direct control over the Raw Product quantity the 
members produce. The cooperative’s objective is to maximise its members’ total 
surplus (COOP1, denoted as ܵ஼ைை௉ ), which is the sum of the profits from the 
production of each member farms and the profit of the operation of processor, which 
are subsequently distributed back to the member farmers:
ܵ஼ைை௉ = െ ܽܳଶ + ܾܽܳ െ ܤܳ െ ܥ(ܳ).
In this case, the cooperative is like a fully integrated firm, who integrates the 
production of its members and acts as monopolist in the Final Product market. The on-
farm costs of members are internalised and the cooperative equalises marginal revenue 
to marginal costs. The integration of upstream and downstream firms bring an 
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advantage to the cooperative by eliminating the double-marginalisation problem
(Spengler, 1950; Feng, 2011; Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). 
The cooperative is assumed to have the same constant marginal costs ܤ (> 0) for 
other input in production. By maximising the total surplus S we obtain:
ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + ܿ)
.
Another possible objective of cooperative is to maximise the output and serve the 
members at cost. We label it COOP2 and we obtain:
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
ܽ + 2ܿ
.
In the case of operating at cost, because the cooperative allows free entry to anyone 
with eligible produce (no input control), the cooperative welcomes all eligible Raw 
Product it is offered as long as no loss occurs in the operation (LeVay, 1983).
When a processor diversifies into a new product, and this product generates profits,
the new product’s demand curve and cost function are similar to those of the Original 
Product, but it is modified according to the new product’s relatedness to the Original 
Product. The relatedness is measured by the new product’s distance to the Original 
Product in the Portfolio Matrix. The distance is defined as the largest vertical or 
horizontal distance from the new product cell to the Original Product cell in the 
Portfolio Matrix. For example, Figure 8.2a illustrates the new product X, Y, and Z,
which has a distance of 1, 1, and 2 to the Original Product, respectively:
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Original 0 0
0 0 X Y 0
0 0 0 0 Z
Figure 8.2a: The Original Product and new products
For a new product with a certain distance to the Original Product, the downward-
sloping demand curve and aggregated cost function of its Raw Product are:
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݌(ܳ) = െܽ(ܦܳ െ ܾ),ܽ > 0,ܾ > 0.
ܥ(ܳ) = ܿ(ܦܳ)ଶ, ܿ > 0.
ܦ = (1 + 0.1)஽௜௦௧௔௡௖௘ , ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = 0,1,2,3 …
D is used to moderate the new product’s demand function and cost function based on 
its distance to the Original Product. When distance is equal to 0, D = 1, it represents 
the Original Product.
By maximising the objective functions, we obtain the general form of ܳூைிכ , ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ
and ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ , i.e. the optimal outputs or production constraints of the product with a 
certain distance to the Original Product:
ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
2(ܽ + ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ
(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
Figures 8.2b and 8.2c compare the demand curve and cooperative’s surplus curve for 
the Original Product and a new product in Figure 8.2a with a distance of 2 (product Z).
Figure 8.2b: Demand curve of the Original Product and the product with Distance=2
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Figure 8.2c: Cooperative’s surplus of the Original Product and the product with 
Distance=2
The rationale behind the distance of a new Final Product to the Original Product is that 
the larger the distance, the steeper the downward-slope of demand curve. It entails that 
the market size of the new product is smaller than the Original Product. However, the 
new product has a higher surplus (profit) per output unit than the Original Product 
does at its optimal output. In this sense, we view the Original Product as the product 
with basic quality features and model the diversification from the Original Product to a 
new product as an extension of business to higher value-added final products.
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Appendix 8.3: Simulation Results of the Monopoly Market
This appendix presents various indicators of the evolution of the product portfolio of 
the IOF (dotted line) and the cooperative (solid line for COOP1 and dashed line for 
COOP2).
Figure 8.3: Simulation results of the monopoly market
Figure 8.3a: Number of Products Figure 8.3b: Total Output
Figure 8.3c: Average Output per Product Figure 8.3d: Average Product Distance
Figure 8.3e: Average Weighted Product Distance Figure 8.3f: Total Profit/Surplus
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Figure 8.3g: Average Profit/Surplus per Product Figure 8.3h: Average Profit/Surplus per Output 
Unit 
Appendix 8.4: Reaction Functions in the Duopoly Market
We first derive how agents decide the output of the Original Product when they are in
competition. We adopt the same settings of Tennbakk (1995) for a mixed duopoly 
market, and assume that the farms are divided into two equal groups with the identical 
aggregated production costs function.
ܥ(ܳ) = ܿ(ܦܳ)ଶ, ܿ > 0.
The production of each farm group is exclusively distributed to the final market via 
one of the two processors – the IOF or the cooperative. The cooperative is modelled as 
a closed cooperative, which only takes the input from its member group. Therefore, 
the IOF is in a monopolistic position for those non-member farms. It is also assumed 
that the cooperative and IOF processor have the same constant marginal costs ܤ (> 0)
for other input in production. The inverse market demand of the Original Product is
captured by:
݌(ܳ) = െܽ(ܳଵ + ܳଶ െ ܾ),ܽ > 0,ܾ > 0.
For the IOF with an output level of ܳଵ, its profit is:
ߨூைி = െ(ܽ + 2ܿ) ଵܳଶ + (ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܳଶ) ଵܳ.
The reaction function of the IOF can be obtained:
ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܳଶ
2(ܽ + 2ܿ)
For the cooperative with an output level of ܳଶ, the  total surplus is:
ܵ஼ைை௉ = െ(ܽ + ܿ)ܳଶଶ + (ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܳଵ)ܳଶ.
The reaction function of the cooperative can be derived by maximising the members’ 
total surplus:
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ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܳଵ
2(ܽ + ܿ)
.
If the cooperative is operating under the at-cost condition, the reaction function is:
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܳଵ
ܽ + 2ܿ
.
The equilibrium output of the Original Product is given by the intersection of the 
reaction functions as shown in Figure 8.4. The asymmetry in the reaction functions
shows that the cooperative is a more aggressive agent by producing more than the IOF
does.
Figure 8.4: Reaction functions of the IOF and Cooperatives
Similar to the monopoly market, for a new product with a specific distance to the 
Original Product, the reaction functions are modified based on the product’s distance
to the Original Product:
ܳூைிכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳଶ
2(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଵכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳଵ
2(ܽ + ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܳ஼ைை௉ଶכ =
ܾܽ െ ܤ െ ܽܦܳଵ
(ܽ + 2ܿ) × ܦ
.
ܦ = (1 + 0.1)஽௜௦௧௔௡௖௘,ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = 1,2,3 …
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Appendix 8.5: Simulation Results of the Duopoly Market: IOF and COOP1
This appendix presents various indicators of the evolution of the product portfolio of 
the IOF (dotted line) and COOP1 (solid line).
Figure 8.5: Simulation results of the duopoly market: IOF and COOP1
Figure 8.5a: Number of Products Figure 8.5b: Total Output 
Figure 8.5c: Average Output per Product Figure 8.5d: Average Product Distance
Figure 8.5e: Average Weighted Product 
Distance 
Figure 8.5f: Total Profit/Surplus
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Figure 8.5g: Average Profit/Surplus per 
Product 
Figure 8.5h: Average Profit/Surplus per 
Output Unit 
Figure 8.5i: Market Share Figure 8.5j: Products in Competition and in 
Equilibrium
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Appendix 8.6: Simulation Results of the Duopoly Market: IOF and COOP2
This appendix presents various indicators of the evolution of the product portfolio of 
the IOF (dotted line) and COOP2 (solid line).
Figure 8.6: Simulation results of the duopoly market: IOF and COOP2
Figure 8.6a: Number of Products Figure 8.6b: Total Output 
Figure 8.6c: Average Output per Product Figure 8.6d: Average Product Distance
Figure 8.6e: Average Weighted Product 
Distance 
Figure 8.6f: Total Profit/Surplus
196_Erim Deng BW stand.job
182
Figure 8.6g: Average Profit/Surplus per 
Product 
Figure 8.6h: Average Profit/Surplus per Output 
Unit 
Figure 8.6i: Market Share Figure 8.6j: Products in Competition and in 
Equilibrium
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9. Product Diversification of Cooperatives and 
Corporations - Evidence from the Netherlands26
Abstract
This chapter investigates empirically the influence of governance structure on product 
diversification behaviour. We compare the product portfolio of Dutch cooperatives 
and publicly listed companies in 2001 and 2012. The results show that cooperatives 
are less diversified than publicly listed companies in 2001, whereas the diversification 
levels of these two governance structures is statistically comparable in 2012.
Keywords: Governance Structure, Product Diversification, Cooperative, Corporation
9.1 Introduction
Although the research interest of product diversification can be traced back to more 
than half a century ago (Penrose, 1959), the studies about product diversification 
strategies of cooperatives are still sparsely covered by literature (van Oijen and 
Hendrikse, 2002). However, the research into product diversification of cooperatives
should not be neglected because cooperatives have been playing an important role in
many economies (van Oijen and Hendrikse, 2002). For example, ‘cooperatives in 
Europe represent 123 million members, 5.4 million employees and 160 thousand 
enterprises’ (Cooperatives Europe, 2012). Globally, cooperatives provide 250 million 
jobs, and the largest 300 cooperatives alone generate a turnover of more than 2.2 
trillion USD in 2014 (ICA, 2014). Given this important economic role of cooperatives 
worldwide, more insights into their product diversification strategies are warranted. 
Many cooperative researchers have compared the organisational characteristics of 
cooperatives with those of corporations, and a common conclusion is that cooperatives 
are different from corporations in terms of governance structure (Staatz, 1987; Cook, 
1995; van Bekkum and van Dijk, 1997; Hendrikse, 1998; Royer, 1999; Nilsson, 2001; 
Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a). Traditional cooperatives, owned and controlled by 
their members, are formed to serve the interests of members rather than generate 
profits for investors (Liang, 2013). According to Commission of the European 
Communities, (2001:12), cooperatives have ‘an orientation to provide benefits to 
26 A version of this chapter was published in the proceeding of the Economics and 
Management of Networks Conference (EMNet), 2013, Agadir, Morocco
(https://emnet.univie.ac.at/upload/media/Deng_Hendrikse.pdf).  
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members and satisfy their needs, democratic goal setting and decision-making 
methods, special rules for dealing with capital and profit, and general interest 
objectives (in some cases)’. As previous research suggests that a company’s ownership 
and organisational structure have effects on its product diversification (e.g. Belkaoui 
and Pavlik, 1992; Bethel and Lieberskind, 1993), these features in a cooperative 
governance structure may influence its product diversification strategies.
Empirical evidence supports that cooperatives with distinguishing governance 
structure features adopt different product diversification strategies than corporations 
do. Dunn, Ingalsbe and Armstrong (1979) point out that in general, farmer 
cooperatives tend to be less diversified than IOFs (investor owned firms). A few 
existing empirical studies on cooperatives seem to support this argument. Sporleder
and Skinner (1977) investigate the diversification of regional marketing cooperatives 
over the period from 1960 through 1973 in the US. The results suggest that the portion 
of diversified regional marketing cooperatives is small (less than 10%) and there is no 
substantial trend towards product diversification. Chen, Babb and Schrader (1985) 
compare 32 large cooperatives and 35 large proprietary firms in 5 food industries in 
the US from 1975 to 1980. Their results suggest that cooperatives were less diversified 
than proprietary firms. Oustapassidis (1988) also finds that the overall diversification 
level of marketing agricultural cooperatives in Britain is uniformly low. And based on 
the comparison between cooperatives and IOFs in the Greek dairy industry, 
Oustapassidis and Notta (1997) conclude that cooperatives do not effectively apply 
diversification strategies in contrast to IOFs. Van Oijen and Hendrikse (2002) also 
find that Dutch cooperatives are less diversified than Dutch publicly listed firms.
The findings of previous empirical studies all indicate that cooperatives tend to be less 
diversified than corporations are. According to these studies, several characteristics of 
the traditional cooperative governance structure provide explanations for the lower 
level of product diversification of cooperatives. For example, cooperatives have less 
financial resources at their disposal for product diversification because their equity 
shares are not transferable and they are not able to raise capital from stock markets 
(Vitaliano, 1983; van Oijen and Hendrikse, 2002). In addition, traditional cooperatives 
used to be production-oriented. The members, who control the cooperatives 
collectively, may not be interested in investing in new activities. Instead, cooperatives 
tend to focus on the strategy of cost leadership and invest in enlarging their current 
operations (Nilsson, 2001). 
However, due to the radical changes in agribusiness in recent decades, the traditional 
cooperative model has been questioned and substantial restructuring in the cooperative 
business sphere has taken place (Nilsson, 1998; Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a). In 
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order to adapt to the changes in market conditions, cooperatives have to modify their 
strategies to become more market-oriented (Bijman, 2002). They need to extend their 
activities to value-added processing, be responsive to the market demand for 
innovative and differentiated products, and compete in international markets (e.g. 
Bijman, 2010; Hendrikse, 2011; Liang, 2013). Given the fact that the governance 
structure of traditional cooperatives is not suitable for these strategies, some 
cooperatives have transformed into other non-traditional organisational models, for 
example by introducing individual ownership by the members (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 
2007) or by restructuring their organisational governance (Bijman, Hendrikse and van
Oijen, 2013). Due to these changes in cooperatives’ governance structure, some 
crucial aspects that make cooperatives different from corporations may no longer exist 
in many cooperatives. Nowadays, cooperatives may become similar to corporations in 
many respects including product diversification.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the difference between cooperatives and 
corporations regarding their levels of product diversification. This difference may be 
explained by the specific governance structure characteristics of cooperatives versus 
corporations. More specifically, we try to analyse the impacts that the characteristics 
of cooperative governance structure may have on cooperatives’ strategies of product 
diversification. We also investigate whether cooperatives are becoming similar to 
corporations in terms of product diversification. The empirical basis of this chapter
consists of the data from Dutch cooperatives and corporations regarding their product 
portfolio in 2001 and 2012. Hence, the dataset aims at revealing the difference 
between the product diversification levels of cooperatives and corporations and 
identifying the potential change in this difference over time.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 focuses on the characteristics of the 
governance structure of traditional cooperatives and elaborates their effects on product
diversification. In Section 9.3, we address the changes in cooperative governance 
structure and discuss the impacts of these changes on cooperatives’ diversification 
strategies. In Section 9.4, we describe the empirical method and dataset, and we
present the results in Section 9.5. Section 9.6 discusses the results and concludes.
9.2 Cooperative Governance Structure and Diversification
Each governance structure is characterised by its income and decision rights allocation
(Hansmann, 1996), which is implemented through asset ownership and/or contracts 
(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2008). A cooperative is characterised by Dunn (1988:85)
as ‘user-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited, i.e. a cooperative belongs to the 
people who use its services, the control of which rests with all members, and the gains 
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of which are distributed to the members in proportion to the use they made of its
services’. It entails that the ownership rights of cooperatives reside with their members. 
The characteristics of the governance structure of traditional cooperatives, in terms of 
decision and income rights allocation, and their impacts on product diversification will 
be analysed in this section.
Decision Rights Allocation
Decision rights concern all rights and rules regarding ‘the deployment and use of 
assets’, and specify who directs the enterprise’s activities (Hendrikse, 2011:1693). The 
allocation of decision rights in cooperatives is different from that in corporations in 
several respects, among which we highlight two features, i.e. the collective decision 
making and stricter internal control mechanism. They both may largely influence
cooperatives’ product diversification strategies. 
First, according to Hendrikse and Feng (2013:307), ‘the distinguishing feature of a
cooperative is member dominance’. As a cooperative is commonly owned by its 
members, collective ownership requires collective decision making. In cooperatives,
extensive decision-making power is allocated to the General Assembly and the Board 
of Directors which are ‘democratically chosen by and from the membership’ (Liang, 
2013:21). More importantly, while the strategic decisions in corporations are mainly 
focused on the company’s profitability and growth, the decision-making scope in 
cooperatives is wider, including both the questions of how to serve the member 
interests and how to generate maximum value at the cooperative enterprise (Feng,
2011). This creates a challenge for the collective decision making in cooperatives,
especially when the heterogeneity of membership is large and members’ interests are 
diverse (Hansmann, 1996). Therefore, the collective decision-making in cooperatives 
makes their decisions of diversification more time-consuming (Hendrikse and van 
Oijen, 2010). This may result in a competitive disadvantage of cooperatives (Henehan 
and Anderson, 1994) and lost opportunities (Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2010). The 
second consequence of the collective decision rights structure of cooperatives is that it 
may amplify risk aversion (Staatz, 1987). Cooperative members are regarded as 
conservative and they often favour a conservative investment strategy in order to 
stabilise member returns (Staatz, 1987; Henehan and Anderson, 1994). Peterson and 
Anderson (1996) also claim that only the most secure projects are considered as 
investment options by cooperative members. Conservativeness is an impediment for 
cooperatives to initiate new and risky business activities such as product 
diversification. Therefore, the decision making process in cooperatives is expected to 
lead to a low level of product diversification of cooperatives.
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Second, while an enterprise’s formal rights of control reside with it owners, the real 
authority is usually delegated to its management (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1999). 
This is also the case for cooperatives. However, one difference between cooperatives 
and corporations is that more extensive decision-making power is retained by 
cooperative members than by the shareholders of corporations (Hendrikse and van 
Oijen, 2010). The CEOs of cooperatives are less powerful than their counterparts in 
corporations. Instead, the Board of Directors of cooperatives, who are representatives 
of the members, plays a more prominent and independent role than their counterparts
in corporations do (Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2010). In a corporation, the CEO ‘often 
has substantial control over setting, ratifying and implementing company policy’
(Hendrikse and Feng, 2013:507), and ‘often has a large, if not dominant voice, in 
selecting the Board of Directors’ (USDA, 2002:11). By contrast, the Board of 
Directors of a cooperative is democratically elected by and from its membership and 
the CEO has almost no influence on the board composition (Cook and Burress, 2013). 
As Hendrikse (1998:203) claims, the members of a cooperative ‘have an incentive to 
structure the internal organisation in such a way that they have confidence that their 
substantial (financial) stakes are protected and their interests are advanced’, and the 
Board of Directors of cooperatives have the independence ‘to question management
decisions and reject its recommendations’ (USDA, 2002:11). In addition, the 
involvement of members in cooperatives’ business also helps to ease the agency 
problem (Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). Amihud and Lev (1981, 1999) proposed that 
managers in manager-controlled firms tend to apply diversification policies and on
average, diversification decreases shareholders’ value. However, members and 
directors of a cooperative have frequent contacts and communication with the 
cooperative enterprise because they are also users. This leads to more effective 
monitoring and constrains of the power of management. Thus, the internal control 
mechanism in cooperatives is stricter than in corporations and managers of 
cooperatives have fewer opportunities to pursue their own interests through 
diversification than managers of corporations do. The investment decisions in 
cooperatives are thus subject to double screening, which means that a cooperative 
consists of two decision-making bodies with each having veto power on potential 
diversification projects (Hendrikse, 1998). Since cooperatives will accept fewer 
investment projects, they are supposed to be less diversified than corporations.
In general, the characteristics of the decision rights allocation in traditional 
cooperatives seem to constrain product diversification. With stricter internal control, 
more conservative and risk adverse decision making, cooperatives are more reluctant 
to enter new businesses than corporations.
Income Rights Allocation
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According to Hendrikse (2011:1693), income rights specify ‘the rights to receive the 
benefits and the obligations to pay the costs associated with the use of an asset, 
thereby creating the incentive system faced by the decision makers’. Among the 
features of cooperatives’ income rights structure, the dual relationship between 
members and cooperatives and non-tradable shares are supposed to have prominent
effects on the product diversification of cooperatives.
First of all, while shareholders have only a singular relationship with corporations, 
members have a dual relationship with their cooperatives or a double-set of income 
rights (Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). The vertical ties between the 
members and the processor consist of a transaction element and an ownership element
(Feng and Hendrikse, 2012). From an investment perspective, cooperatives are 
generating patronage cash flows, asset cash flows, or both (Peterson, 1992). In 
traditional cooperatives, because dividends of equity shares are limited and have been 
subordinated to patronage cash flows (Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013), 
members are therefore more interested in optimising the volumes and prices of their 
transactions with the cooperatives (Hansmann, 1996). This leads to free-riding in 
equity contribution and underinvestment problems. Members have the tendency to 
invest less than optimal since their payoffs are based on their patronage instead of on
their investment in the cooperatives. Another consequence of the dual relationship is 
that the cooperative become a ‘home’ for the output of members, which also limits the 
possibilities for cooperatives to diversify (Saitone and Sexton, 2009:1224). Because 
cooperatives are run for the needs of members who are the formal owners of the firm,
cooperatives have less freedom than corporations in disciplining from markets for 
inputs (Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2010). This is also labelled as the ‘single origin 
constraint’ (Cook, 1997:87). Traditional cooperatives usually focus on processing 
higher volumes of members’ outputs or inputs at better prices instead of diversifying 
product portfolio (Nilsson, 2001). Product diversification may lead to economies of 
scope. However, cooperative members’ income rights focus on receiving patronage 
refunds, driving cooperative enterprises to pursue economies of scale instead of 
economies of scope. Therefore, diversification into new businesses is more probable 
for corporations, which aim to maximise the capital returns for their investors, than it 
is for cooperatives.
Second, another important feature of cooperatives’ income rights structure is that the 
residual claim rights or shares of traditional cooperatives are not tradable without 
restriction because the majority of the shares have to stay with the membership
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004). The first consequence of this feature is that the ownership 
of cooperatives is collective and restricted to patron members (Vitaliano, 1983). 
Cooperatives are not able to attract capital from external investors and raise capital 
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from capital markets by issuing stocks. Hence, cooperatives have to rely mainly on 
internal equity sources, i.e. by convincing members to invest new capital, by retaining 
earnings, or by extending membership (Hansmann, 1996; USDA, 2002). The second 
consequence of the non-transferability of cooperative shares is that it depresses 
members’ incentive to invest in cooperatives, leading to the free-riding problem, 
portfolio problem, and horizon problem (Cook, 1995). In general, without external 
equity sources and being confined to the equity from members, who are commonly 
less able and willing to provide new equity, ‘the most important challenge facing 
traditional cooperatives is accumulating equity capital’ (USDA, 2002:23). Therefore, 
as members are reluctant to finance new initiatives, especially those unfamiliar and 
risky activities, and there is no external source for risk capital, we expect that 
traditional cooperatives are less diversified than corporations because of the lack of 
financial resources. 
In summary, we discuss four characteristics of traditional cooperatives’ governance 
structure, which may reduce their product diversification: (a) collective decision 
making; (b) stricter internal control; (c) dual relationship; and (d) non-tradable shares. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Cooperatives are less diversified than corporations are.
9.3 Flexibility of Cooperative Governance Structure 
The traditional type of cooperative has been successful in general. Cooperatives 
compete with corporations in many sectors of most modern economies and occupy a 
significant part of market share, especially in the agricultural sector (Cook, 1995; 
Hendrikse, 1998). However, the conditions in the market and in society have been 
changing quickly over the past decades (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a). On the one 
hand, the great concentration of the agrifood distribution sector, rise of demand on
processed products, increasing concern for product quality, and changing consumer 
preferences for products, etc. all placed new market opportunities and challenges on 
cooperatives (e.g. Bijman, 2010; Hendrikse, 2011; Liang, 2013). On the other hand, 
the need for differentiation, innovation and value-added in business has the tendency 
to increase member heterogeneity (Hendrikse, 2011). USDA (2002:3) states that, 
‘cooperatives now must adapt to a more diverse membership that requires different 
services, products, and structures’. The traditional cooperatives may have difficulties 
when facing these external and internal changes. Accordingly, they need to adapt new 
strategies and realign their organisational structures (Kyriakopoulos and van Bekkum,
1999; Hendrikse, 2011). Changes of ownership rights such as contractual production, 
merger and acquisition, demutualisation, etc. are potential solutions (Hendrikse and 
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Feng, 2013). However, the flexibility in cooperatives’ income and decision rights 
allocation also creates a number of possibilities for cooperatives to adapt to the new 
circumstances, while maintaining the allocation of ownership rights with members
(Liang, 2013; Hendrikse and Feng, 2013). In this section, we discuss the adaptation of 
the cooperative governance structure in terms of decision rights and income rights 
allocation, and their potential impacts on product diversification. 
Adaptation of Decision Rights Allocation
The adaptation of decision rights allocation can be realised by changing the allocation 
of decision power between the various bodies within the cooperative (Hendrikse and 
Feng, 2013). In order to be more responsive to market competition and reduce the 
costs of collective decision-making, cooperatives have to move the decision power 
closer to the downstream and centralise it to a larger degree than what they used to be.
To achieve this goal, cooperatives may professionalise the management, delegate 
formal authority regarding more aspects of the cooperative enterprise to management, 
and separate the society of members and the cooperative enterprise, etc. (Hendrikse
and Feng, 2013). The adaptation in decision rights allocation may reduce the 
involvement of members on the cooperatives’ decision making and make cooperatives’ 
management increasingly autonomous (Bager, 1996; Harte, 1997; Bhuyan, 2007; 
Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013). Hendrikse (2005) observes that the change 
of cooperatives’ character in its governance structure and public appearances place
members in a less influential position in decision making. As a consequence, ‘the 
aspirations of the managers, rather than those of the farmers, are realised’ (Hind, 
1999:536). Cooperatives driven by management will behave more like ordinary 
enterprises. 
As cooperatives become more management driven, the management has more freedom 
to make diversification decisions. The change of cooperatives’ internal organisational
structure follows this adaptation progress regarding the allocation of decision rights. 
For example, the agency relationship between the board and the management is
changing in Dutch cooperatives. Nowadays, most of the expertise and the real 
authority lie with the professional management, which increasingly makes more 
strategic and operational decisions, while ‘pushing the board into a supervisory role’
(Bijman, Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2013:204). Bijman et al. (2013) also observe that 
cooperatives with the traditional board model are least diversified, while those with 
the management board model are most diversified. This adaptation of decision rights 
allocation supports cooperatives’ market-oriented strategies and makes the decisions 
for product diversification easier. Based on the empirical findings on cooperative 
performance, Sexton and Iskow (1993) concluded that cooperatives are generally not
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less efficient than other types of firms. As such, we expect that the difference of 
product diversification between cooperatives and corporations nowadays is smaller 
than before. 
Adaptation of Income Rights Allocation
Starting from the 1990s, many traditional cooperatives have taken steps to restructure 
their income rights structure by replacing the collective capital structure with a more 
individualised capital structure (Nilsson, 1998). To acquire external equity capital, 
some cooperatives have converted to the model with a ‘capital-seeking entity’ or the 
model of ‘investor-share cooperatives’ (Chaddad and Cook, 2004:352). Both of these 
new models of cooperatives attenuate the restriction of cooperative ownership rights 
only to members. In the model with a capital-seeking entity, a cooperative introduces a 
separate legal entity, which is wholly or partially owned by the cooperative, to acquire 
external equity. The investor-share cooperatives issue separate classes of equity shares 
for external non-member investors. Alternatively, in order to generate incentives for 
members to provide equity, some cooperatives convert to ‘proportional investment 
cooperatives’ or ‘new generation cooperatives’ (Chaddad and Cook, 2004:352). In 
proportional investment cooperatives, although the ownership of cooperatives is still 
not transferable, the distribution of net earnings of cooperatives is proportional to 
member shareholding rather than patronage. The new generation cooperatives model 
relaxes the non-transferability of cooperative shares and the shares are appreciable as 
well as transferable among the ‘well-defined member-patron group’ (p.355). These 
two models maintain the principle that the owners of cooperatives must be members, 
but the appreciation and transferability of cooperative shares enhance members’ 
willingness to invest in their cooperatives. The traditional cooperatives that have 
restructured the income rights allocation to these new models are expected to become
capable of raising sufficient equity for participating in value-added processing and 
product diversification. 
Another consequence is that the restructuring of income rights makes the asset cash 
flow so important that not only will the external investors demand a high return on 
their investment but also the members’ income relies on the return on investment.
Various previous studies already indicate that the financial performance of 
cooperatives is generally as strong as that of IOFs (Parliament, Lerman and Fulton 
1990; Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Harris and Fulton, 1996). In new generation 
cooperatives, members can realise additional benefits from their equity investment in 
cooperatives (USDA, 2002). This change reinforces the financial relationship between 
members and cooperatives. The demand of members for investment returns makes 
cooperatives more ready to adopt good diversification projects that will result in 
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profitability and growth. Meanwhile, cooperatives also restructure their income rights 
by spending considerable efforts in developing member benefit programmes to counter 
the process of adverse selection and attract innovative members (Hendrikse, 2011). 
Cooperatives are thus able to attract high-quality suppliers and diversify into high 
value-added products. For example, Friesland Campina, a leading Dutch dairy 
cooperative, has been moving from 50:50 high versus low value-added products, to 
80:20 now, and plans to reach 90:10 in a few years (van de Horst, 2012). 
In sum, when considering the adaptation of decision rights and income rights 
allocation in cooperatives in the past decades, it is reasonable to project a decreasing 
difference of product diversification levels between cooperatives and corporations 
over time. In other words, cooperatives and corporations shall become similar in terms 
of product diversification behaviour. We conclude this section with the second 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The difference in the level of product diversification between 
cooperatives and corporations disappears over time. 
9.4 Method
In this section, we explain the samples and data collection, the measures, and the 
analyses we use to test the propositions.
Sample and Data Collection
The samples and the data are extracted from the REACH database published by 
Bureau Van Dijk. 27 The REACH database contains comprehensive information on 
companies in the Netherlands. The REACH database was merged into Orbis Database 
of Bureau Van Dijk in 2007, which covers the data of firms worldwide.
We first select all active Dutch cooperatives (national legal form: C) and publicly
listed companies for the year 2012. The latter type of firms represents corporations. 
And then we look for these companies in the database in 2001. Consistent with the 
previous research on product diversification, we remove firms from the financial 
services industry (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 6000 to 6999) and regulated 
utilities industry (SIC 4000 to 4999) (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997; Goranova et al., 
2007). The results are 429 cooperatives and 48 public listed companies (Sample 1). 
For each company, we extracted its SIC code information from the database. The data 
for the year 2012 is downloaded from Orbis edition December 2012, and the data for 
the year 2001 are part of the REACH database historical edition in December 2001. 
27 http://www.bvdinfo.com/
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With this measure, we identify the companies that are present in both 2001 and 2012, 
i.e. the companies that operate continuously during the time period of 2001-2012. The 
purpose is to adjust for the impact of the entry of new single-segment companies 
(Basu, 2009) and to differentiate the genuine changes from sampling errors. From 
2001 to 2012, the number of cooperatives increases from 1,249 to 3,678, the entry of 
such large amount of new cooperatives in the database may bias the analysis. We 
therefore only investigate the same group of companies.
Given the fact that other factors, such as firm size, leverage, etc., may also affect 
product diversification (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997), and in order to remove the 
inactive cooperatives with no business activities (for example, cooperatives founded 
by the owners of apartments jointly to exploit common facilities are not aimed at 
creating business and thus not useful for comparison) from Sample 1, we further select 
the cooperatives that have available financial data (operating revenue) from Sample 1. 
Because reporting financial information is not mandatory for cooperatives, there are 
only a few cooperatives (31 out of 1,249) in REACH database with financial 
information in 2000 (one year before the sampling time). As a consequence, there are 
only 11 cooperatives with financial data in both 2000 and 2011. This requirement 
seems to be too strict and results in a too small sample of cooperatives. However, 
more cooperatives report financial data in 2011 (486 out of 3,678). We therefore select 
the cooperatives which have available operating revenue data for 2011. By doing this, 
we secure that the cooperatives in our sample are active in business activities. It results 
in Sample 2, which consists of 114 companies (66 cooperatives and 48 publicly listed 
companies).
Measures 
The governance structure is measured by a dummy variable, which has value zero for 
cooperatives and value one for corporations. The most accepted and popular measures 
of product diversification are based on discrete and continuous business count 
approaches (Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987). However, the continuous business 
count approaches such as Berry-Herfindahl and entropy diversification indices are 
inapplicable for our dataset because the required information of breakdown of sales is 
not available for most of the cooperatives in our sample. Therefore, we take the
discrete business count approach, which does not require data on sales of products but 
still provides insights into the degree of diversification of a company. Specifically, we 
use the number of 4-digit industry codes to measure each company’s absolute degree 
of overall product diversification (Kim, Hoskisson and Wan, 2004). 
Companies in different industrial sectors may have different opportunities and 
motivations for diversification. With all samples, we control the industrial effect based 
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on the classification of the main 2-digit SIC code of a firm. We introduce an industry 
dummy to reflect the 8 industrial sectors (see Appendix 9.1). We control for company 
size and leverage of the firms in Sample 2 based on the availability of financial data.
We used the natural log of average company assets and operating revenue for 2009, 
2010 and 2011 to measure firm size. The solvency ratio is introduced into the model as 
a control of leverage. Similarly, the 3-year average value for 2009, 2010 and 2011 is 
taken to smooth the fluctuation. 
Analysis
Because of the potential inconsistency in the coding system due to revisions of SIC 
(Martin and Sayrak, 2003), conducting a panel analysis by using the product 
diversification data for the year 2001 and 2012 in Sample 1 and 2 is problematic. This 
is similar to the problem in historical analysis of financial data, which suffers from 
changes of accounting policies and systems over time (Hind, 1997). We therefore 
focus our study on the basis of a multiple cross-sectional data analysis and aim at 
investigating the change of the difference of product diversification levels between 
cooperatives and corporations from 2001 to 2012. The difference of product 
diversification levels in each single year is not affected by the inconsistency of the 
coding system because both types of companies report their product portfolio under 
the same standard of the year under observation.  
Thus, for both Sample 1 and 2 we first compare the product diversification level of 
cooperatives and corporations in different years, and then investigate whether the 
difference of product diversification level between these two types of companies 
changes between the year 2001 and 2012. After that, we adopt a Poisson Regression 
Model to investigate the relationship between company’s governance structure 
(independent variable) and product diversification level (dependent variable). For 
Sample 2, we incorporate additional control variables in the Poisson Regression Model. 
Because the dependent variable (number of 4-digit code a firm has) is discrete in 
nature and dispersedly distributed, we decide to choose a Poisson Regression Model 
for count data, instead of the linear regression model (Verbeek, 2012).
9.5 Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 9.1 and 9.2 present the number and percentage of the diversified firms, and the 
distribution of firms in different industrial sectors. In both samples, the number of 
cooperatives is higher than that of publicly listed companies. The distribution of 
companies among industries is consistent between two samples. The companies in 
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sector A, which consists of agriculture, forestry and fishing, are all cooperatives. This 
is in line with the fact that cooperatives are playing a major role in the Dutch 
agricultural and food sector (Bijman and Hendrikse, 2003). However, the cooperatives 
in the agricultural sector accounts for only about 6% of the cooperatives in each 
sample. Cooperatives are also more active in sector F (wholesale trade) compared with 
corporations. By contrast, corporations are more dominant in sector B (mining) and
sector D (manufacturing). No company changed the governance structure between 
2001 and 2012. However, some companies changed their major business activities. In 
Sample 1, 9 cooperatives and 5 corporations have changed their major business 
activities in the period. And in Sample 2, 2 cooperatives have changed their major 
business activities. The number of companies in sector B (mining), C (construction), 
and G (retail) decreases but the number of firms in sector I (services) increases. 
Some trends regarding product diversification can be identified by comparing the data 
across 2001 and 2012. First, we find a decrease in the percentage of the diversified 
publicly listed companies. The samples show that in 2001, around 69% of the 
corporations have more than one product or activity, i.e. they are diversified. This 
percentage drops to around 56% in 2012. This result is in line with empirical findings 
of the downward trend of corporate diversification (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Second, 
the percentage of diversified cooperatives decreases from 60% to 54% in Sample 1 but 
increases from 55% to 62% in Sample 2. Since the direction of the trends in the two 
samples is mixed, we are not able to tell whether more cooperatives chose to diversify 
or not. However, the cooperatives in Sample 2, which report operating revenue data, 
are usually large cooperatives. Among this group of cooperatives, 5 chose to diversify 
in the last 10 years, which may mean that large cooperatives tend to diversify their 
product portfolios in the past 10 years.
Table 9.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the product diversification level, 
measured by the number of 4-digit SIC codes, of all the companies in the samples. We 
find that the mean and distribution of the number of 4-digit SIC codes are similar for 
different samples in the same year but different between 2001 and 2012 for the same 
sample. In 2001, the mean diversification levels of all companies are 2.37 and 2.57 for 
Sample 1 and 2. In 2012, both means drop by about 0.45 to 1.94 and 2.12, respectively.
The second change across 2001 and 2012 is the increase of the percentage of firms 
that has only one 4-digit SIC code. This corresponds with the decrease of fraction of 
diversified firms. The distribution of product diversification level is not normally 
distributed, with more than 60% of the companies having only 1 or 2 SIC codes. 
However, the distribution is more concentrated in the range of 1 to 7 in 2012, whereas 
in 2001 it is much more dispersed. 
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Table 9.1: Distribution of firms in industry sectors in Sample 1
2001 Type of Firm Sample Size
Diversified 
Firms Distribution of Firms in Industrial Sectors
A B C D F G I J
Cooperative 429 259 27 0 13 27 170 29 162 1
60% 6% 0% 3% 6% 40% 7% 38% 0%
Corporation 48 33 0 2 4 17 5 7 13 0
69% 0% 4% 8% 35% 10% 15% 27% 0%
Combined 447 292 27 2 17 44 175 36 175 1
61% 6% 0% 4% 9% 37% 8% 37% 0%
2012 Type of Firm
Sample 
Size
Diversified 
Firms Distribution of Firms in Industrial Sectors
A B C D F G I J
Cooperative 429 233 26 0 9 33 170 26 165 0
54% 6% 0% 2% 8% 40% 6% 38% 0%
Corporation 48 27 0 1 4 18 4 4 17 0
56% 0% 2% 8% 38% 8% 8% 35% 0%
Combined 447 260 26 1 13 51 174 30 182 0
55% 5% 0% 3% 11% 36% 6% 38% 0%
Percentages are in italics.
Table 9.2: Distribution of firms in industry sectors in Sample 2
2001 Type of Firm Sample Size
Diversified 
Firms Distribution of Firms in Industrial Sectors
A B C D F G I J
Cooperative 66 36 3 0 0 10 21 4 27 1
55% 5% 0% 0% 15% 32% 6% 41% 2%
Corporation 48 33 0 2 4 17 5 7 13 0
69% 0% 4% 8% 35% 10% 15% 27% 0%
Combined 114 69 3 2 4 27 26 11 40 1
61% 3% 2% 4% 24% 23% 10% 35% 1%
2012 Type of Firm Sample 
Size
Diversified 
Firms
Distribution of Firms in Industrial Sectors
A B C D F G I J
Cooperative 66 41 3 0 0 11 20 5 27 0
62% 5% 0% 0% 17% 30% 8% 41% 0%
Corporation 48 27 0 1 4 18 4 4 17 0
56% 0% 2% 8% 38% 8% 8% 35% 0%
Combined 114 68 3 1 4 29 24 9 44 0
60% 3% 1% 4% 25% 21% 8% 39% 0%
Percentages are in italics.
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Diversification Level Difference
Table 9.4 compares the mean product diversification levels of cooperatives and 
corporations in different years. In addition to the t-test statistic, we report the 
Wilcoxon nonparametric statistic because the data are not normally distributed. The
Wilcoxon test enables us to distinguish between the two types of companies in terms 
of their product diversification levels. We find a significant difference in the mean
product diversification levels between two types of companies in 2001, and more 
importantly, this difference disappears in 2012. In both Sample 1 and 2, the mean 
product diversification level of cooperatives is significantly lower than that of 
corporations in 2001. This result suggests that cooperatives in the samples are less 
diversified than corporations in 2001 are. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported. However, 
the difference in mean product diversification levels becomes smaller in 2012, and in 
both samples, the mean product diversification levels of cooperatives and corporations 
are no longer significantly different in 2012. In other words, the levels of product 
diversification of cooperatives and publicly listed companies are statistically 
comparable in 2012. The result of the 2012 data indicates that cooperatives are similar 
to corporations in terms of product diversification level. The difference between 
cooperatives and corporations in product diversification level is much smaller than 
before. The second hypothesis is thus supported by the data of 2012.  
Regression analysis 
Our preliminary results based upon the Wilcoxon nonparametric test (Table 9.4) are 
reinforced by using regression analysis. We run an individual Poisson regression on 
the cross-sectional data for each year to determine the relationship between firms’ 
governance structure and product diversification level. The results are presented in 
Table 9.5.
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Table 9.5: Regression results of product diversification level
Dependent Variable: Number of 4-digit SIC Codes
Method: ML/QML - Poisson Count (Quadratic hill climbing)
Sample 1 Sample 2
Variable 2001 2012 2001 2012 2012’
Constant 0 0.5515 0 0.5184 -0.0125
0 (9.5964)** 0 (3.9587)** (-0.0369)
A. Agriculture 1.8689 -0.0563 1.8971 0.3287 0.2717
(1.8636)* (-0.4848)** (1.8514)* (0.8221) (0.0677)
B. Mining 1.2819 0.6044 1.2171 0.8114 0.7518
(1.2106) (1.0250) (1.1449) (1.3564) (1.2433)
C. Construction 1.0989 0.7082 0.9657 0.8914 0.8981
(1.0884) (4.3932)** (0.9249) (2.7991)** (2.7163)**
D. Manufacturing 1.1803 0.2821 1.1292 0.6081 0.4906
(1.1754) (2.5000)** (1.1187) (3.5889)** (2.6517)**
F. Transportation 0.7170 0.0806 0.7053 0.2898 0.3657
(0.7160) (0.2704) (0.6987) (1.5537) (1.8857)*
G. Wholesale 0.5436 0.1988 0.4547 0.4251 0.3651
(0.5393) (1.4390) (0.4423) (1.7018)* (1.4341)*
I. Service 0.5470 0.4712
(0.5461) (0.4673)
Asset (log) 0.0745
(1.2566)
Solvency (%) 0.0055
(1.6730)*
Structure 0.2222 -0.0563 0.2870 -0.2312 -0.3197
(2.2210)** (-0.4848) (2.0898)** (-1.5580) (-1.8267)*
Observations 447 447 114 114 114
Log Likelihood -802.57 -705.91 -211.26 -173.56 -171.95
R2 0.325 0.126 0.208 0.208 0.247
z-statistics are in parentheses.
*denotes significance at the 10% level.
**denotes significance at the 5% level
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The results for Sample 1 suggest that, while controlling for industry, the coefficient for 
governance structure (0 for cooperative and 1 for corporation) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in 2001 but negative and insignificant in 2012. 
We obtain similar results from the regression on Sample 2. It entails that, ceteris 
paribus, in 2001, corporations have more products or activities than cooperatives do.
However, in 2012, corporations seem to have fewer products or activities than 
cooperatives but this coefficient is not statistically significant. In the regression on the 
2012 data of Sample 2, we also try to add two additional variables – asset and 
solvency ratio, to control for firm size and leverage. The results show that, while 
controlling for industry, firm size and leverage, the coefficient for governance 
structure is negative, at the 10% significance level. Firm asset and solvency ratio both 
have positive impacts on product diversification but these impacts are not statistically 
significant. 
In summary, the analysis of the data for Dutch cooperatives and corporations reveals 
that cooperatives were less diversified than corporations in 2001. However, when 
comparing these two types of different firms again in 2012, we find that the relation 
between the governance structure and product diversification level is not statistically 
significant. This supports our argument that the impact of governance structure 
difference between cooperatives and corporations on product diversification may be 
disappearing. We can no longer assert that cooperatives are less diversified than 
corporations are.
9.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Findings of research into product diversification based on corporations may not 
automatically apply to cooperatives because they have different governance structures
(Hendrikse and van Oijen, 2010). However, does the governance structure really 
matter in product diversification? This chapter investigates the difference in product 
diversification levels between cooperatives and corporations. The results show that the 
product diversification level of Dutch cooperatives is lower than that of Dutch publicly
listed companies in 2001. However, the difference in product diversification levels 
between these two types of companies is statistically insignificant in 2012.
The analysis and explanation of the (in)difference in product diversification level 
between cooperatives and publicly listed companies is based on the impacts of a 
company’s governance structure on its product diversification strategy. In this chapter,
we focus on the decision and income rights allocation, which distinguishes
cooperatives and corporations. For several years, Dutch agricultural cooperatives have 
made substantial structural changes (Bärnheim, 1996; van Dijk, 1997; Zwanenberg, 
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1997). Like other types of companies, cooperatives must continually adapt to the 
changes in market conditions. As substantial changes have taken place in the 
cooperative business sphere over the past decades, Fulton (1995) questions whether 
cooperatives can adapt to the rapidly changing environment. In our opinion, the 
flexibility of cooperative’s governance structure makes this adaptation possible. 
Through the adaptation in decision and income rights allocation, cooperatives are able 
to deal with the new circumstances efficiently and continue to coexist and compete 
with other types of firms. In addition, cooperatives may actually behave similarly to 
corporations in terms of product diversification.
The adaptation of cooperatives’ decision rights structure is based on the flexibility 
regarding the allocation of power in cooperatives. Delegating more decision rights by 
members to management entails giving real authority away while keeping the formal 
control staying with the members (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). The separation of formal 
and real authority will give cooperative management more freedom to operate
(Hendrikse, 2005). The principal-agent relationship in cooperatives is thus modified to
make cooperatives more responsive to the market. As such, the governance structure 
of a cooperative may not matter at all in its investment behaviour (Hendrikse, 2007). 
Another adaptation of cooperatives’ governance structure is with the allocation of 
income rights. Cooperatives can replace the collective capital structure with a more 
individualised capital structure (Nilsson, 1998). Through this adaptation, although 
cooperatives’ ownership rights still reside with members, cooperatives become more 
capable of raising sufficient equity and may ease the financial constraint for product 
diversification. In sum, as many observations have signalled that cooperatives behave 
like ordinary enterprises, in this chapter we show that the product diversification levels 
of Dutch cooperatives and publicly listed companies are statistically indifferent in 
2012. It is intriguing that Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago (2012) establish a similar result 
regarding the productivity of worker cooperatives and capitalist firms in four 
manufacturing industries in France.
This study is subject to some limitations. Since we focus on the cooperatives and 
corporations in the Netherlands, it thus has the limitation of external validity. Due to
different institutional environments, the characteristics of the cooperative governance 
structure can be different from country to country, even within Europe (Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos, 2013). Therefore, it is valuable to conduct more longitudinal studies based 
on the samples from other countries, in order to validate the change of the difference 
between cooperatives and corporations in the past decades. An additional limitation of 
the current study is that, due to the different SIC coding systems in 2002 and 2012 and 
lack of insights into corporations, we cannot be sure that the convergence between 
cooperatives and corporations in terms of diversification level is caused by changes in 
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cooperatives or by changes in corporations (or both). Further study should identify the 
trends in product diversification by using more consistent measures of product 
portfolio and using panel datasets. Finally, enterprises are grouped crudely into two 
types: cooperatives and IOFs. However, there is substantial variety in each group. For 
example, there are consumer cooperatives and marketing cooperatives, and there are 
private and publicly listed corporations. Future research may take these differences 
into account.
Appendix 9.1:  2-Digit SIC Code Detail Level
Sector Product or Activity Range of 2-Digit SIC Code
A Agriculture, forestry, & fishing 01-09
B Mining 10-14
C Construction 15-17
D Manufacturing 20-39
E Transportation & pub. utilities 40-49
F Wholesale trade 50-51
G Retail trade 52-59
H Finance, insurance, & real estate 60-67
I Services 70-89
J Public administration 91-97
K Non-classifiable establishments 99
Source: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, United States Department of Labour.
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10. Conclusion of Part B
In Part B of the dissertation, we conduct two studies regarding the product 
diversification of cooperatives. The major research questions we try to answer are:
x What are the potential impacts of governance structure on cooperatives’
product diversification behaviour?
x Do cooperatives and IOFs differ in terms of product diversification strategy?
To investigate these research questions, two different methodologies are applied. In 
Chapter 8, we adopt an agent-based model to simulate the evolution of product 
portfolio of different types of companies under different market settings. To capture 
the impact of the cooperative governance structure on product diversification, we 
highlight three features of cooperatives in the simulations. The first feature we 
highlight is the single origin constraint of cooperatives (Cook, 1997). This means that 
the original product requiring the input of the members will never be divested by a 
cooperative. The single origin constraint is determined by the ownership nature of 
cooperatives. A cooperative is collectively owned by its members to advance their 
interests. The members are not only residual income claimants but also input suppliers 
of the cooperative processor. As such, while an IOF may move to the products with a 
higher return for its investors, a cooperative will never divest the activity of processing 
the produce of its members.
Second, the cooperative and the IOF are different in the decision-making process with 
respect to project selection. Because more extensive decision-making power is 
retained by cooperative members via the General Assembly and Board of Directors, a
cooperative is characterised by the double screening process in project decisions
(Hendrikse, 1998). A cooperative will accept less diversification projects than an IOF 
does because each investment proposal must be approved by both the society of 
members and the management of the cooperative. This has an impact on the pace of 
cooperatives’ product portfolio evolution. Cooperatives are therefore more 
conservative in terms of diversification than IOFs are.
Third, different objectives of firms lead to different income rights allocations in 
governance structures, which in turn influence their output decisions and performance.
While an IOF determines its product output level by maximising the total profits of the 
downstream processor, the cooperative may maximise the summed profits of the 
upstream farms and downstream processor (Staatz, 1987), or maximise the product 
output by making the downstream processor serve the members at cost (LeVay, 1983).
This results in cooperatives being more aggressive producers than IOFs (Albaek and 
Schultz, 1998).
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A prominent advantage of the agent-based methodology is that all the above described
features in cooperatives’ decision and income rights structure can be incorporated in 
one dynamic model of product portfolio evolution. Through simulation, we are able to 
observe how firms’ decisions are made and analyse the outcomes that emerge at the 
aggregated level. We start with a basic model that focuses only on the impact of the 
single origin constraint of cooperatives. The single origin constraint is modelled by 
assigning an infinite lifetime only to the original product of a cooperative. The 
simulation results show that the single origin constraint pulls the products of the 
cooperative in one cluster centred on the original product. This centralisation effect
decreases the probability of the cooperative to choose new products while increases 
the output of the original product continuously. Therefore, the single origin constraint
leads to the lower diversification level and larger output of cooperatives. Without 
single origin constraint, the product portfolio of the IOF evolves in such a pattern that 
it consists of clusters of related products that deviate from the original product. In the 
long term, the IOF will be more diversified than the cooperative and keep a stable 
number of products in its portfolio. The output of the IOF is also relatively constant.
We extend the basic model by including additional governance structure features and 
simulate the product portfolio evolution of a cooperative and an IOF in two market 
settings. We first investigate the monopoly market, where the cooperative and the IOF 
evolve the product portfolio independently. Similar to the results of the basic model, 
the cooperative’s product portfolio centres on the location of the original product,
while the product portfolio of the IOF evolves in such a pattern that it consists of 
clusters of related products that deviate from the original product. The cooperative is 
less diversified than the IOF and has a larger product output. Specifically, the 
cooperative that maximises its members’ total surplus has a larger product output than 
the IOF because the vertical integration of the member farms and the cooperative
processor eliminates the double-marginalisation problem. The cooperative that serves 
the members at cost will further expand the production. In general, the cooperative’s 
product portfolio is featured as less diversified, centred on the original product, with a 
larger output, a higher surplus per product, and a lower surplus per output unit. The 
IOF has more products in its portfolio, which are far away from the original product, 
with a smaller output, a lower profit per product, and a higher profit per output unit. 
The total surplus of the cooperative and the total profit of the IOF are close. However, 
the farms that deliver raw products to the IOF obtain a much lower profit compared 
with the surplus received by the cooperative member farms.
We capture the competition between different agents in the simulation of the mixed 
duopoly market. The results show that the cooperative still has fewer products in its 
portfolio and a higher total and per product output than the IOF does. Similar to the 
219_Erim Deng BW stand.job
205
results of the monopoly market, the cooperative has a higher surplus per product, 
whereas the IOF has a higher profit per output unit in the duopoly market. However, 
both the cooperative and the IOF are more diversified in the duopoly market than in 
the monopoly market. The reason is that, according to the transition rule, an agent will 
add the new product to its portfolio if the product is in the rival’s portfolio. This 
behaviour increases the chance of adding new products and increases the number of 
products in both agents’ portfolios. It entails that the competition may boost product 
diversification if the agents apply a following strategy. Another impact of the 
competition is that, by keeping a cluster of the IOF’s products close to the original 
product, it prevents the IOF’s portfolio from continuously deviating from the original 
product. Furthermore, it is shown that the cooperative occupies a larger market share 
in the mixed duopoly market. The cooperative that serves the members at cost will 
further expand its market share in the competition with the IOF. The results also show
that the total surplus of the cooperative and the total profit of the IOF are close, but 
both types of the cooperative can improve the member farms’ wellbeing in the 
duopoly market by avoidance of market power.
In order to test the results of the simulation model, in Chapter 9 we empirically 
compare cooperatives and IOFs in terms of their product diversification levels by 
using a dataset from the Netherlands. Our sample consists of a group of Dutch 
cooperatives and publicly listed firms. We compare their product diversification levels 
in two different years. The results show that the product diversification level of Dutch 
cooperatives is lower than that of Dutch publicly listed firms in 2001. However, the 
difference in the product diversification levels between these two types of companies 
is statistically insignificant in 2012. The previous difference in product diversification 
level between cooperatives and publicly listed firms may be explained by the specific 
governance structure characteristics of cooperatives versus corporations. We also 
argue that the disappearance of the difference can be attributed to the substantial 
structural changes of Dutch agricultural cooperatives. Through the adaptation in 
decision rights and income rights allocation, cooperatives may behave similarly to 
corporations in terms of product diversification. On the one hand, the adaptation of the 
decision rights allocation supports cooperatives’ market-oriented strategies and makes 
the decisions for product diversification of easier; on the other hand, many traditional 
cooperatives have restructured their income rights into more individualised forms, 
which enable them to raise sufficient equity for participating in value-added 
processing and product diversification. In sum, due to the changes in cooperatives’ 
governance structure, we argue that some crucial aspects that make cooperatives 
different from corporations may no longer exist in many cooperatives.
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Summary
A marketing cooperative is an enterprise owned by a society of members. Each 
member has an ownership and a transaction relationship with the cooperative. The 
transaction relationship, i.e. products or services are being exchanged between the 
owners and the enterprise they own, is absent in an investor owned firm (IOF). This 
thesis addresses social capital and diversification of cooperatives in a comparative 
institutional approach with the IOF as benchmark.
Part A (Chapters 2 – 7) of this dissertation examines the nature of a marketing 
cooperative by considering both its economic and social attributes. The structural, 
cognitive, and relational social capital constitute the social attributes while the 
economic attributes are represented by the governance structure in terms of decision 
and income rights. A cooperative’s social and economic attributes must be aligned in 
order to obtain organisational efficiency. We argue that, when the social capital level 
in a cooperative changes, the cooperative shall adopt strategies to rebalance its social 
and economic attributes, either by restoring social capital or by changing its 
governance structure. Chapter 2 analyses the different dimensions of social capital in 
the organisational context of cooperatives. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 model the income 
rights structure of cooperatives and its interaction with the relational and structural 
dimension of cooperative social capital. Chapter 6 models the decision rights structure 
of cooperatives by considering the visions of the cooperative CEO and Board of 
Directors, which is related to the cognitive dimension of cooperative social capital. 
The major conclusions are as follows. First, a necessary condition for high product 
quality under cooperative equitable principles is the existence of a high level of social 
capital in the cooperative. However, an income rights structure with stronger quality 
incentives must be adopted by the cooperative to maintain product quality when the 
level of social capital declines. Second, the complete pooling policy is not only 
economically efficient but also socially advantageous when it can stimulate frequent
social interactions among members. However, when the social context of the 
cooperative community is no longer conducive to social interactions, the complete 
pooling policy will become sub-optimal. The cooperative should abandon the pooling 
policy. Third, the combination of decision rights structure and cognitive social capital 
has significant performance implications. Cooperatives with member CEOs are 
upstream focused because of the cascading effect of negative vision biases towards 
downstream projects. When downstream activities become more important, 
cooperatives need to replace the member CEOs with professional CEOs. In sum, Part 
A constructs an analytical framework of cooperative social capital and advances the 
understanding of the interaction between social capital and governance structure. We 
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propose that cooperatives’ social and economic attributes can be understood as the 
equilibrium outcome of the interaction between social capital and governance structure. 
The social context of the cooperative community affects the equilibrium that the 
cooperative will choose. 
Part B (Chapters 8 – 10) of this dissertation attempts to gain a better understanding of 
cooperatives’ product diversification strategies. Two methodologies are applied. In 
Chapter 8, agent-based simulations are adopted to analyse the relationship between 
governance structure and the evolution of product portfolio. The cooperative 
governance structure is featured by the single origin constraint, the double screening in 
decision making, and the objective of maximising upstream and downstream surplus 
jointly. The simulation results show that the cooperative’s product portfolio centres on 
the location of the original product, while the product portfolio of the IOF evolves in 
such a pattern that it consists of clusters of related products that deviate from the 
original product. In addition, the cooperative is less diversified than the IOF but has a 
larger product output. Chapter 9 empirically investigates the influence of governance 
structure on product diversification behaviour by using a dataset from the Netherlands. 
The sample consists of a group of Dutch cooperatives and publicly listed firms. We 
compare the product diversification level of these two types of firms in 2001 and 2012. 
The results show that cooperatives are less diversified than publicly listed companies 
in 2001, whereas the product diversification levels of these two types of companies are 
statistically comparable in 2012. We conclude that, with the flexibility in governance 
structure, cooperatives may actually not behave differently from other types of 
enterprises in terms of product diversification.
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Samenvatting (in Dutch)
Een coöperatie is een bedrijf dat eigendom is van een vereniging van leden. Het 
verschil met eigendom van investeerders is dat elke investeerder slechts een financieel 
belang in het bedrijf heeft, terwijl elk lid van een coöperatie een eigen bedrijf heeft dat 
naast een financiële relatie ook een transactierelatie heeft door middel van levering 
van inputs aan of afname van de productie van het coöperatieve bedrijf. Dit 
proefschrift is gewijd aan sociaal kapitaal en diversificatie in coöperaties in een 
vergelijkende institutionele benadering met de beursgenoteerde onderneming als 
vergelijkingsmaatstaf.
In deel A (hoofdstukken 2-7) van deze dissertatie wordt de aard van een coöperatie 
onderzocht door te kijken naar zowel haar economische als sociale attributen. Het 
relationele, structurele en cognitieve sociale kapitaal vormen de sociale attributen; de 
economische attributen worden vertegenwoordigd door de bestuurlijke structuur in 
termen van beslissings- en inkomensrechten. Om organisatorische efficiëntie te 
bereiken, moeten de sociale en economische attributen binnen een coöperatie op elkaar 
afgestemd zijn. Wij stellen dat de coöperatie een strategie moet hanteren om de balans 
tussen sociale en economische attributen weer in evenwicht te brengen wanneer de 
mate van sociaal kapitaal binnen een coöperatie wijzigt, hetzij door herstel van het 
sociale kapitaal hetzij door wijziging van de bestuurlijke organisatie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de verschillende dimensies van sociaal kapitaal in de 
organisatorische context van coöperaties geanalyseerd. Hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 
modelleren de uitbetalingsstructuur van de coöperatie in relatie tot de relationele en 
structurele dimensies van het sociale kapitaal. Hoofdstuk 6 modelleert de visie van 
respectievelijk de CEO en het bestuur in de besluitvormingsstructuur van coöperaties, 
waarbij de visie betrekking heeft op de cognitieve dimensie van het sociale kapitaal 
van een coöperatie.
De belangrijkste conclusies zijn de volgende. Ten eerste: een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde voor het gelijkheidsprincipe van coöperaties om producten van voldoende 
kwaliteit te leveren is een hoog niveau van sociaal kapitaal binnen de coöperatie. 
Echter, kwaliteit dient onderscheidend te worden beloond om de productkwaliteit te
waarborgen en te behouden, wanneer het niveau van het sociale kapitaal afneemt. Ten 
tweede: het gelijkheidsbeleid is niet alleen economisch efficiënt, maar brengt ook 
sociale voordelen, mits het frequente sociale interacties tussen leden stimuleert. Echter, 
het gelijkheidsprincipe functioneert niet optimaal, als er binnen de sociale context van 
een coöperatie weinig of geen interactie plaatsvindt. In dat geval zal de coöperatie de 
pooling policy moeten laten vallen. 
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Ten derde: de wisselwerking tussen de besluitvormingsstructuur en het cognitieve 
sociale kapitaal heeft significante gevolgen voor de prestaties van een coöperatie. 
Coöperaties waarvan de CEO ook een lid is, zijn stroomopwaarts gericht vanwege het 
cascade-effect van vooringenomen negatieve visies op projecten stroomafwaarts. 
Wanneer stroomafwaartse activiteiten belangrijker worden, dient de coöperatie de uit 
de leden gekozen CEO’s te vervangen door professionele CEO’s. 
Kortom, in deel A wordt een analytisch raamwerk geconstrueerd met betrekking tot 
het sociale kapitaal van een coöperatie en de interactie tussen sociaal kapitaal en 
bestuursstructuur verduidelijkt. Wij stellen dat sociale en economische attributen van 
een coöperatie kunnen worden begrepen als de uitkomst van de wisselwerking tussen
sociaal kapitaal en bestuursstructuur. De sociale context van de coöperatieve 
gemeenschap bepaalt het evenwicht dat de coöperatie kiest. 
In deel B (hoofdstukken 8-10) van deze dissertatie wordt getracht een beter begrip te 
verkrijgen van de productdiversificatiestrategieën van een coöperatie. Twee methoden 
zijn hiervoor toegepast. In hoofdstuk 8 worden agent-gebaseerde simulaties gebruikt 
om de relatie tussen de bestuursstructuur en de evolutie van het diversificatiebeleid te 
analyseren. De bestuurlijke organisatie van een coöperatie wordt gekenmerkt door de 
levering van inputs van de leden, de dubbele controle in het besluitvormingsproces en 
het doel om de winst van het coöperatieve bedrijf en de bedrijven van de leden beide 
te maximaliseren. 
De resultaten van de simulatie laten zien dat het productportfolio van een coöperatie 
zich richt op de het originele product, terwijl een beursgenoteerde onderneming zich 
zodanig ontwikkelt dat het productportfolio bestaat uit clusters van verwante 
producten die afwijken van het originele product. Daarnaast geldt, dat een coöperatie 
weliswaar een minder divers productportfolio heeft dan de beursgenoteerde 
onderneming, maar wel een hogere productie oplevert. 
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt empirisch onderzoek naar de invloed van de bestuursstructuur 
van de onderneming op het diversificatiebeleid gepresenteerd met behulp van 
Nederlandse gegevens. De steekproef bestaat uit een groep van Nederlandse 
coöperaties en beursgenoteerde bedrijven in 2001 en 2012. Wij maken een 
vergelijking tussen het niveau van productiediversificatie van deze twee soorten 
bedrijven in 2001 en 2012. De resultaten laten zien dat coöperaties in 2001 een minder 
divers productportfolio hadden dan beursgenoteerde bedrijven, terwijl de 
productdiversificatie op een statistisch gelijk niveau was in 2012. Wij concluderen dat 
coöperaties zich door hun flexibiliteit in interne bestuursstructuur met betrekking tot 
hun productdiversificatie in feite niet anders hoeven te gedragen dan andere soorten 
ondernemingen.
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l)SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DIVERSIFICATION OF COOPERATIVES 
This thesis contributes to two research streams of the literature regarding marketing
cooperatives, namely, social capital and product diversification. First, the thesis examines
the nature of a marketing cooperative by considering both its economic and social attribu -
tes. Several formal models are formulated to address the interaction between cooperative
governance structure and the different dimensions of cooperative social capital. The coope -
ra tive’s social and economic attributes are viewed as the equilibrium outcome of this
interaction, while the social context of the cooperative community affects the equilibrium
that the cooperative will choose. Second, the governance structure of cooperatives has an
impact on the product diversification. An agent-based simulation shows that the single
origin constraint of a cooperative creates a centralization effect in its product portfolio
evolution, resulting in a lower diversification level and a larger output of the cooperative.
Empirical evidence from the Netherlands shows that cooperatives are less diversified than
publicly listed firms in 2001. However, the diversification level of cooperatives is compar -
able to that of publicly listed firms in 2012. It is concluded that, by making a change in the
governance model in response to changes in the competitive environment, cooperatives
may actually behave not differently from other types of enterprises in terms of product
diversification.
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